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You wish to know where my true loyalties lie?  
Not with any king or queen, but with the people.  
The people who suffer under the despots and prosper under the just rule.  
The people whose hearts you aim to win.1 
 
 
 
 
‒ We need a system where the politicians sit down and discuss the 
problem, agree what’s the interest of all the people, and then do it. 
‒ That’s exactly what we do. The trouble is that people don’t always agree. 
- Well, then they should be made to.2 
 
 
 
 
I am tired of the people with power running this country.  
This is a fight between the people with power and poor people, weak people.  
If I am elected […] those who never had a voice will have a voice.3  
 
 
 
 
There's people in this country who are sick and tired. 
Tired of hearing all the rhetoric, tired of Washington 
failing us while they pat their own backs.  
Finally someone comes along who says what he feels.  
That's why people like him: because say what you want,  
at least he doesn't sound like another politician.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 Varys in Game of Thrones, Season 7, Episode 2. 
2 Anakin Skywalker and Padmé Amidala in Attack of the Clones, 2002. 
3 Pablo Escobar in Narcos, Season 1, Episode 3. 
4 Man in a bar in South Park, Season 20, Episode 3 (on Donald Trump). 
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Abstract 
 
This work points to the importance of different political cultures when studying the social 
acceptability of populist discourses. Following the literature on political and economic 
factors behind the electoral success of populist actors, it remains unexplained why 
populism thrives in certain countries but not in others. This is the case because beyond 
socio-economic and political-institutional factors that trigger populism on the short term, 
one must not forget long-term, cultural elements that might close down or open up the 
window of opportunity for populist discourses. In Western Europe the social acceptability 
of the populist idea of power is linked to the collective memory that a certain country 
developed about the fascist past. In turn, different collective memories produce different 
levels of stigmatization of that past. Where the fascist idea of power is taboo, a no-go 
area, populist discourses are also stigmatized and relegated to the margins of public 
debates. Conversely, populist discourses enjoy a widespread social acceptability in 
countries where the fascist past is not stigmatized. The fascist past resonates with the 
populist present because populism and fascism share several illiberal elements. As soon 
as a strong stigma is attached to the fascist past, also the populist idea of power is 
considered as a threat to several pillars of liberal democracy such as pluralism, minority 
rights, and division of powers. This study stresses the relevance of long lasting cultural 
elements in the study of populism's social acceptability, and develops a new typology of 
collective memory that can explain the degree of stigma of the fascist past in eight West 
European countries, and therefore the social acceptability of populist discourses.  
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Each country's type of collective memory is analyzed through the study of the relevant 
literature, and finally a level of stigmatization of the fascist past is attributed to each 
country. Moreover, a content analysis of 173 party manifestos is performed in order to 
obtain a measure for the social acceptability of populist discourses over four decades 
combining the percentage of populist statements in manifestos with the vote share and 
degree of radicalism of each party. Four conditions usually associated with the electoral 
success of populist actors are tested, but the results of a QCA analysis show that these 
four elements fail to explain why populism is socially acceptable in certain countries while 
it remains taboo in others. Economic performance, levels of corruption, ideological 
convergence of the political spectrum, accountability and responsiveness of the 
democratic system: all this factors cannot explain the social acceptability of populist 
discourses across countries. It means that some unobserved, latent factors have been 
left out of the picture. For this reason, the analysis is repeated one more time with the 
inclusion of a new, crucial factor: the levels of stigma of the fascist past. The findings 
clearly point to the fact that right-wing populism is more or less acceptable in different 
countries according to the degree of stigma associated to the fascist past. This confirms 
the importance of national political cultures in defining which ideas of power are socially 
acceptable and which ones are, conversely, taboo and stigmatized. The social 
acceptability of populism, and in particular of right-wing populism, is therefore linked to a 
combination of short-term contingent factors and long-term cultural elements.  
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Introduction – Populism and the Fascist Legacy 
 
It is difficult to fully grasp the current wave of populism in Western Europe because 
short-term economic and political factors often fail to explain the social acceptability 
of populist discourses across countries. While the vast majority of studies point to 
contingent demand and supply side factors that are supposed to explain the 
electoral success of populist discourses, this study shows the importance of 
considering populism from a long-term perspective in order to understand its social 
acceptability. The populist idea of power is circulating in every public debate across 
Europe, but its social acceptability is strongly determined by cultural elements.  
 
Without this historical approach, it would be impossible to explain why populism is 
socially acceptable in certain countries while it is taboo in others. The presence of 
high levels of corruption combined with a poor economic performance and growing 
inequalities, for example, might not lead to the success of populist discourses. 
Similarly, in a country with a growing economy and a responsive political system 
there might be the presence of several and successful populist actors. This can only 
be explained by adopting a long-term perspective that focuses on the stigma 
generated by different collective memories of the fascist past. Only in this way it is 
possible to make sense of the different levels of populism's social acceptability 
across West European countries. 
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Naturally, long-term legacies that determine the Salonfähigkeit of populism always 
interact with short-term socio-economic and political-institutional factors. It is impossible 
to ignore that in Western Europe populist movements, parties, and leaders often settle 
the political debate and obtain remarkable electoral results. Populist discourses have 
become mainstream in liberal democracies to the point that the political climate 
characterizing the last two decades has been described as populist Zeitgeist.5 When the 
political system is perceived as ‘out of touch’ and isolated in its ivory tower, and those in 
power do not deliver on their promises, citizens want to be heard and to hold their 
representatives accountable. If the media add fuel to the fire of supranational integration 
and refugee crisis, the perfect cocktail is served, and populism becomes a very effective 
way to mobilize resentment by offering redemption from the old politics and by exploiting 
the fears of constituencies disoriented by modernization.  
 
This means that when trying to understand the mechanisms determining the social 
acceptability of populist discourses across countries, one must constantly bear in mind 
that populism is increasingly successful in elections and often accepted in the political 
debate. Indeed, the data examined in this work confirm a growing presence of populist 
discourses in West European party manifestos. This indicates that short-term supply and 
demand side conditions are favourable for populism to thrive.  
 
In times of protracted economic crisis and deterioration of the credibility of political parties 
and institutions, the growing political weight of populist actors should not come as a 
                                                           
5 Mudde (2004). 
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surprise. Indeed, populism gains traction when the gap between representatives and 
represented grows to a critical point, which is why it can be considered as a potential 
"barometer" of the health of representative politics (Taggart 2002, 71): high levels of 
populism might indicate the malfunctioning of liberal and constitutional democratic 
mechanisms. Moreover, by observing previous waves of populism one can notice that 
socio-economic turbulence and political transformations have always been key factors for 
the success of populism. If one considers that the last three decades in Western Europe 
have been marked by the Great Recession, the process of supranational integration, and 
the flow of migrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa, the boisterous success of 
populism becomes the obvious ending of a well-known story rather than a flash in the 
pan.  
 
Socio-economic and political-institutional factors, however, are only a part of the 
explanation and they must be considered in interaction with the national political culture 
of each country, which can either prevent or foster the social acceptability of populism. 
Indeed, it is remarkable to observe that the social acceptability of populist discourses 
greatly varies across countries which are experiencing the same transformations and 
turbulences with a similar timing. This suggests that in certain countries populism does 
not thrive despite the presence of favourable conditions, and vice versa. While certain 
countries can be considered as 'populist paradises' (e.g. Italy, Switzerland, Austria), in 
other countries populist discourses do not have enough legitimacy to leave the periphery 
of the public debate and become a credible alternative (e.g. Sweden, Germany). Why is 
that the case?  
4 
 
 
To better understand the cross-country variation of populism's social acceptability one 
must observe how short-term social, economic, and political factors interact with cultural 
elements. In particular, different collective memories of the fascist past can open up or, 
conversely, close down windows of opportunity for the social acceptability of populist 
discourses. By observing different re-elaborations of that past it is possible to determine 
the degree of stigma attached to it, and therefore the Salonfähigkeit of populist discourses 
in a given society. This explains why populist discourses are widespread and electorally 
successful in countries where short-term factors seem unfavourable, and vice versa.  
 
The degree of stigmatization of the fascist past is determined by four different types of re-
elaboration: culpabilizaiton, heroizaition, cancellation, and victimization. In countries 
characterized by victimization – producing a very low degree of stigma of the fascist past 
– populism is particularly acceptable. By contrast, in countries characterized by 
culpabilization – producing a very high degree of stigma – populism is taboo and therefore 
socially unacceptable, at the margins of the public debate.  
 
It is not surprising to observe that, in particular, it is the social acceptability of right-wing 
populism that proves to be highly linked to the levels of stigma of the fascist past. Indeed, 
the authoritarian past in Western Europe is represented by the fascist regimes in power 
in Italy in Germany between 1922 and 1945.6 Countries which did not deal with the fascist 
                                                           
6 In Portugal António Salazar remained in power until 1974 and Francisco Franco in Spain until 
1975. However, the memories of these two regimes after 1945 follow a different trajectory 
compared to the one relevant for the present study. 
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legacy in a profound and responsible manner are therefore supposed to constitute a fertile 
ground for right-wing populism to thrive, and vice versa.  
 
For example, while Germany took responsibility for its past and admitted its guilt (a 
process called Vergangenheitsbewältigung), Austria shifted the blame and refused to 
critically deal with its past. These two opposite types of collective memory produce 
respectively a very high and very low degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements. Given 
the fact that the two countries have similar levels of, say, economic development or 
accountability and responsiveness of the political system, one can hypothesize that their 
different types of collective memories about the fascist past respectively trigger and block 
the social acceptability of populism. 
 
A key element of this argument is represented by the elective affinities between populism 
and fascism. On the one hand, the two are extremely different phenomena and the aim 
is not to collapse the two concepts on each other to the point of making them 
undistinguishable.7 What matters here is the fact that the populist idea of power is often 
portrayed as a dangerous political ideology vis-à-vis liberal and constitutional ideas of 
power precisely because of its illiberal elements, which strongly resonate with certain 
traits of the fascist idea of power in contrast to liberal and constitutional democracy.  
 
                                                           
7 For example, contrary to populism, fascism also includes para-militarism, corporatism and 
imperialism. Similarities and differences between populism and fascism are thoroughly discussed 
by Eatwell (2017). Among other things, the author argues that, unlike fascism, populism is a form 
of democracy, albeit not liberal democracy. 
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This negative characterization of populism is very much present in the European 
collective imagination. Politicians accused of being populist are often implicitly linked to 
the cumbersome legacy of the twentieth century, hence to the absence of democracy.8 
Indeed, the term populist is often evoked in European politics in order to label someone 
as an anti-democratic demagogue, and populism is ultimately seen as a proto-totalitarian 
and illiberal ideology, because the populist idea of power is at odds with the liberal and 
constitutional types of democracies which became dominant in Western Europe in the 
aftermath of World War II.9 
 
The tension between liberal and populist ideas of power is the expression of opposite 
types of democratic qualities: rule of law versus majoritarianism; checks and balances 
versus unmediated exercise of power; constitutionalism versus unconstrained will of the 
people; division versus concentration of powers.10 The fascist past resonates as soon as 
politicians articulate one of these points and criticize representative politics.  
 
This study does not constitute the first attempt to explain cross-country and longitudinal 
variations in the presence of populism. Nonetheless, it displays three innovative elements 
concerning, respectively, the measurement of populist messages, the amplitude of the 
                                                           
8 In 2012, then EU President Herman van Rompuy and then European Commission President 
Barroso, warned against the danger for democracy represented by populism, followed by German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, and Prime Minister of Norway 
Erna Solberg. 
9 As it will become evident in Chapter 1, whether or not populism is a threat depends on the 
normative idea of democracy used as a yardstick for comparison. 
10 Slater speaks of a "tension between democratic inclusivity and democratic constraints", and of 
a "friction between vertical and horizontal accountability" to describe the relationship between 
different ideas of democracy based on different levels of liberalism (2013, 732). 
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data used for the analysis, and the introduction of a novel condition linked to the presence 
of populism. First, the discursive dimension of populism is taken into consideration. This 
means that the phenomenon to be explained is the Salonfähigkeit or social acceptability 
of populist discourses, measured as the combination of levels of populism in party 
manifestos, the parties' degree of radicalism and their electoral performance. Second, the 
presence of populist discourses is measured in eight West European countries since the 
1970s through an extensive content analysis of 173 party manifestos.11 Third, this study 
introduces the idea that collective memories are connected to the social acceptability of 
populism and starts from the assumption that socio-economic and political-institutional 
factors are complementary to cultural opportunity structures in explaining different levels 
of populist discourses. 
 
Structure of the dissertation 
 
The structure of this work follows several steps in order to test whether the levels of stigma 
of the fascist past – in interaction with traditional demand and supply side factors – can 
explain the social acceptability of populism. The first task consists in illustrating the 
theoretical framework used in order to operationalize and measure populism, as well as 
the link between the populist idea of power, fascism and liberal democracy (Chapter 1). 
Once clarified how populism is understood and conceptualized, Chapter 2 presents the 
existing literature about the conditions that are supposed to explain the electoral success 
                                                           
11 Such an extensive content analysis has been possible thanks to the NCCR Democracy 
program: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century (Module 2: Populism in the Context of 
Globalization and Mediatization). 
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of radical right-wing parties. This literature, however, focuses on a mono-dimensional idea 
of populism as a right-wing and often extremist political ideology. Moreover, short-term 
supply and demand side factors appear to leave unexplained part of the cross-country 
variation in terms of populism's social acceptability. Hence it is introduced the idea that 
different collective memories determine different degrees of stigmatization or acceptation 
of populism and therefore play a role in triggering or blocking the social acceptability of 
populist discourses (Chapter 3). 
 
The research design is presented in Chapter 4. It provides all the details concerning the 
operationalization and measurement of populist discourses in party manifestos, a 
discussion of the case selection, and a brief description of the methodology implemented. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the content analysis and offers an overview of the 
presence of populism. The percentage of populist statements in party manifestos is 
weighted by the vote share and degree of radicalism of each party, thus providing a 
measure for the social acceptability of populism across countries and over time. Chapter 
6 presents the relevant literature about each country's type of re-elaboration in order to 
establish, for each case, the overall level of stigmatization of the fascist past.  
 
Chapter 7 tests the role of several conditions usually associated to the electoral success 
of populism. Derived from the literature review presented in Chapter 2, these supply and 
demand side factors are supposed to trigger the social acceptability of populism. The 
analysis assesses the presence of sufficient and necessary conditions for the social 
acceptability of populist messages in eight West European countries over the last three 
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decades. Chapter 8 finally tests the impact of the degree of stigma associated to the 
fascist past. It shows to what extent long-term cultural factors are essential in explaining 
the social acceptability of populist discourses. The Conclusions aim at proposing 
directions for future research as well as to assess the generalizability of the findings 
outside Western Europe.  
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Chapter 1 – Taxonomy of a Chameleon: the Populist Idea of Power 
 
This chapter aims at clarifying the object of this study. It is essential to situate the chosen 
approach to populism among the burgeoning literature on the topic, which originates from 
different disciplines and relies on different concepts. What is populism, and how can its 
presence be measured in party manifestos? How is it possible to understand the 
relationship between populism and democracy, and how does this impact the possible 
explanatory models for its social acceptability?  
 
Christoph Blocher in Switzerland and Beppe Grillo in Italy, Nigel Farage in the United 
Kingdom as well as Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France – despite being erratically positioned 
along the right-left and authoritarian-libertarian (or GAL-TAN) axes – share a common 
element: they articulate populist discourses. They express an ideology, a vision of the 
world, which on the one hand celebrates the common people as the only legitimate source 
of power, and on the other hand represents the economic, cultural, and political elites as 
the enemy, the cancer of society, a clique of intrigues and corruption which must leave 
the stage to the vox populi. This logic entails that only the truly populist leaders and parties 
may redeem the common people and implement radical, direct, or simply legitimate forms 
of democracy.  
 
Given the gargantuan variety of approaches to populism, however, the popular use of the 
term is often inaccurate or misleading: the misuse and abuse of the term have contributed 
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to increase its aura of elusive concept.12 Even inside academia there has been much tug-
of-war around definitions and applications, and the impression is that since the seminal 
work of Ionescu and Gellner (1969) the fuzziness has done nothing but increasing. 
Populism seemed to be the Teumessian Fox of the Greek mythology, destined never to 
be caught. Since the 1960s, scholars have been baffled by the "chameleonic" nature and 
"conceptual slipperiness" of populism (Taggart 2000). Isaiah Berlin argued that studies 
about populism suffer of the "Cinderella complex": 
 
There exists a shoe – the word “populism” – for which somewhere exists a foot. There are 
all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. 
The prince is always wandering about with the shoe; and somewhere, we feel sure, there 
awaits a limb called pure populism.13 
 
The concept of populism has become increasingly present in the public debate also 
because of its slipperiness and adaptability to several contexts. It is erroneously used as 
a synonym for nationalism, anti-elitism and chauvinism, but also to denote simplistic or 
even vulgar political positions. Duncan McDonnell and Ben Stanley have dubbed the term 
“schmopulism” to describe the fact that “populism” has become a popular buzzword in 
media and academia alike.  
                                                           
12 For an interesting study concerning the use of the term in the British media: Bale, van Kessel, 
and Taggart (2011). A telling statement form Moffitt and Tormey (2014, 382) reads as follows: "It 
is an axiomatic feature of literature on the topic to acknowledge the contested nature of populism 
[…], and more recently the literature has reached a whole new level of meta-reflexivity, where it 
is posited that it has become common to acknowledge the acknowledgment of this fact." 
13 Quoted by Margaret Canovan (Canovan 1981, 7). 
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Figure 1: Populism in Newspaper Articles and Academic Journals 
 
 
Figure 1 shows how scholars and journalists have started talking about populism more 
than ever before.14 In newspaper articles (plot on the left), the term started gaining 
popularity since the 1990s, then it grew steadily, and in just one year (between 2015 and 
2016) the term became literally ubiquitous, with a jump from around 34,000 articles 
mentioning the term to more than 65,000 articles. The development in academic peer-
                                                           
14 Both plots show the number of articles mentioning populism or relate terms (populis* or populist* 
or populism*) in six languages (English, German, French, Italian, Swedish, and Dutch) between 
1969 and 2016. On the left, through Factiva, the major newspapers are included (the pre-1985 
levels are particularly low also because only a few newspaper articles are available, but what 
matters most is the increase after 2010). On the right, through Web of Science, the major 
academic peer-reviewed journals are considered. 
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reviewed journals is similar, although the term populism already appears in a significant 
number of articles since the 1970s. From the 2000s, the growth has become phenomenal: 
57 articles in 1999 became 446 in 2016. This is just a rough measure that anyway 
contributes to understand to what extent populism has become one of the most discussed 
topics both inside and outside academia in Western Europe.  
 
Top avoid any conceptual slipperiness and in order to adopt a clear theoretical framework, 
this study situates itself in a precise strand of literature, which considers populism as an 
ideology – or a worldview – articulated discursively. This conceptualization has provided 
a theoretical and analytical toolbox which finally allows studying populism in a consistent 
and comparative way. The next sections expose the extreme variability of populist 
discourses in order to grasp its ideological essence and eventually propose a minimal 
definition, which will constitute the base for the operationalization and measurement of 
populism in Chapter 4. Next, it is clarified the relationship between populism and liberal 
democracy, and which elements of the populist idea of power resonate with the fascist 
past. 
 
Populism in historical perspective 
 
From a populist perspective true democracy, the rule (krátos) of the people (demos) exists 
only when the will of the common people is respected as sovereign.15 It follows that 
                                                           
15 Themistocles, Athenian politician and general, is sometimes described as a paleo-populist 
since he decided to move to Keramikos, a down-market part of Athens, in order to be perceived 
14 
 
populism becomes successful especially because it promises to introduce (or restore) 
accountability and responsiveness by involving the people in the decision-making 
process, thus reviving the idea of direct democracy introduced in Ancient Athens 25 
centuries ago.16 However, political structures such as the Greek poleis do not exist 
anymore, and direct democracy in the context of nation-states is not at stake (R. Dahl 
1989).  
 
Several historical manifestations of modern populism across the world show that the 
centrality of the people is constantly evoked in times of rapid socio-economic and political 
developments which leave large portions of the population without a credible 
representation of their interests. Globalization and modernization constitute the two main 
triggers for the formation of a breeding ground for populism not only in the 21st century, 
but throughout history.  
 
For example, both agrarian populism and anti-Catholic nativism in 19th century United 
States developed in times of socioeconomic turmoil as a response to the profound 
socioeconomic and cultural challenges of the time (Swank and Betz 2003). The Russian 
Narodniki17, around 1860s and 1870s, originated from similar socio-economic conditions: 
                                                           
as a man of the people. According to Plutarch, his role of attorney and arbitrator gained him further 
popularity among the hoi polloi (the many, the majority). 
16 The negative connotation of the word ‘Idios’ (the Greek term for ‘private person’), speaks 
volumes about the political role of the citizens in Ancient Athens. However, 'direct' does not mean 
'inclusive'. In fact, it was a very restrictive idea of democracy. It excluded women, slaves and 
those who did not have the Athenian citizenship. 
17 Narodniki comes from the Russian word “narod”, translatable as “people”, “folk”.  
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a group of intellectuals tried to convince the peasantry to fight an egalitarian struggle 
aiming at land redistribution, believing in the peasants’ inherent socialism (Pedler 1927).18  
 
Völkish movements19,which developed in 19th century Germany as a mix of populism, 
Romantic Nationalism and German folklore (Trägårdh 2002; Olsen 1999) were the 
expression of an anti-modernity reaction to the Industrial revolution. Kurlander (2002, 36) 
argues that, in order to survive, liberalism in Germany had to become völkish, and 
eventually created the space for the emergence of National Socialism.20 Similarly, in 
Austria and France, at the end of the 19th century, right-wing populist actors such as Karl 
Lueger and Georges Ernest Boulanger became very popular.  
 
Since the 1970s populism resurfaced in Europe in its right-wing, nativist form as a reaction 
to the New Left and to the de-industrialization process, insisting on issues positioned on 
the cultural axis of competition such as immigration, crime, and nationalism. Parties such 
as the Front National in France, the Danish People’s Party, and the Vlaams Belang in 
Belgium mobilized disillusioned constituencies in opposition to the mainstream parties 
and the political, economic and cultural elites while proposing an ethnocentric vision of 
the people. In the following years, many other populist parties with a similar agenda 
emerged all over Europe, such as the Sweden Democrats, the United Kingdom 
                                                           
18 This makes of the ‘Narodniki’ one of the rare examples of exclusively top-down populist 
movements. 
19 From the German word ‘Volk’, again translatable as ‘people’. 
20 "[…] in so far as German liberalism was universalist and inclusive, it was ultimately rejected by 
a völkish constituency. Conversely, in so far as the liberals assimilated and promoted certain 
tenets of the völkish Weltanschauung, German liberalism clearly helped to pave the way for Hitler 
and National Socialism." 
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Independence Party, and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. This is the most 
studied and best documented wave of populism, and it generated such a tremendous 
attention that it often overshadowed every other historical populist manifestation.21 As a 
result, extreme and radical right-wing populism became a (wrong and misleading) 
synonym for populism tout court.  
 
More recently, growing attention has been devoted also to left-wing populist movements 
and parties such as Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece (Stavrakakis and 
Katsambekis 2014), or the Occupy movements (Pickerill 2015). These political 
experiences gained traction in the context of a protracted and generalized economic crisis 
by proposing to fight inequalities and corruption and to restore the sovereignty of the 
people vis-à-vis supranational economic institutions.  
 
This far from exhaustive historical overview – which focuses mainly on Europe while 
ignoring many other populist manifestations in Asia, Latin America and Africa – clarifies 
how heterogeneous populism can be and in how many different organizational and 
ideological ways it can be declined. The purpose was to illustrate the extreme variability 
of parties and movements articulating populist discourses in order to understand which is 
the lowest common denominator and therefore propose a minimal definition of populism 
which allows to study the phenomenon in a comparative and longitudinal way (Rooduijn 
2014b).  
 
                                                           
21 To mention a few among others: Betz (1994); Kitschelt (1995); Kazin (1995); Taggart (1995); 
Rydgren (2005); Mudde (2007). 
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Populism: its ideological dimension and a minimal definition 
 
This study, in order to analyse the presence of populism in several countries over time, 
adopts the ideational approach proposed by Mudde (2004). This represents to best way 
to grasp the essence a political phenomenon which varies so heavily over time and across 
countries. If the last section illustrated the populist phenomenon by exposing some of its 
manifold empirical manifestations, this sections aims at re-composing the idea of 
populism by following the fil rouge which allows identifying its ideological core.  
 
Every populist manifestation in first place shares the same idea of power. Only on a 
second stage, it matters whether a particular manifestation of populism follows a right-
wing or left-wing agenda, if it is a bottom-up movement or a top-down project, if it relies 
on a charismatic leader or not, if it opposes or proposes certain policies, whether it stands 
in government or in opposition. The aim of this study consists in understanding the 
conditions triggering the social acceptability of populist discourses across eight West 
European countries, and for this purpose it is essential to identify a set of common 
elements that characterize every empirical, and in particular discursive, manifestation of 
populism.22  
 
                                                           
22 The framework of analysis must be at the same time precise and flexible enough to include 
every instance of populism while excluding other types of discourses, this avoiding both type I 
and type II errors. 
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For this purpose, the ideational approach appears to be the most suitable and 
convincing.23 It defines populism as a particular ideology or worldview based on a 
Manichean distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite. Since it entails a 
very narrow set of ideas, populism is often described as a thin-centred ideology. In order 
to gain political depth, thin-centred ideologies such as populism are most commonly 
combined with more developed political ideologies such as socialism, nativism, or 
liberalism, depending upon the specific socio-political context and the type of actor 
articulating them.24 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012, 12) claim that "in practice, 
populism is almost always combined with one or more other ideological features". This 
study adopts the ideational approach and therefore identifies populism as a combination 
of people-centrism and anti-elitism. This leads to the following definition (Wirth et al. 2016, 
15)25:  
 
Populism is a thin-centered ideology, which considers – in a Manichean outlook – society 
to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and postulates unrestricted sovereignty of the people. 
 
                                                           
23 On this point there seems to be quite a large consensus among scholars: Jagers and Walgrave 
(2007); Stanley (2008); Hawkins (2009; 2010); Pauwles (2011); Rooduijn et al. (2012) to mention 
just a few. 
24 The combination of a thin (populist) ideology with a thick (or full) one, describes the vast majority 
of populist manifestations. Indeed, it is very rare to find populism in its purely thin form. The case 
of the Five Star Movement could go in this direction, since the party refuses to be labeled as right 
or left-wing and indeed seems to rely on a vague post-ideological approach. On this topic: 
Manucci and Amsler (forthcoming). 
25 The is definition of populism, used by the whole module on Populism in the Context of 
Globalization and Mediatization of the NCCR Democracy program, is mainly derived from 
Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008) and Mudde (2004). 
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The ideational approach, compared to the other existing ones, presents a main 
advantage: since it conceives populism as a set of ideas, it become possible to clearly 
assess whether an actor is articulating a populist discourse.26 Indeed, the populist 
ideology becomes measurable as soon as an actor articulates it discursively.27 Moreover, 
it overcomes the typical dichotomous classification of political actors and journalists as 
either populist or not. In fact, it reflects the spectrum of different levels and varieties of 
populist discourses (Deegan Krause and Haughton 2009; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van 
der Brug 2014).  
 
Populism is therefore understood as a type of discourse available to every political actor, 
who can employ "populism as a flexible mode of persuasion to redefine the people and 
their adversaries" (Panizza 2005, 8). This does not imply that every actor should be 
labelled as populist: at the empirical level, researchers can draw a distinction between 
populist or non-populist actors by establishing how often a certain actor has to articulate 
anti-elitist and people-centric messages in ordered to be labelled as a populist. On the 
other hand, it becomes possible to establish that an actor is more populist than another 
and that their discourses are populist in different ways because they use different rhetoric 
strategies and are attached to different full ideologies. In this study, the aim is to establish 
                                                           
26 Other approaches, for example, define populism in stylistic terms (Kazin 1995), according to its 
organizational features (Weyland 2001) or as a type of mobilization (Jansen 2011). 
27 This can happen among other ways through speeches (Hawkins 2009), party manifestos 
(Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011), newspaper articles (Rooduijn 2014), but also interviews and 
parliamentary discussions. Moreover, different types of actors can articulate populist discourses: 
while politicians and journalists play a crucial role in circulating populism in the public debate, also 
common people as well as celebrities, representatives of NGOs and famous brands or other 
organizations can articulate populist discourses. 
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when a certain country – at a certain time in point – displays a high social acceptability of 
populism.28  
 
After having defined populism as a thin-centred ideology that can be articulated 
discursively, a definition that encompasses all the historical manifestations of populism, 
it is essential to describe the populist idea of power and how this is in conflict with liberal 
and constitutional ideas of power. Hence, the next sections present the relationship 
between the elite and the people as antagonistic elements of society in the populist 
ideology, as well as the substantial differences between the populist idea of power and 
liberal democracy. These aspects must be discussed for two reasons. First, they are 
central for the development of the argument presented in Chapter 3 because they clarify 
the link between populism and illiberal ideas of power and therefore the link between the 
fascist past and the present social acceptability of populism. Second, they clarify the 
operationalization of populism presented in Chapter 4.  
 
The people and the elite 
 
By following the ideational approach and therefore defining populism as a thin-centred 
ideology, it follows that the categories of ‘people’ and ‘elite’ can assume different 
connotations over time and across cases or, to say that à la Laclau, the elite and the 
people remain "floating signifiers" (2005). In other words, the full ideology attached to 
                                                           
28 The methodological aspects concerning calibration are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and in 
the section Operationalization and calibration of Chapter 7. 
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populism defines how the social cleavage between the pure people and the corrupt elite 
is declined. While the cleavage is a constant element of the populist ideology, it can be 
interpreted in many different ways by different actors by excluding different portions of the 
demos and targeting different kinds of elites. The Manichean opposition between good 
and evil remains, but the boundaries of inclusion and exclusions vary. 
 
At the center of the populist worldview there is the idea of demos, and consequently 
demoticism (closeness to the ordinary people). The people is characterized as a 
homogeneous entity expressing a common will, or volonté générale. Moreover, the 
people is often portrayed as a virtuous and inherently good group, and its will constitutes 
the only source of legitimacy and authentic democracy (March 2011; Stanley 2008; 
Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Kriesi 2014; Taggart 2000). The duty of populist 
politicians is to embody and implement the vox populi in the most direct and faithful way. 
Indeed, only populist politicians are supposed to instinctively know what the people want 
and can voice their needs. As Pasquino noticed, "populist leaders do not represent the 
people, rather they consider themselves – and succeed in being considered – an integral 
part of the people. They are of the people" (2007, 21–22). 
 
When the thin populist ideology is associated to a full ideology, usually it becomes explicit 
who belongs to the demos and who does not: a more or less net division line is 
established between 'us' and 'them'. In general, it is possible to identify three different 
conceptions of the people which refer to three different social dimensions: political, 
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cultural, and economic.29 In empirical terms, the three conceptions of the people are not 
necessarily distinguished. In fact, they might be combined in a single populist discourse 
and potentially they can even be present all at the same time. 
 
Politically, populism identifies the people as sovereign. Therefore there is a perfect 
overlapping between the people and the demos: all the people are included.30 This is 
generally the most inclusive articulation of populism, although its conceptualization 
greatly varies across countries and over time. The cultural conception considers the 
people in an ethnic sense: in fact, the people is not understood as demos but rather as 
ethnos, and the dividing line excludes part of the national community such as migrants 
and other minorities, considered as aliens or outsiders. This is normally the most 
exclusionary articulation of the boundary of the demos, and it is typically interpreted by 
extreme right-wing populist parties. The economic conception describes the people as a 
class and distinguishes between ‘ordinary people’ and the rich ones (or the ‘one percent’), 
in other words it draws the line between the privileged and the common ones. Similar to 
the political conception it is rather inclusive, but the dividing line here is articulated on the 
economic axis, and it is particularly common among – but not exclusive of – left-wing 
populist parties. As illustrated by the historical excursus presented sopra, different 
conceptions of the people are articulated by different actors according to different social-
political contexts, but the opposition 'people vs elite' remains constant. 
                                                           
29 In the historical manifestations of populism presented in the section Populism in historical 
perspective it is possible to identify each of the main conceptions of demos presented here. 
30 With a caveat: all the people belonging to a certain territory (generally a country, but also 
existing and even imaginary regions – like Padania in Italy) are included. Theoretically, there 
might be forms of transnational populism, but empirical examples lack in this sense. 
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As in every ‘good and evil’ dichotomy, while the people are the collective hero there must 
be a (collective) villain of the story: in this case, the elites. Indeed, they are often portrayed 
as corrupt or conspiring, while their members are generally considered as unaccountable 
and incompetent (Jansen 2011; Hawkins 2009; Rooduijn 2013). Mudde (2004, 544) 
incisively defined the populist interpretation of the elites as the people’s nemesis.  
 
Similarly to the concept of people, also the concept of elite can be declined in different 
ways. It can refer to a political dimension, and in this case it might include the government 
as well as mainstream parties and other national and international actors. It can refer to 
a cultural dimension, thus including the mass media system, as well as writers and more 
generally the intelligentsia. Moreover, the elite can be defined in economic terms and 
refer to bankers, managers, and generally speaking to national and international 
economic institutions. As illustrated by the historical excursus presented sopra, different 
elites are targeted according to different social-political contexts. Once again, however, 
they are always portrayed as having interests and values opposed to those of the 
common people. 
 
Populism and democracy 
 
Based on the definition of populism provided sopra, it is now possible to highlight the 
differences between the populist idea of democracy compared to the liberal (or 
constitutional) one. First of all, the two counterparts of populism must be identified: elitism 
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and pluralism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Caramani 2017). Like populism, 
elitism splits society in two homogenous parts, but operates a symmetric division: it 
praises the elites and considers the people as incapable of making informed decisions. 
Pluralism, on the other hand, opposes the Manichean perspective present in populism, 
and considers diversity of opinions and compromises as a value.  
 
The lack of pluralism in the populist idea of power made several authors conclude that 
populism can threaten (or be disadvantageous for) democracy, thus constituting a 
‘syndrome’ or a ‘pathology’ (Taggart 2002; Pasquino 2005; Rosanvallon 2008). Others, 
on the contrary, argued that the presence of anti-elitism entails a watchdog-type of 
relationship between those in power and the opposition, and for this reason populism 
should be rather considered as a corrective or at least an intrinsic part of democracy, thus 
being its ‘shadow’ or ‘mirror’ (Tännsjö 1992; Canovan 1999; Arditi 2004; Laclau 2005; 
Panizza 2005). 
 
This long-lasting academic controversy is particularly slippery, mainly because the debate 
is framed in a wrong way. The point is not whether populism constitutes a threat or a 
corrective for democracy, but rather to what extent different types of populism can have 
a positive or negative impact on different forms of democracy. For this reason it is 
advisable to follow Rovira Kaltwasser’s argument about the necessity of a minimal 
approach: populism represents a threat from a liberal perspective on democracy and a 
corrective from a radical perspective (2012). Consequently, different ideas about the 
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relationship between democracy and populism are too strongly based on normative 
assumptions about democracy itself.  
 
This study however is not purely theoretical. Since it focuses on the presence of populism 
in Western Europe since the 1970s, the debate focuses mainly on the potential threat that 
extreme right-wing populism can represent for liberal democracy. As Dahl pointed out, a 
populist democracy differs from a liberal "Madisonian" democracy in its disregard of 
constitutionalist elements such as the rule of law, the division of power, and the respect 
for the rights of minorities (1956). In a similar vein, Abts and Rummens (2007) observed 
that the populist demand for unrestricted power of the people distinguishes the populist 
idea of democracy from constitutional and liberal logics of democracy. Also Mény and 
Surel (2002, 10) highlighted the fact that populism is against counterweights to the 
unbalanced supremacy of the people including "enforceable human rights, constitutional 
courts, the territorial and functional division of powers, and the autonomy of the central 
banks". These positions are effectively summarized by Pappas (2014) who defined 
populism as "democratic illiberalism" (although populism is not necessarily combined with 
democratic features). 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the traits of the populist idea of power that are inherently illiberal 
and that therefore are in contrast with a liberal and constitutional idea of power. The link 
between the populist and the fascist idea of power rests upon the illiberal elements they 
have in common, and for this reason it is possible to hypothesize that the present social 
acceptability of populism is linked to the collective re-elaboration of the fascist past. 
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Figure 2: Populist Democracy and its Illiberal Elements 
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   No pluralism 
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 No division of 
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 Link to the Illiberal 
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This does not imply that populism is a threat for democracy per se, but since it is inherently 
based on illiberal elements it strongly challenges the only form of democracy present in 
Western Europe since 1945: liberal and constitutional democracy.  
 
It is interesting to observe the relationship between populism and liberal democracy 
because they are deeply in tension: for example, populism constitutes an effective critique 
of liberal democracy because it highlights some of it shortcomings, pitfalls, and paradoxes 
such as lack of direct democracy, the process of cartelization of political parties and their 
corruption. This is possible because populism opposes to two pillars of liberal democracy: 
27 
 
the rule of law, as well as the protection of individual and minorities rights (Plattner 2010). 
The implementation of the populist idea of power on the one hand would solve the 
tension31 inherent to liberal democracy, but on the other hand it would also foster a model 
where the protection of minority rights is replaced by the indisputable decision of the 
majority and potential conflicts are thus solved through a purely majoritarian approach 
targeting the 'common good' as final goal.  
 
If there is any lesson that European politicians should have assimilated form the tragic 
events that led to World War II, the respect of minority rights and the importance of the 
rule of law are two of the most important ones. For this reason the populist idea of power 
is often rejected by institutions and political actors and it is perceived as a dangerous 
ideology that might threaten some of the key Western values developed as a reaction to 
the barbarism of World War II and the Holocaust. Müller (2016) argues that European 
political systems were built on a distrust of popular sovereignty fueled by the experience 
of fascism. Importantly, however, he maintains that politicians and the media should 
address the issues raised by populists not by ignoring or excluding them but by 
challenging their framing. In other words, by taking the liberal and democratic principles 
more seriously. 
 
                                                           
31 The paradox is based on the coexistence of a democratic pillar and a liberal pillar. This implies 
that even if every person belonging to the demos has equal rights (liberal pillar), on the other hand 
it must be established who belongs to the demos and who does not (democratic pillar), and this 
inevitably triggers inequality. "What cannot be contestable in a liberal democracy is based on the 
idea that it is legitimate to establish limits to popular sovereignty in the name of liberty. Hence its 
paradoxical nature" (Mouffe 2000, 4). Moreover, as Abts and Rummens argued, "populist 
resentments arise when constitutional democracy is perceived to be out of balance in favour of 
the constitutional pillar" (2007, 410). 
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Chapter 2 – The Natural Habitat of Populism: Favourable Conditions and Triggers 
 
This chapter presents a detailed literature review of both supply side and demand side 
factors usually identified as triggering populism. The first section illustrates the theoretical 
framework linking the presence of populism to large-scale processes such as 
modernization and globalization. The second one illustrates and discusses the results 
produced by the empirical research testing the factors linked to the above mentioned 
processes. The third one presents the conditions that are relevant for the present study 
and therefore selected for the analytical section. The aim is to produce an explanatory 
model able to keep together socio-economic and political-institutional factors that might 
explain the social acceptability of populism. Finally, a formal hypothesis is formulated. 
 
Contrary to the majority of the literature on the topic, the outcome to be explained in this 
study is not (only) the electoral performance of allegedly populist parties. As it will be 
explained more in detail in Chapter 4, the outcome to be explained (the social 
acceptability of populism) is in fact a combination of three factors: the percentage of 
populist statements in a manifesto (discursive dimension); the degree of radicalism of the 
party author of the manifesto (political and ideological dimension); the vote share of the 
party at the elections for which the manifesto was written (electoral dimension).  
 
In this chapter the findings of the relevant literature are hence adapted to the purposes of 
the present study. Two further caveats have to be considered in this regard. First: while 
most research on Europe focuses on right-wing populism, this study aims at identifying 
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the factors that can explain the presence of populism as a thin ideology independently 
from the full ideology attached to it. Several variables analyzed in the literature refer to 
the success of far-right or extreme right-wing parties, but unless they are supposedly 
linked to the thin ideology of populism (a Manichean worldview opposing the good people 
and the corrupt elite) they will not be considered. Second: while most studies focus on 
the international dimension of populism understood as a global phenomenon manifesting 
itself in virtually every democracy, this study aims at explaining why populism thrives in 
certain countries but not in others, therefore the cross-country dimension is essential and 
variables which do not display any cross-countries variance are not included (e.g. socio-
economic variables are very similar in all the cases included, as well as the process of 
mediatization of politics and the process of supranational integration). 
 
Populism as a by-product of modernization and globalization 
 
The growing presence of populism in Europe is often considered as the result of two 
interconnected transformations. First: the shift from materialist to post-materialist values 
occurred during the 1960s and 1970s and symbolized by the protests of 1968. Second: 
the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies that took place during the 1980s 
and 1990s. In the first case the 'New Left' mobilized a young electorate which shared 
post-materialist and cosmopolitan values revolving around civil rights, gay rights, 
abortion, environmentalism, and gender roles; while in the second case radical right-wing 
populist parties were able to counter-mobilize the so-called losers of globalization along 
the new cultural cleavage. The two phases are connected to each other, and they are 
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supposed to constitute the transmission chain that made right-wing populism so 
widespread since the 1990s. 
 
The process of electorate de-alignment and re-alignment along new dividing lines has 
been labelled as ‘silent revolution’ in its first – mainly left-wing – phase (Inglehart 1977), 
and ‘silent counter-revolution’ in its subsequent – mainly right-wing – articulation (Ignazi 
1992). This shows that populism becomes a successful political resource as soon as the 
traditional class and religious cleavages fail to structure the political struggle within 
society.  
 
More in detail, during the 1960s and 1970s European societies witnessed the end of the 
stability of the traditional cleavage structure, and a generational and educational 
revolution brought to the fore values such as pacifism, feminism, civil rights, and 
environmentalism. New generations without major concerns for material subsistence 
started attributing more importance to post-materialist values based on autonomy and 
self-expression, and this produced the fading of established partisan loyalties of the 
electorate. The re-alignment occurred around along new lines of conflict (cosmopolitan 
vs communitarian, or libertarian vs authoritarian) together with the old redistributive axis 
of conflict (Kitschelt 1994). The new cleavage structure favoured left-wing movements 
and political experiences able to mobilize a new constituency which could not find any 
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representation in the previous cleavage structure, while norms and values opposed to 
the libertarian movements emerged only later on.32 
 
Indeed, the political mobilization of traditional and authoritarian values became 
widespread only after a second transformation occurred. During the 1980s and 1990s 
the decline of the secondary sector, the privatization of public sector enterprises, the 
cross-border mobility of workers, and the delocalization of the production processes 
marked the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies. These transformations, 
rooted in processes such as modernization, globalization, and de-industrialization, 
produced a dividing line between the so-called winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi 
et al. 2006; Kupchan 2012).  
 
In particular, the latter felt that higher unemployment, growing inequalities, and 
decreased social services threatened their style of life and social status (Cox and Sinclair 
1999; Zimmerling 2005). Moreover, the perceived threat was originated also by the 
weakening protection of the traditional national boundaries, thus originating a reaction 
invoking protectionist measures and national independence (Cerny 1999). By fighting 
the universalistic values mobilized by the 'New Left' and by articulating new discourses 
and issues related to nativism on the cultural axis (Betz and Johnson 2004), right-wing 
populist parties became increasingly successful since the 1980s. 
 
                                                           
32 Hooghe et al. (2004) define the new cleavage as the opposition between GAL-TAN values: 
green, alternative and libertarian positions versus traditional, authoritarian and nationalist 
positions.  
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Concerning the mechanisms behind this transformation, while for Kitschelt (1995) the 
impact of post-industrial societies triggered preferences for ethnocentrism and 
authoritarianism, a complementary approach based on emotions (such as resentment, 
anxiety, and hostility) has been proposed by Betz. He identified the success of right-
wing populist parties in their "ability to mobilize resentment and protest and their 
capability to offer a future-oriented program that confronts the challenge posed by the 
economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced West European democracies."  
 
The point of convergence is the strong link between socioeconomic and cultural 
transformations and the loss of credibility and accountability of the elites. As Kitschelt 
observed, "the rise of radical right-wing populist parties has coincided with a marked 
increase in public disaffection and disenchantment with the established political parties, 
the political class, and the political system in general" (1995, 169). In particular, the 
transformations of the traditional cleavage structure created the political opportunity 
structures for populist parties who mobilized electoral constituencies traditionally linked 
to social-democratic parties (Kitschelt 1994).  
 
Bornschier (2010a) found that while the traditional cleavage based on class conflict 
gradually lost its salience, the cultural divide increasingly structures the political 
competition. In particular, the salience of the opposition between libertarian-
universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values is a central element for the success 
of the populist right, linking it to the transformation that took place starting from the 1960s. 
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Although there is consensus in the literature about the salience of the cultural cleavage 
in explaining the success of right-wing populist parties, this does not imply that economic 
issues are not relevant anymore. In fact, following the Great Recession that 
characterized the period 2008-2012, the constituency identifiable as ‘losers of 
globalization’ has considerably expanded. It started including increasingly wider portion 
of the middle-class, and this allowed also left-wing populist parties to obtain remarkable 
electoral performances. The effects of the economic crisis could explain the success of 
left-wing populist parties such as SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain, although 
this link has not been yet confirmed empirically (Kriesi and Pappas 2015).  
 
Besides the profound socio-economic and cultural transformation that brought to the de-
alignment and re-alignment of the European electorates along a new interpretation of the 
cultural cleavage, two additional factors have been recently associated with the 
breakthrough of populist parties: supranational integration and mediatization of politics. 
These factors characterized virtually every European country and they are supposed to 
trigger the electoral success and persistence of populist parties. They do not offer an 
alternative explanation compared to the traditional cleavage model, but rather reinforce 
the effects produced by the mass values change and the de-industrialization process. 
 
European elites and institutions have been described as too distant from the people, and 
this, in turn, has reinforced the lack of a fully developed European identity. Given the fact 
that it has not been possible to identify a unified European demos, some authors have 
proposed the concept of European demoicracy (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013), 
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while the democratic deficit of the European institutions has become a widespread refrain 
among politicians and commentators.33  
 
Unsurprisingly, the critique of supranational institutions has been a distinctive mark of 
both right and left populist parties (Gifford 2006; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007). Indeed, 
they consider multilevel governance as an element further fraying the accountability 
chain and creating a dimension of contestation between supra-national integration and 
national independence (Marks and Wilson 2000). Hence, the process of supranational 
integration – combined with the effects of the Great Recession – is supposed to have 
long-term effects on the tension between responsibility and responsiveness of the 
political parties (Mair 2013; Bardi, Bartolini, and Trechsel 2014).  
 
On the one hand the elites must act responsively towards international markets and 
supranational institutions; on the other hand this diminishes their responsiveness 
towards the voting public (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In other words, since the 
process of European integration entails the creation of supranational institutions and the 
implementation of models of multilevel governance, this can pose problems of 
democratic inclusion, accountability, responsiveness, and transparency (Papadopoulos 
2010; Lavenex 2013). 
 
Last but not least, the so-called process of ‘mediatization of politics’ has been identified 
as a relevant factor linked to the growing alienation of the voters from the traditional 
                                                           
33 For an overview about the debate: Follesdal and Hix (2006). 
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political process, and therefore as a trigger for populism.34 Commercial media are 
supposed to land more visibility to populist actors because of their flamboyant style of 
communication (Mazzoleni 2003; 2008). In turn, populist actors are supposed to exploit 
the climate of cynicism and disillusionment generated by the media. As a result, populist 
actors have access to the public debate and their critique of the establishment is backed 
by the news coverage of the media focused on scandals and corruption. This process 
has been labelled as video-malaise and is considered to trigger the success of populist 
actors while harming democratic quality.35  
 
Several authors highlighted the decisive role of the media in providing an essential space 
in the public debate to populist actors. According to Ellinas, without the spotlight of the 
media "Far Right movements might be doomed to political irrelevance and relegated to 
the margins of political discourse" (2010, 32–33). In a similar vein, Art claims that 
the failure of populist radical right in Germany is related to the media’s attacks on these 
parties (2006), and Kitschelt maintains that unless the media are willing to disseminate 
their messages "Far Rightists will not be able to capitalize on the opportunities that 
are made available in the electoral arena" (1995, 130). In general, the role of the media 
is considered as a crucial factor both for the emergence of populist parties and for their 
legitimization (Eatwell 2003; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007). 
 
                                                           
34 Mainly on a theoretical basis; empirical studies are still in their initial phase. About this topic, 
see Manucci (2017). 
35 Many authors made reference to it, from Robinson (1976) to Mutz and Reeves (2005). 
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All in all, virtually every European country seems to constitute a fertile ground for populist 
parties to thrive. As summarized by The New York Times, a few factors seem to be 
unequivocally linked to the breakthrough of far-right parties: "Amid a migrant crisis, 
sluggish economic growth and growing disillusionment with the European Union, far-right 
parties – some longstanding, others newly formed – have been achieving electoral 
success in a number of European nations."36 The next section provides an extensive 
review of the most relevant studies on the topic and it shows that the puzzle is far from 
easily solvable. First, populism does not coincide with far-right parties. Second, different 
studies offer different interpretations about the same phenomena according to different 
methods and operationalisations. Third, although every European country is 
experiencing the same transformations with a similar timing, populism is not equally 
widespread in each country. 
 
Empirical findings in the literature 
 
A vast literature analyses the factors linked to the electoral success of (mainly right-wing) 
populist parties, and most of the studies rely on the theoretical framework presented 
sopra: radical right populism is widely considered as a counter-revolution triggered by the 
effects of modernization and globalization and fuelled by processed such as mediatization 
of politics and supranational integration.  
                                                           
36 The New York Times, December 4, 2016. "Europe’s Rising Far Right: A Guide to the Most 
Prominent Parties". Available online (consulted in October 2017): 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/world/europe/europe-far-right-political-parties-
listy.html 
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There are important empirical results that should be taken in consideration about 
demand side as well as supply side conditions for the electoral performance of populist 
parties. Supply side explanatory variables concern the conditions that are supposed to 
create the favourable political opportunity structures for populism, while demand side 
factors concern the reasons why people vote for populist parties (or show populist 
attitudes). Several authors emphasize the importance to consider the interaction 
between these two sets of factors (Eatwell 2003; Norris 2005; Mudde 2007), and 
here they are presented separately only for sake of clarity. 
 
For each factor, the results of the relevant empirical research are presented. The 
following section presents and justifies the final choice of the factors that can be 
considered as relevant for the social acceptability of populist discourses, and not only for 
the electoral performance of radical or new right-wing populist parties. The aim is to 
create a set of conditions which are supposed to trigger the social acceptability of 
populism, and in particular to explain the cross-country variance of populism's social 
acceptability. As already mentioned, the choice is further restricted by methodological 
issues as well as by data availability. 
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Supply side factors 
 
Several supply factors have been identified as relevant for the electoral success of 
populist parties: low quality of representative democracy; corruption scandals; 
ideological convergence of the mainstream parties; the presence of a proportional 
electoral system; the process of mediatization of politics.37  
 
1) Concerning the relationship between democracy and populism, the protest voting 
model argues that people vote for a populist party in order to express their distrust 
towards the political elite (Fieschi and Heywood 2004). Betz noticed that populist parties 
"became popular at a time when there was a dramatic rise in public disenchantment 
with traditional parties, political leadership, the political process, and even the way 
democracy works in developed democracies" (Betz 2002). In other words, there is space 
for new political parties (including populist ones) as soon as the political system is 
inefficient and unstable.  
 
For example, this might be originated by cartelization: colluding parties employ the 
resources of the state to limit political competition and to ensure their own survival and 
electoral success (Katz and Mair 1995). Cartelization is usually linked to "the rise of 
                                                           
37 Another element has been mentioned in the literature: the presence of an appealing and well 
organized populist party (Taggart 2000; van Kessel 2015b). However, the presence of a credible 
populist party in a certain country might be associated with the national political culture of the 
country and indirectly with the collective re-elaboration of the fascist past. Including that as a 
relevant condition would be a tautology and, more importantly, it would generate an endogeneity 
problem. Therefore this condition will not be further examined. 
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populist anti-party-system parties that appeal directly to public perceptions that the 
mainstream parties are indifferent to the desires of ordinary citizens" (Katz and Mair 
2009, 759). However, van Kessel found that "populist parties have done well in low-trust 
countries […] but also in countries […] where people have been relatively satisfied with 
the way democracy works and where trust in parliament and political parties has been 
relatively high" (2015b, 97).  
 
Empirical research on this topic remains scarce and unsystematic. However, several 
studies analysing the link between political discontent and radical right voting found 
that political distrust has an impact on the probability to vote for a radical right party 
(Norris 2005; M. Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels 2011; Caiani, Della Porta, and 
Wagemann 2012). 
 
2) A similar and interconnected aspect concerns the perception of corruption, which is 
supposed to trigger the Parteienverdrossenheit (Mair 1998)38. Unsurprisingly, it has 
been established a correlation between perception of corruption and low levels of trust 
in political parties (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012). 
However, according to van Kessel (2015b) and Ivarsflaten (2008) corruption does not 
have a significant impact on the success of populist parties.  
 
3) When political parties converge towards the centre of the political spectrum, this 
provides expanding political opportunity structures for new right-wing populist parties 
                                                           
38 Parteienverdrossenheit is translatable as "anti-party sentiment" or "disenchantment with the 
political parties". 
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(Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). More in general the widespread feeling 
among the electorate that all the parties are "the same" opens the space for new political 
parties at the extremes of the spectrum and can facilitate the creation of niches within 
the political space (Kriesi 1999).  
 
Several studies confirmed the convergence thesis (Abedi 2002; Van der Brug, Fennema, 
and Tillie 2005), although Bornschier (2010b) criticized previous works either because 
they assume that party positions can be represented on a single left-right dimension 
or because they assume that voters will support only parties that adequately represent 
them on both dimensions. 
 
4) Also the presence of a proportional rather than majoritarian electoral system is 
supposed to create favourable conditions for the electoral performance of populist 
radical right parties (Swank and Betz 2003). Although several studies found support for 
this hypothesis39, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) found that,  after controlling for socio-
demographic variables,  the presence of a proportional electoral system even has a 
negative impact on the performance of radical right parties. Different thresholds for 
entering the Parliament are another aspect of the electoral system that has been 
considered, but the empirical findings tend to disprove this hypothesis.40  
 
                                                           
39 Among others: Jackman and Volpert (1996); Golder (2003). 
40 Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that higher electoral thresholds reduce the support for 
extreme right parties, but Swank and Betz (2003) and Golder (2003) disproved their findings. 
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5) Finally, the process of ‘mediatization of politics’ has been linked to the growing 
success of radical and populist parties. The idea is that the media-logic and the 
political-logic are converging; therefore media actors and political actors have common 
interests in providing and broadcasting emotional and conflictive stories. This means 
that political actors know more and more how to ‘use’ the media to gain visibility (a 
process called ‘self-mediatization’)41 while the media find newsworthy and economically 
successful the presence and actions of populist actors. The two aspects converge and 
create a relevant opportunity structure for the presence of populism in the public 
debate. There is empirical evidence that the media system plays an important role 
in giving visibility to radical and populist parties.42 Another aspect of the connection 
between political and media actors concerns the populist attitude of different media 
outlets. In particular, it has been argued that while tabloid press and commercial 
television are supposed to work in ‘complicity’ with populist movements, quality 
newspapers are supposed to act as ‘paladins’ of mainstream parties (Mazzoleni 2003). 
 
Demand side factors 
 
Several demand factors have been identified as favourable for the electoral performance 
of radical right- wing populist parties: economic hardship; high presence of immigrants 
                                                           
41 The concept was introduced by Meyer (2002) and developed by Strömbäck (2008) and Esser 
(2013). It refers to the ability of political actors to adapt to the media-logic in order to gain visibility. 
42 In particular, Plasser and Ulram (2003), Biorcio (2003), Birnenbaum and Villa (2003), 
Hellström et al. (2012) linked the success of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, the 
Lega Nord in Italy, the Front National in France and the Swedish Democrats in Sweden to the 
role of the media. For an overview on this topic, see Manucci (2017). 
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and salience of the issue in the public debate; low welfare protection; demographic 
factors. 
1) It is intuitive to link a poor economic performance in one country with a bottom-up 
critique of its political and economic elites. In turn, this critique is supposed to open 
the space for populist attitudes among the electorate. However, empirical findings 
largely contradict this theoretical expectation. Swank and Betz (2003) did not find any 
evidence that a poor economic performance – which includes growth, unemployment, 
and inflation rates – affects the vote share for radical right-wing parties independently 
from other factors, in particular the presence of a strong welfare state. Several authors 
focused on the levels of unemployment, again with no results confirming the theoretical 
expectations.43 On the other hand, Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that higher rates 
of unemployment provide a favourable environment for radical right parties, while 
Mughan et al. (2003, 631) claim that job insecurity explains "voting support for populist 
right-wing alternatives in preference to established parties of government."  
 
Recent studies argue that the voters' preference for populist parties has little to do with 
the objective economic situation: Mols and Jetten (2016) found that perceived relative 
deprivation better explains the preference for right-wing populist parties rather than 
objective relative gratification, and in a similar vein Elchardus and Spruyt (2016) claim 
that support for populism is a consequence of 'declinism' (a very negative view of the 
                                                           
43 Among others: Knigge (1998); Arzheimer and Carter (2006); Bjørklund (2007). Arzheimer and 
Carter argue that perhaps voters turn to mainstream parties in times of high unemployment 
because they are considered more experienced. 
43 
 
evolution of society) and the feeling of belonging to a group of people that is unfairly 
treated by society. 
 
2) The role of immigration is probably the most controversial among the demand side 
explanatory variables for the success of populist right-wing parties. The presence of 
immigrants (or refugees), combined with the salience of the topic in the public debate, 
is considered as extremely relevant44 or negligible45 according to different authors. In 
isolation it seems not to constitute a powerful predictor of the electoral performance of 
radical right-wing populist parties. All in all, the empirical results are contradictory and 
the levels of immigration might have different effects according to aspects such as 
different national political cultures, the presence of a colonial past, or the role of the 
media. 
 
3) In a context of economic hardship, the presence of a strong welfare system is 
supposed to reduce the appeal of the extreme right. For example, Swank and Betz 
(2003) found that universal welfare states decrease the positive effect of immigration 
on votes for radical right-wing parties. On the other hand, the erosion of the welfare 
system might constitute an advantage for right-wing political parties proposing its 
retrenchment in order to exclude non-nationals (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). 
Indeed, populists with a welfare chauvinistic position normally blame the elite for cutting 
the welfare rights of deserving ‘natives’ and the non-natives for their excessive claims on 
the welfare state.  
                                                           
44 Thränhardt (1992); Lubbers et al. (2002); Anderson (1996); Knigge (1998), Golder (2003). 
45 Mayer and Perrinau (1989); Kitschelt (1995); Norris (2005); Arzheimer and Carter (2006). 
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4) Finally, there are several voters’ sociodemographic features showing a high 
correlation with the likelihood of voting for populist right-wing parties: for example being 
male, under-25, and a manual worker compared to being female, middle-aged and a 
professional (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Spierings and Zaslove 2017). On the other 
hand, family income and level of education are not linked to party preference on the 
cultural axis, namely concerning pro- or against-immigration parties (Van der Brug, 
Fennema, and Tillie 2005). Moreover manual workers, self-employed, routine non-
manual workers and unemployed are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties. 
However, when economic characteristics are added to the model the relationship 
between unemployment and vote for right wing parties becomes negative (Lubbers, 
Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002).  
 
Building an explanatory model  
 
After having illustrated the main demand and supply side factors usually considered in 
the relevant literature, the next step consists in selecting the relevant conditions that are 
supposed to bear some explanatory power concerning the Salonfähigkeit or social 
acceptability of populism. First, the conditions must be related to populism as a thin-
centred ideology, independently from the full ideology attached to it. Second, the aim is 
to explain the cross-country variations in the social acceptability of populism, therefore 
conditions which are equally present in each country are not helpful in this regard. Third, 
the data must be available since the 1990s for each of the eight West European countries 
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considered. For all these reasons, not all the conditions illustrated in the literature review 
can be adopted and tested.46 
 
Moreover, there is a further crucial aspect that must be considered in order to select the 
relevant conditions. A condition becomes relevant for this study as soon as it is related 
not only to the electoral dimension of populism but more in general to the social 
acceptability of populism, given by the combination of three factors forming the outcome 
to explain: the percentage of populism in electoral manifestos, the degree of radicalism 
of the party and its electoral performance.  
 
Populism is here understood as an ideology expressed discursively because it makes 
possible to measure how often populist messages are articulated over time and across 
countries.47 However, while the electoral performances of populist parties vary greatly 
between countries, it is not clear whether this is reflected in the social acceptability of 
populism. This generates two crucial questions. First: to what extent the variables used 
to explain the electoral performance of populist parties can also explain the social 
acceptability of populist discourses in party manifestos? Second: to what extent the 
electoral success of populist parties and the presence of populist messages in party 
manifestos overlap? 
                                                           
46 On a more pragmatic note, it should be stressed that given the number of cases considered in 
this study (23) and the type of method employed in the analytical section (Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis) the number of total conditions tested should not be higher than five in order to produce 
more credible results. Since the stigma of the fascist past will be tested afterwards, no more than 
four variables will be extracted from the relevant literature. 
47 According to Rovira Kaltwasser (2014, 497) by considering populism as an ideology it is 
possible to "grasp that its rise and fall is related to both supply side and demand side factors." 
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Table 1 – Different Approaches to Populism 
 Understanding of Populism 
in the Academic Literature 
Understanding of Populism 
in this Study 
Ideological 
Dimension 
Mainly right-wing, rarely left-
wing, (virtually) never 
combined 
Populism as thin ideology 
attached to any possible full 
ideology 
Radicalism Mainly radical/far/extreme right parties are considered 
Populist messages are not 
necessarily radical 
Parties Mainly new parties, niche parties, social movements 
Every party can articulate 
populist messages  
Empirical 
Manifestation 
Electoral component: 
success and performance in 
electoral competition 
Discursive component: the 
populist ideology is 
articulated discursively 
 
Concerning the first question, the existing literature often fails to explain what part of the 
electoral success of populist parties is linked to their radical features rather than to their 
populist nature. This is due to the fact that these studies often consider extreme right-
wing parties as automatically populist. Moreover, until recently there has been almost no 
space for the analysis of European left-wing populist parties. In a similar vein, some 
of the factors tested in literature relate to new or radical parties, which are often 
considered as automatically populist. Table 1 summarizes the main differences between 
the focus of the existing literature compared to the approach used in this study.  
 
Concerning the second question, empirically it is possible that a poor electoral 
performance of populist parties happens in a context characterized by a high social 
acceptability of populist messages. For instance, this might occur in case mainstream 
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parties articulate highly populist messages and populist parties score poorly in elections. 
On the other hand, good electoral results of populist parties can be coupled with a very 
low presence of populist messages in party manifestos. This might happen in case 
allegedly populist parties seldom rely on populist messages and so do mainstream 
parties. 
 
In this study the discursive and electoral approaches, rather than being considered as 
mutually exclusive, are seen as complementary aspects. Indeed, they relate to two 
distinct but interconnected elements of populism: how often a (more or less radical) 
political party discursively articulate populist messages, and how well does the same 
party perform in elections. Despite the conditions triggering the electoral performance of 
populist parties and those determining the social acceptability of populist discourses 
might partially overlap, they are not necessarily the same. 
 
Two supply side factors are not included in the analysis. First, the process of 
mediatization of politics is not selected because it is a common feature of all the countries 
considered in this study, and also the timing of its development is not significantly 
different across cases. It would be a relevant condition if one would study how 
widespread are populist messages in newspaper articles, TV shows, or social media, but 
this is not the case.  
 
Secondly, the presence of a proportional electoral system is discarded. On the one hand, 
because it relates to the electoral dimension of populism (but not necessarily to its 
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discursive dimension), and on the other hand because empirical research shows that the 
presence of a proportional electoral system seems to have an even negative effect on 
the performance of radical right parties.48 
 
Three supply side factors are not included in the analysis. First, the levels of migrants 
and asylum-seekers in a country as well as the relevance of the topic in the public debate 
cannot be selected as a relevant factor for this study because the aim is to explain the 
presence of populism as a thin ideology, while these aspects mainly relates to the 
breakthrough of far right parties (which are not necessarily populist) and considerably 
less to left-wing and centre parties. Moreover, several empirical studies have not found 
any concluding evidence about the correlation between nativism or the number of 
asylum-seekers and the extreme right vote; therefore there are no reasons to link this 
factor to the presence of populism.49 
 
The idea that the presence of a strong welfare system is supposed to reduce the appeal 
of right-wing populist parties is also discarded. By observing empirical cases it would be 
difficult to explain the presence of populist parties in Scandinavian countries, since they 
                                                           
48 To be fair, there is not full consensus among scholars on its effects, and one should be careful 
when evaluating the impact of electoral systems on the performance of radical right-wing populist 
parties. 
49 According to Lubbers et al (2002) the effect of different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes is large 
in Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark, but much smaller in Austria, Italy and Sweden. 
Moreover, on an empirical level, among the European countries with the highest number of 
migrants per 1000 inhabitants there are Austria and Switzerland (displaying high levels of 
populism), while among those with the lowest number of migrants there are Italy, France, Poland, 
and Hungary (also with high levels of populism). Source: Eurostat (online data codes: 
migr_imm1ctz and migr_pop1ctz). This means that one should also consider other factors such 
as the salience of the topic in the public debate, as well as the framing and the attention devoted 
by the media to the topic. However, the data concerning these elements are extremely difficult to 
obtain in a reliable and comparable way for a period of twenty years across eight countries. 
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have a strong welfare system. In fact, populist parties such as the Finns Party, the 
Sweden Democrats, and the Danish People’s Party, not only exist since many years, 
but also obtained significant electoral results. In fact, it could be argued that a universal 
welfare protection – when considered as too inclusive – might constitute an advantage 
for those parties proposing welfare chauvinism.50 In conclusion, including a strong 
welfare system would be problematic since it is empirically unclear whether it triggers or 
undermine the social acceptability of populist discourses.51 
 
Finally, at the micro-level, several voters’ sociodemographic features might be linked to 
the electoral performance of populist parties, but there are no reasons to consider them 
since they are rather equally distributed across the eight countries included in the study. 
In particular being male, under-25 and a manual worker is almost equally likely across 
countries (Table 2).52  
                                                           
50 The work of Ennser-Jedenastik (2017) seems to confirm this impression, although with several 
caveats. In general, the relationship between right-wing or left-wing populism and types of welfare 
system remains unclear. 
51 It is also possible to argue that the condition about the economic performance of a country, 
which includes the Gini coefficient after redistribution, already contains some elements that 
resonate with the type of welfare system and how inclusive and universal it is. 
52 The statistics about age, ratio of men and median age are obtained through Eurostat. The 
remaining data are obtained through the database of QoG (Quality of government), and they all 
refer to the last measurement performed. 
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Table 2 – Socio-demographic Factors 
 
Proportion 
population 
aged 20-
24 
Educational 
attainment 
15-24 years 
(male) 
Employment 
in high-tech 
sectors 
(male) 
Employment 
in low-tech 
manufacturing 
(male) 
Ratio 
men 
Median 
age 
Austria 6.4 11.67 4.9 5.9 48.99 43 
France  5.7 12.28 5 5 49.15 41.2 
Germany 5.6 12.4 5.2 5.2 49.21 45.8 
Italy 5 12.96 4 7.1 48.70 45.5 
Netherlands 6.3 13.18 5.2 5.4 49.73 42.4 
Sweden 6.7 13.98 6.5 4.5 50.01 40.9 
Switzerland 6 11.22 NA NA 49.52 42.3 
United 
Kingdom 6.6 13.72 6.3 4.1 49.31 40 
 
More interestingly, some studies recently started investigating the presence of ‘populist 
attitudes’ among the public (A. Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2013; van Hauwaert and 
van Kessel 2017). It is possible to imagine that supply and demand side factors activate 
these predispositions. While it is not possible to completely exclude the relevance of 
socio-demographic factors, it appears premature to claim that individual populist 
attitudes can explain the cross-country variation.  
 
As shown in Table 3, only four factors can be selected for the present study, and they 
will be tested in the analytical section: poor economic performance, democratic gap, 
widespread corruption, and ideological convergence of the party system. However, it 
is necessary to make another step in order to make these factors relevant for the cross-
country variance in the social acceptability of populist discourses: their 
operationalization. This aspect will be considered in Chapter 7. 
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Table 3 – Supply and Demand Side Factors 
 All Factors Selected Factors 
Demand-Side Factors 
Economic Hardship Yes 
Immigration Flows and their 
Salience 
No 
Low Welfare Protection No 
Sociodemographic factors No 
Supply Side Factors 
Democratic Performance Yes 
High Levels of Corruption Yes 
Ideological Convergence Yes 
Proportional Electoral System No 
Mediatization of Politics No 
 
Therefore it is possible to hypothesize that: 
 
H1: the more unfavourable the socio-economic and political-institutional 
conditions, the higher the social acceptability of populism.  
 
Four sub-hypotheses can be formulated concerning the four factors in isolation.  
 
H1A: the higher the economic hardship, the higher the social acceptability 
of populism. 
H1B: the higher the democratic gap, the higher the social acceptability of 
populism. 
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H1C: the higher the perception of corruption, the higher the social 
acceptability of populism. 
H1D: the higher of the ideological convergence of the political system, the 
higher the social acceptability of populism. 
 
These conditions are operationalized and tested in Chapter 7. Chapter 8, however, 
discusses the importance of considering not only socio-economic and political 
institutional factors, but also cultural ones, in particular the role of collective memory 
and the re-elaboration of the past, in order to explain cross-country variation. 
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Chapter 3 – Populism, Collective Memory, and Stigma of the Fascist Past 
 
This chapter introduces the main conceptual novelty of the study: the idea that the populist 
ideology might be more or less legitimate in different countries because of cultural and 
historical reasons. Indeed, it is possible to claim that every country presents a certain 
political culture which in turn legitimizes or stigmatizes different ideas of power. In particular, 
the collective memory of the fascist past might explain the legitimacy of the populist idea of 
power in a certain country. This step is necessary, since socio-economic and political-
institutional factors do not fully explain the cross-country variation of the social acceptability 
of populism. The model produced in Chapter 2 is supposed to explain why populism thrives 
or not, but the literature clearly points to the fact that those conditions do not have the same 
effect in every country. This indicates that country-specific elements should be considered 
as well.  
 
The aim is to observe the following cultural structure which has an impact on the presence 
of populism in each country:  
 
1) The country's re-elaboration of World War II and the collective memory of its own role 
during the fascist past.53 
2) According to the type of collective memory of the fascist past, a certain level of 
stigmatization of that past is present in the country. 
                                                           
53 As already explained, the general argument refers to any authoritarian past that a country has 
experienced. Since the focus of this study is on Western Europe, the authoritarian past is here 
represented by the fascist past. 
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3) A strong stigma of the fascist past produces unfavourable cultural opportunity structures, 
and conversely a weak stigma produces favourable cultural opportunity structures. 
 
On the one hand, the conditions for populism to thrive can be more or less favourable 
according to the economic situation of the country, the levels of corruption, the levels of 
accountability and responsiveness, and the ideological convergence of the political system. 
On the other hand, unfavourable cultural opportunity structures might close down the 
window of opportunity for populism even in countries where the political opportunity 
structures are favourable, and vice versa.  
 
The fascist past resonates with the populist present because both the fascist and the 
populist ideas of power are based on illiberal elements. The way a society collectively 
remembers the fascist past and its role vis-à-vis fascist regimes determines to what extent 
the fascist idea of power is legitimized or stigmatized, and in turn it is supposed to affect 
the social acceptability of populist discourses in a certain country. This leads to the 
formulation of the hypothesis that a high stigmatization of the fascist past closes down the 
cultural opportunity structures for the social acceptability of populism. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. First it illustrates the concept of cultural opportunity 
structure and its importance in explaining the cross-country variation in populism's social 
acceptability. Then it describes a new typology of collective memory and its four different 
types: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, and victimization. Each type of collective 
memory is associated with a certain degree of stigmatization of the fascist past.  
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Cultural opportunity structures 
 
The strands of literature examined in Chapter 2 converge in acknowledging that the 
country-level plays a crucial role in explaining different electoral performances of radical 
right-wing populist parties. Arzheimer (2009, 274) tested all the most common factors 
linked to the electoral performance of extreme right-wing populist parties and concluded 
that: "there are striking differences between countries […]. Put differently, given the 
levels of the variables included in the model, in Austria, Italy, and Denmark the extreme 
right is persistently much stronger and in Spain, Sweden, and Finland, it is much weaker 
than one would expect it to be."  
 
Similarly, Lubbers et al. (2002, 366) found that the cross-country variance is linked to the 
fact that individual political attitudes are unevenly distributed across countries: "[…] 
variations in the composition of the population, not in social background but in political 
attitudes, helped account for cross-national differences too. Thus, a considerable part of 
the original country-level variance was explained." Indeed, the effect of education is small 
in Austria and Italy, but particularly significant in Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. 
On the other hand, the effect of different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes and 
dissatisfaction with democracy is large in Norway, Netherlands and Denmark, but much 
smaller in Austria, Italy and Sweden.  
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These findings resonate with the work of Inglehart and Welzel (2010, 554), which 
considers socio-cultural changes as path dependent since religious and historic 
legacies are long-lasting. When trying to explain the shift from survival to self-expression 
values and from traditional to secular-rational values (in other words the passage from 
traditional and materialist to modernization-linked and post-materialist values), the 
authors found that "the nation remains a key unit of shared socialization, and nationality 
explains far more of the variance than factors such as education, occupation, income, 
gender or region."  
 
Accordingly, it seems safe to assume that national cultural elements play a pivotal role in 
determining the presence of populist discourses. In other words, besides structural and 
short-term elements, country-specific characteristic might have an impact on the social 
acceptability (Salonfähigkeit) of populist messages.54 The concept of political opportunity 
structures remains important to understand and explain the presence of populism, but 
cultural long-lasting elements should also be considered. In other words, the combination 
of political (short-term) and cultural (long-term) opportunity structures can explain the 
presence of populism in different countries. 
 
Implicitly developed by Lipsky (1968) and formalized by other authors such as Tilly (1978) 
and Tarrow  (1983), the concept of political opportunity structures refers to "specific 
configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for 
social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some 
                                                           
54 About the concept of Salonfähigkeit and its link to the study of populism, see Art (2006, 103). 
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instances and constrain them in others" (Kitschelt 1986, 58). In a broader sense, political 
opportunity structures emphasize the exogenous conditions for party success and 
combine the presence of stable institutional features with volatile or conjectural factors. 
The combination of supply and demand side factors for the success of populist parties 
illustrated sopra can be considered as a set of political opportunity structures. 
 
As already mentioned, however, socio-economic and political-institutional opportunities 
are of little use to explain the cross-country variation of the social acceptability of 
populism. The limitations of the classic approach to political opportunity structures and 
populism can be overcome by introducing into the picture Putnam’s idea that civic 
traditions are important factors for the political performance of a country (1993; 2002). 
Putnam argued that differences in the design of institutions are of secondary relevance 
and that civic traditions account for most of the differences in explaining a community’s 
political performance. In a similar vein, it is possible to argue that different political cultures 
influence the perception of different ideas of power and therefore the social acceptability 
of populist discourses.  
 
As defined by Almond and Verba in their seminal work (1963, 13), political culture is "the 
particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the 
members of a nation." Since political cultures include all politically relevant beliefs, values, 
and attitudes among the population, they determine social and political norms at the 
collective level. In turn, these norms become observable through the ritualization of 
political behaviors. Different narrations and re-elaborations of the fascist past 
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retrospectively illuminate different national political cultures and allow estimating the 
degree of stigma attached to fascism (Connerton 1989). To determine whether in a 
certain country there are favourable cultural opportunities structures for populism, it is 
possible to observe the collective memory of the fascist past.  
 
Certain types of collective memory highly stigmatize the fascist past, and therefore create 
unfavourable opportunity structures for populism. Other types of collective memory do not 
stigmatize the fascist past, and therefore create favourable opportunity structures for 
populism.  
 
Cultural opportunity structures can be defined as specific configurations of symbolical, 
memorial, and historical elements that shape the range of legitimate and stigmatized 
political behaviors, discourses, and ideas of power. A central role is played by the 
collective memory and re-elaboration of the past. Although other elements such as 
collective customs and traditions can concur in forming cultural opportunity structures, 
collective memories can be used as a valid proxy because they are more easily 
observable.  
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Figure 3: Opportunity Structures for Populism and the Role of Memory 
I) Conditions for populism  II) Memory as a filter  III) Social Acceptability of populism 
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Figure 3 visualizes the mechanism linking the presence of populism to the presence of 
political opportunity structures interacting with cultural opportunity structures. In stage I, 
every country displays a certain pattern of supply and demand side factors for the 
presence of populism, which in turn form favourable or unfavourable political opportunity 
structures. However, favourable political opportunity structures are not enough to predict 
the acceptability of populism. In fact, in stage II a collective memory which highly 
stigmatizes the fascist past can make the populist idea of power socially unacceptable 
and outside the realm of 'what can be said'. This creates unfavourable cultural opportunity 
structures and therefore and populism is supposed to be socially not accepted. 
 
The link between fascism and populism 
 
Some authors have already linked the presence of populism to different political cultures, 
while several studies mention the role of traumatic collective memories in blocking the 
social acceptability of populist discourses, especially concerning the case of Germany 
(e.g. Art 2006). However, this link has never been analyzed in a systematic way given 
also the difficulties in measuring something as impalpable as collective memories.55 
Despite the absence of comprehensive and systematic analyses, the relevant literature 
seems to give for granted that different national political cultures can explain why a 
populist radical right party is conceived as "a major democratic threat in a country or as a 
                                                           
55 A notable exception is represented by Art (2011b). More in general, the link between collective 
memory, political culture and populism, has not been applied to comparative studies but rather to 
case studies or binary comparisons. Most of them are mentioned in the next pages when 
analysing the type of collective memory present in each of the eight countries considered. 
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reliable ally for a government coalition in another country" (Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 
2016, 211).56  
 
The examples in this sense are numerous. In Germany, extreme right-wing populist 
parties have never become relevant because the debates about the Nazi past of the 
country closed the possibility for them to emerge (Art 2006, 196; Betz 2002; Bornschier 
2012; Decker 2008, 125; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014, 212–13; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). 
On the other hand, in Austria the elite reactions shaped the legitimacy of the far-right in a 
totally opposite way (Art 2007, 338). In Spain the ideological links of Fuerza Nueva and 
Alternativa Española with fascism and Franco's regime always made these parties 
"morally distasteful to the great majority of Spanish citizens" (Alonso and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2015, 26). Similarly, in Italy the fascist heritage still influences the actions of 
mainstream parties and the public responses (Tarchi 2002, 135–36), while in the United 
Kingdom the British National Party’s links to Nazism are perceived as particularly negative 
(Fella 2008, 195).  
 
Concepts such as ‘historical burden’, ‘long-lasting legacy’, ‘heritage’, ‘shadows of the 
past’, and ‘collective memory’ are often associated in the relevant literature to penalizing 
effects on the electoral performances of radical right-wing political parties. In a similar 
vein, notions such as ‘stigma’57, ‘ostracism’ and ‘cordon sanitaire’ are commonly used to 
                                                           
56 A similar point is made in Mudde (2007). 
57 The term ‘stigma’ is often used by researchers examining how mainstream parties interact with 
the radical right. E.g. Art (2011); Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015); Van Spanje and Van Der 
Brug (2007). Erving Goffman defined stigma as ‘"the situation of the individual who is disqualified 
from full social acceptance" (1963, 12). The same definition can be used for parties instead of 
individuals. 
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describe the reaction of mainstream parties vis-à-vis far right parties (Cfr. Demker 2011; 
Widfeldt 2004). In nuce, this is the core of the concept of cultural opportunity structures: 
a certain idea of power is more or less acceptable not only because of socio-economic 
and political-institutional factors, but also because of long-lasting political cultures and 
collective memories. 
 
Since the literature about populism has only fleetingly interacted with the literature on 
collective memory, the role of collective re-elaborations of the past has been 
acknowledged but not studied in a systematic and comparative way.58 This study aims at 
connecting different strands of literature including history, memory studies, and political 
science starting with the assumption that when a country is confronted with an 
authoritarian regime, in the case of Western Europe fascist regimes, it can either 
stigmatize or legitimize that type of regime and that particular idea of power according to 
different types of collective memories.59 In turn, different collective memories indicate 
favourable or unfavourable cultural opportunity structures thus opening or closing cultural 
windows of opportunity for the presence of populism. 
                                                           
58 Historical studies sometimes consider the role of previous regimes on the formation of political 
cultures. For example Aguilar and Humlebaek (2002) examine the impact of the authoritarian past 
on Spanish political culture. Similarly, Power and Zucco (2009) wrote about Brazilian political 
culture and noticed that the transition to democracy after a right-wing authoritarian regime 
generated the so-called direita envergohada (‘ashamed right’). 
59 A country can be directly under an authoritarian regime, or have to deal with neighboring 
countries led by an authoritarian regime. The fascist past in Western Europe directly affected only 
a few countries (Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain) but indirectly every other West 
European country had to take a position and subsequently re-elaborate that past. 
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Figure 4: Venn Diagram Populism and Fascism 
 
 
As visualized in Figure 4, the link between populism and fascism is based precisely on a 
set of illiberal elements they both share.60 This does not mean that fascism and populism 
are perfectly overlapping concepts. For example, if a populist party or regime respects 
democratic procedures (in particular, free elections) it clearly has democratic features, 
but it might still share some illiberal elements with fascism. Indeed, while fascism was 
historically against electoral representation, populism channels elections in authoritarian 
terms (Finchelstein 2017, 96). The mechanism linking the fascist past with the present 
populism is based on the fact that, even if at different levels of radicalism, populism 
                                                          
60 Many authors described the illiberal elements of populism. Among them: Abts and Rummens 
(2007); Canovan (1999); Pappas (2014); Pinelli (2011); Plattner (2010); Riker (1988); Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2012); Urbinati (1998). 
Populism
FascismDemocracy
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includes core elements of fascism at odds with a liberal and constitutional interpretation 
of democracy.61  
 
Historically, fascism in Europe has been a form of political power based on a Manichean 
separation between the common good of the nation and the threat represented by the 
conspiracies of evil and foreign elements. While it claimed to interpret the unitary will of 
the masses, fascism implemented a nationalist, totalitarian and racist ideology. According 
to Griffin, for example, historically fascism was a fascist populism (1995).  
 
This resonates with the three pillars of the fascist ideology provided by Eatwell (2017, 
367): "the creation of a new man", "the forging of a holistic nation in order to survive 
internal and external threats", and "the creation of a neither capitalist nor communist third 
way authoritarian state (which involves government for, but not by the people)". In turn, it 
confirms the observation of de la Torre (2014, 463), who argued that “Populist disrespect 
of pluralism is explained by their view of the people as a subject with a unitary will and 
consciousness, and of rivals as enemies of the virtuous people.” 
 
Accordingly, it is possible to disentangle three relevant elements concerning the 
relationship between fascism and populism in theoretical and empirical terms: 
                                                           
61 In Umberto Eco's (1995) list of traits typical of the fascist ideology, there is selective populism: 
"Since no large quantity of human beings can have a common will, the Leader pretends to be 
their interpreter. Having lost their power of delegation, citizens do not act; they are only called on 
to play the role of the People. Thus the People is only a theatrical fiction. To have a good instance 
of qualitative populism we no longer need the Piazza Venezia in Rome or the Nuremberg Stadium. 
There is in our future a TV or Internet populism, in which the emotional response of a selected 
group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the Voice of the People.'" 
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1) Both fascism and populism claim that the empty locus of power, instead of remaining 
empty as in constitutional democracy (Lefort 1988), must be filled by a substantive image 
of the people as a homogeneous unity (Abts and Rummens 2007). For this reason 
Urbinati claims that a populist regime can only survive if it becomes authoritarian and 
despotic (1998, 122), while Panizza maintains that the need to protect the fictitious unity 
of the people might ultimately lead to totalitarianism (2005, 29). In other words, populism 
can be considered as a proto-totalitarian ideology, but it is important to stress that 
populism does not necessarily displays strictly fascist characteristics such as refusal of 
democratic elections, para-militarism, corporatism, and imperialism.  
 
2) Both fascism and populism share an illiberal approach based on unconstrained popular 
will and unmediated relationship between elite and people. Accordingly, they distrust 
political parties and their competition because every type of intermediary body – apart 
from populist movements – is seen as carrier of particularistic interests in contrast with 
the common good. For these reasons, checks and balances are considered as 
unnecessary obstacles to the implementation of the popular will.  
 
3) Fascism and radical right declinations of populism share a nativist definition of the 
people based on exclusionary criteria. When populism is attached to a nativist full 
ideology, it can be understood in terms of a proto-totalitarian ideology because it goes 
against minority protection and implements a dictatorship of the majority (Abts and 
Rummens 2007, 406, 422).62 
                                                           
62 Of course this link (and possibly the corresponding stigma) is stronger for neo-fascist and 
radical right parties articulating populist discourses, and for this reason the levels of populism in 
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Between 1945 and 1948 – as a reaction to the tragic events that led to World War II and 
the Holocaust – every Western country has adopted liberal democracy, which 
emphasizes "checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law, 
impartial courts and tribunals, and separation of church and state" (Fareed 1997, 26). 
However, not in every country the stigma attached to the fascist past is equally strong, 
and therefore the cultural opportunity structures for populism are not everywhere the 
same. While modern populism might constitute a "useful safety valve for discontent in 
contemporary democracies", it can also pose a threat to liberal democracies as soon as 
it shows traits such as "egocentric leaders, Manichean demonization and loss of faith in 
a liberal system based on representative government, compromise and legal rights" 
(Eatwell 2017, 382). Modern populism "is rooted in a post war reformulation of fascism" 
and although it is now essentially democratic, it is impossible to ignore the fact that 
populism effectively became fascist in the interwar years switching back to democracy 
after 1945 (Finchelstein 2014, 474–76).63 
 
Indeed, when a country is confronted with populist discourses, the literature seems to 
indicate that the collective memory of the fascist past provides the guidelines for the 
rejection or acceptance of the illiberal elements of populism, such as lack of minorities’ 
protection, absence of separation of powers, and refusal of pluralism. In other words, a 
certain type of re-elaboration of the past may open up or close down the cultural 
                                                           
party manifestos will be weighted by the degree of radicalism of each party. See Chapter 4 for 
more details. 
63 Peronism in Argentina is probably the first example of post-war populist democracy. 
Finchelstein (2014, 476) observes how "Peronism is not fascism, but fascism represents a key 
dimension of its origins." 
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opportunity structure for populism to be socially acceptable in given countries, because 
collective memories shape and determine the field of ‘what can be said’ and the ideas of 
power than can be expressed.  
 
This leads to hypothesize that:  
 
H2: the lower the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past, the higher the 
social acceptability of populist discourses.  
 
Collective memories of the fascist past and stigma for populism 
 
Determining which type of collective memory of the fascist past has become mainstream 
in a given country, and whether secondary narratives emerged, is crucial in order to 
understand the level of stigmatization of the fascist past and therefore of the populist idea 
of power.64 This task is particularly complex, since the formation of collective memories 
is the outcome of a complex process of Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit, a concept that 
expresses the idea of ‘working through the past’. Alternatively it can be used the term 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, translatable as ‘coming to terms with the past’. However the 
latter expression has a crucially different meaning since it implies the idea of ‘let bygones 
be bygones’, thus silencing the past instead of problematizing it (Adorno 1977).65  
                                                           
64 For a seminal study on the differences and commonalities between individual and collective 
memory: (Halbwachs 1950). For a comprehensive collection of papers on the topic: Olick, 
Vinitzky-Seroussi, Levy (2011). 
65 The fact that the German language provides the most appropriate terms to define the process 
of elaboration of the past is clearly not a coincidence. In fact, Germany is the country that more 
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Here collective memory is defined as the outcome of a social and political process 
selecting parts of the past in order to create a collective identity (Gildea 2002, 59; T. 
Berger 2002, 80).66 The process can be characterized by collective amnesia, removals, 
and reinterpretations. When divergent historical narratives of the same past exist, this 
generates a conflict and possibly the adoption of secondary narratives along the master 
(or mainstream) narrative. 
 
The process of memory building takes place at different levels. Institutional 
commemorations and holidays, streets names, textbooks, movies and TV shows, 
symbolic actions, speeches, they all contribute to the formation (and ritualization) of a 
collective memory. All these aspects create layers of narrations, symbols, discourses, 
which become part of the collective memory of a country. The result of this process is 
shaped by the country's political culture, and at the same time contributes to shape it 
(Berger 2002, 81).  
 
Different types of historical critical junctures can originate a process of ‘working through 
the past’, such as revolutions, wars, and regime changes. In the words of Capoccia and 
Kelemen (2007, 348) critical junctures are “relatively short periods of time during which 
there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome 
of interest." The fascist past in Europe (a relatively short period) can be considered as a 
                                                           
than others – in Europe, but probably all over the world – had to face and elaborate its past in 
order to build a new identity and redefine its political culture. 
66 Other seminal works about the link between collective memories and identities are Todorov 
(1995) Ricoeur (2004).  
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critical juncture determining the ideas of power (outcome) that are legitimate or 
stigmatized in a given society (the agent). 
 
It is possible to argue that 1945 represents for Western Europe the 'year zero' of collective 
memory and democracy, and the fascist past is a critical juncture for the development of 
democratic ideals in Europe. After the end of World War II, every country had to re-
elaborate its past, offer a narration of its role during the war, and take position about the 
fascist regimes that directly or indirectly affected the country. Every European country 
had to make sense of the Shoah, the fascist and National-Socialist regimes, and had to 
define the type of collective memory to transmit to future generations. In other words, 
every country had to define its own new collective identity. 
 
More precisely, the fascist past is the most important moment of definition of national 
identity for modern nations67 and it is a common European-wide defining moment. 
Moreover, contrary to what happened with other historical and social moments of 
fundamental change (such as imperialism, World War I, civil wars or state formation), the 
re-elaboration of the fascist past took place in conditions of full democratic mobilization 
thus involving the masses in the formation of the collective memory. 
 
It is important to notice, however, that it is almost impossible to define the type of collective 
memory adopted in a given country immediately after World War II. This is the case 
because – like after every traumatic event – the process of re-elaboration is initially 
                                                           
67 Comparable only to state formation in the 19th century 
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blocked by removal and refusal. This initial phase can be labelled as silencing phase. It 
can be more or less protracted over time and it is characterized by the fact that thorny 
topics are avoided and the past is not confronted. During this phase it is not possible to 
form any collective stigmatization, and not surprisingly right-wing populist movements 
such as Poujadisme and Uomo Qualunque had the chance to emerge in France and Italy 
in the 1950s. Even in Germany, until the end of the 1950s, it was present in the public 
debate a clear distinction between "evil Nazis and good Germans" (S. Berger 2010, 121) 
because the country did not face its past yet.68 
 
After the silencing phase, normally in the 1960s but sometimes not before the beginning 
of the 1970s, countries started examining their role vis-à-vis the fascist past and World 
War II. Normally the self-critical phase is highly conflictual because opposite 
interpretations collide and the outcome of intellectual and political negotiations 
determines the country's collective memory. During the self-critical phase, countries 
decide what has to remain in the mainstream narrative and what has to be excluded 
because embarrassing or contradictory. It is worth mentioning, however, that some 
countries might never engage (or engage only to a minimum degree) with such a stage 
of memory building thus simply removing and ignoring their own role. In other cases, 
countries might face their past only when forced by external or internal pressure. 
 
Normally, collective memories emerge as the result of the self-critical phase and 
crystallize into official and – possibly – secondary narratives. It is in this moment that a 
                                                           
68 Pakier and Stråth (2010) describe in detail the silencing phase and its characteristics. 
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main narrative clearly emerges and alternative memories either become irrelevant and 
disappear or become accepted as secondary narratives. This means that in certain cases 
diverging interpretations maintain a certain acceptability and credibility in the public 
discourse, while in other cases only an official and mainstream memory is allowed. Once 
the self-critical phase is concluded, the mainstream and possibly secondary narratives 
are established and crystallize into an official collective memory. 
 
Moreover, while a correct process of socialization can prevent the fading of collective 
memories, it might also be the case that a natural generational change combined with the 
advent of new critical junctures (e.g. the end of the Cold War, the September 11 attacks, 
the Great Recession) might make societies perceive the 'remote' past as less and less 
relevant for the present.  
 
Before describing the different types of collective memory, and assign one type to each 
country (this will be performed in Chapter 6), it is important to explicit four caveats 
concerning the nature of collective memory and its evolution over time. First, this study 
does not consider the pre-1970 period because the silencing phase makes impossible to 
define any collective memory. Second, collective memories can evolve over time. This 
evolution is triggered by several factors such as debates among historians, international 
controversies, trials, school programs, movies, and TV shows, and makes memories 
open to variations caused by short-term junctures as well as by long-term processes. 
Third, the process of memory building is not relevant for the present analysis, therefore it 
is considered as a black box. In other words, the only relevant aspect is the type of 
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collective memory that emerged as the outcome of the process, and not the process itself. 
Fourth, not all countries necessarily fit perfectly only one type of collective memory. 
Indeed, the process of re-elaboration can lead to the formation of two or more coexisting 
collective memories. In this case, along with a mainstream narrative it is possible to 
identify one or several secondary narratives.  
 
Types of collective memory and levels of stigma 
 
Operationalizing and measuring different types of collective memory constitutes a 
relatively unexplored field. One could just consider the historic role of a certain country 
during the fascist past (victim, perpetrator, or bystander) in order to determine the degree 
of stigmatization of the past, but this would be highly misleading, since the memory of 
past events does not coincide with the events themselves. What matters is not the role of 
the country, but the memory of the country's role and the legitimacy or stigma attached to 
the country's past actions. 
 
According to the existing literature it is possible to identify a typology with four ideal-types 
of collective memory regarding the fascist past: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, 
and victimization.69 Each of them entails a specific idea of the role of the country during 
World War II and vis-à-vis the fascist regimes. This in turn determines different degrees 
of stigmatization of the illiberal elements that fascism and populism have in common. 
Indeed, populist discourses are seen as dangerous, and therefore become socially 
                                                           
69 The typology has been developed by Caramani and Manucci (under review). 
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unacceptable, because of the unmediated idea of popular sovereignty and the disregard 
for checks and balances that characterize the populist interpretation of democracy. In a 
country where the memory of fascism is strongly negative, these elements of populism 
can be seen as worrying signs for the strength of liberal democracy, while the same 
elements can be socially accepted in countries where the memory of fascism is more 
nuanced. 
 
Culpabilization and heroization have in common the fact that they imply a confrontation 
with the fascist past and its condemnation, which generates respectively very high and 
high levels of stigma towards illiberalism. When a country elaborates a collective memory 
based on culpabilization, the fascist past is condemned, the country takes responsibility 
for the past, and a thorough self-critical examination takes place. The country considers 
itself as guilty and assumes the burden of guilt for the fascist regime and its perpetrations. 
This indicates a very high degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements by making amend 
and compensating in various forms.70  
 
Opposed to culpabilization, there is a type of collective memory based on heroization. It 
also involves a strong condemnation of the fascist past, but for completely different 
reasons. This type of memory is based on a narration of the country as acting heroically 
against the fascist threat to defend liberal values and democratic institutions. The degree 
of stigmatization of illiberal elements is high, but less high compared to culpabilization, 
since the country was not responsible for the fascist past and does not have to take 
                                                           
70 The popular expression "once bitten, twice shy" here could be applied to explain why 
culpabilization implies a higher degree of stigma than heroization. 
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responsibility.71 In other words, heroization strongly condemns the fascist past but not as 
strongly as culpabilization because the country was not "infected" with the "fascist virus" 
and therefore could not fully develop the antibodies needed to combat it, including 
stigmatization.72  
 
Cancellation and victimization have in common the avoidance of responsibility, in other 
words they are based on denial.73 A collective memory based on cancellation takes place 
when a country decides to forget its role vis-à-vis the fascist past, and avoids 
responsibility since it considers itself as an external actor. In other words, the country 
does not problematize its implicit or explicit complicity with, and accommodation of, fascist 
regimes. The resulting degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is low, because the 
country avoids the process of ‘working through the past’.74 
 
Contrary to cancellation, a re-elaboration based on victimization confronts the past. 
However, this is done in order to overturn it and escape responsibility. It is worth clarifying 
that in this study victimization is understood as self-victimization or victim playing, and 
                                                           
71 The countries' past is only partially endogenous to their memory. Collective memories are 
intrinsically linked to the process of collective re-elaboration which, in turn, is linked to the 
country's role but also to the construction of memories of the country's role which are not 
necessarily historically accurate and serve as ex-post justifications. 
72 In this case, the pre-existent national political culture is quite important. If a liberal and 
democratic political culture has flourished for a long time it can provide the necessary antibodies 
against illiberal elements. Otherwise, the stigmatization of illiberal elements might result 
weakened.  
73 In the Oxford Dictionaries, "denial" is defined in one of its meanings as "Failure to acknowledge 
an unacceptable truth or emotion or to admit it into consciousness, used as a defence 
mechanism." 
74 In this case, pre-existent national political cultures are extremely important. Since the country 
does not distance itself from that past but rather refuses to deal with it, the stigmatization of illiberal 
elements is mainly linked to the long-lasting effect of a pre-existent national political culture. 
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therefore cannot be applied to countries which were actually victims of fascist regimes.75 
In other words, only in case the country was at least partially ascribable to the group of 
perpetrators. Indeed, the country was directly or indirectly supporting a fascist regime, but 
its refusal to ‘work through the past’ makes it ignoring its responsibilities while standing 
as a victim. Moreover, the country shifts the blame to external forces while presenting its 
own national experience in a positive light. This type of memory therefore presents a 
strong form of alteration which makes possible for alternative narratives to be perceived 
as legitimate: no narrative is really stigmatized – including nostalgic and revisionist ones. 
The degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is extremely low because the strong 
form of self-delusion blocks the formation of negative attitudes towards illiberalism.  
 
Figure 5 shows that the different types of collective memories have a nominal value but, 
in terms of degree of stigmatization, the four types of narratives can be conceived as a 
single variable with an ordinal value. At one extreme is culpabilization, with a very high 
level of stigma due to a combination of two factors: a total acceptation of guilt and an 
existential stigmatization of fascism (++). A step lower there is heroization, which 
stigmatizes fascism without fundamentally question the country's identity and national 
culture (+). 
 
                                                           
75 Such as Poland, that never collaborated with the Nazis nor surrendered. 
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Figure 5: Collective Memories as Proxy for Cultural Opportunity Structures 
 
Past  Black Box  Type of Memory  Level of Stigma 
 Cultural Opportunity 
Structures for Populism 
Each country 
is confronted 
with fascism 
and World 
War II 
 
Conflicts, debates, 
and negotiations, 
originate different 
types of collective 
memories. 
 
Culpabilization  Very High (++)  Closed Down 
 Heroization  High (+)  Partially Closed Down 
 Cancellation  Low (-)  Partially Opened Up 
 Victimization  Very Low (--)  Opened Up 
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Culpabilization is expected to close down the space for right-wing populism because the 
fascist past is completely condemned and becomes a no-go area. Collective feeling of 
guilt and shame, acquired through socialization over generations, makes unacceptable 
any link with the past. Responsibility and guilt are internalized and undisputed, while 
holding views associated with the fascist past is socially sanctioned. Also heroization is 
expected to close down the space for right-wing populism because any link to a past 
fought through sacrifice becomes shocking and socially sanctioned.  
 
Cancellation, being a type of non-narrative where the past is avoided, neither discusses 
nor alters the past hence preventing the formation of stigma (-). In the case of 
victimization, responsibility is rejected and the past is altered and therefore not 
stigmatized at all (--). In these two narratives the stigma associated with the fascist past 
is weak or absent – and even when present it can be contested. This is the case because 
the past, being either ignored or altered, has no negative connotations and holding views 
in line with that past remains acceptable or not socially sanctioned. In the case of 
cancellation, this is due to the lack of public debate. In the case of victimization, this is 
due to the alteration of past roles and to blame-shifting toward external forces. 
 
Before Chapter 5 discusses the amount of populism in each country and Chapter 6 
assigns a type of collective memory to each country, it is necessary to introduce in 
Chapter 4 the case selection and the operationalization used to measure populism in 
party manifestos, as well as the methodology implemented in order to determine the 
impact of collective stigmatization of the fascist past.  
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Chapter 4 – Research Design 
 
This chapter illustrates how populism is operationalized and measured through a process 
of semi-automated content analysis. Moreover, several key elements of this study are 
explained and justified, such as the case-selection, the time frame, the criteria for the 
selection of party manifestos, and the methodology used in the analytical section. The 
tools employed for the semi-automated content analysis of populist discourses have been 
designed in the context of the third phase of the NCCR Democracy project at the 
University of Zurich. A four-years-long joint effort has produced: a common codebook for 
the analysis of the texts, the training of a large number of highly-skilled coders, and the 
production of an electronic interface (Angrist) that enables the coders to input relational 
data in a quick and efficient way.76 In particular, a team of 76 coders has been trained 
intensively in order to code several types of media outlets. For the present study, only 
party manifestos for eight countries in the period 1970-2014 are considered.77 All coders 
passed a reliability test assessing the validity of their decisions, with a mean agreement 
of 85.7% in identifying units of analysis within the texts, and a mean interrater reliability 
of Kappan=0.813 in coding the content of these units of analysis.78 
 
                                                           
76 Wettstein (2014; 2016). The documentation (retrieved in October 2017) about Angrist is 
available at: 
http://www.ipmz.uzh.ch/Abteilungen/Medienpsychologie/Recource/Angrist/ANGRIST_1-2-en.pdf 
77 The actual number of coders involved in this particular research project was actually 43.  
78 About Brennan & Prediger's Kappa, see (Brennan and Prediger 1981) 
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Table 4 – Kappan Coefficients Coding Populism 
Variables measuring populism Kappan Coefficient 
Praising the people’s achievements 0.984 
Blaming the elites 0.629 
Expressing Closeness to the people 0.983 
Denouncing the elites 0.778 
Excluding of the elite from the people 0.889 
Stating a monolithic people 0.740 
Claiming power for the people 0.988 
Denying power to the elites 0.946 
Stressing the virtues of the people 0.980 
Summary 0.813 
 
First, a test was conducted on coder validity (checking the coders' agreement with a gold 
standard solution) and then a hidden reliability test was conducted. During the content 
analysis, and without notification, coders were assigned single texts from a corpus of 29 
texts in German and English. The results of these two tests for every aspect of populism 
are generally acceptable, with average-levels of Cohen’s Kappa of 0.73 for the ‘gold 
standard’ test and 0.76 for the hidden reliability test. Table 4 shows the Kappan 
coefficients for each variable.79 
 
Reliability and validity are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the measurement 
of populism, considering the many different approaches emerged in the literature.80 The 
                                                           
79 The values are presented for all the variables, including those used uniquely for the alternative 
operationalization. 
80 An extensive overview is offered in Aslanidis (2017). 
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nature of this study, however, is essentially comparative and the absolute levels of the 
acceptability of populism are less relevant insofar as the differences across countries are 
correctly represented. Nonetheless, many aspects have to be thoroughly discussed in 
order to make sure that the measurement is performed in accordance with the definition 
of populism provided in Chapter 1 and that it allows the highest degree of comparability 
between countries. 
 
Finally, it is important to highlight why fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) 
can be considered as the most appropriate method for this study. Since the aim is to 
understand under which socio-economic and political-institutional opportunity structures 
populist discourses are more or less socially acceptable, fsQCA allows determining to 
what extent each condition is necessary for the outcome to occur, and which (combination 
of) conditions are sufficient. Moreover, it becomes possible to assess to what extent the 
levels of stigma contribute to form a better explanation for the phenomenon. 
 
Populist discourses in party manifestos 
 
Consistently with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1, this study considers 
populism as an ideology articulated discursively. This implies that the populist ideology 
becomes empirically measurable as soon as an actor articulates it discursively. This 
allows measuring populism in a consistent and comparable way across countries and 
over time (Aslanidis 2017). Ideally, the best measurement for the acceptability of populism 
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in a certain country at a certain time in point would include each type of discourse 
circulating in the public debate, as well as every type of speaker.81  
 
However, discourses articulated by different types of actors (politicians, journalists, 
celebrities, common people, or religious leaders) in different media outlets (party 
manifestos, social media, newspapers, TV shows, or blogs) are not necessarily 
comparable, and analyzing them can be extremely expensive and time consuming. 
Moreover, the hypothesis developed in this study stipulates that populist discourses are 
more or less legitimate according to different levels of stigmatization of the fascist past. 
Therefore, party manifestos are the most suitable and convenient type of document to 
analyze for several reasons. 
 
First, by analyzing party manifestos it is possible to observe how often political actors rely 
on populist discourses when they are free to communicate directly to the electorate, thus 
articulating – in an unmediated way – their idea of society and, ultimately, their idea of 
power. Second, non-political actors are less affected by the possible stigma attached to 
the fascist past. Compared to political actors, who have an institutional and official role, 
for them it might be more socially acceptable to articulate populist discourses, hence 
making a comparison highly problematic. Third, the choice of investigating the presence 
of populism in party manifestos is linked to previous studies which consider this type of 
                                                           
81 Following previous studies about the presence of populist discourses, I define public debates 
as the public discussion of ideas, facts, feelings and opinions relevant to politics and involving 
citizens, politicians, and experts, with the media acting at the same time as ‘gatekeepers’ and 
actors themselves (Rooduijn 2014a; Bennett and Entman 2001; Vliegenthart and Roggeband 
2007). National newspapers, magazines, television programs, and internet fora all constitute 
places where the public debate takes place.  
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material as "an authoritative document that gives a clear overview of the ideas of a party 
at a certain point in time" as well as appropriate for comparative content analysis 
(Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014, 566).  
 
The advantage of a semi-automated content analysis over expert survey data is self-
evident. Instead of relying on data that might be biased by theoretical expectations 
regarding how ‘populist’ is a certain party or politician, this method provides fine-grained 
and objective measures of the levels of populism in the electoral manifestos of different 
political actors. In other words, rather than assuming that certain actors are populist by 
definition, the content analysis allows determining how often each actor articulates 
populist messages. 
 
Given that analyzing party materials is labor intensive, most studies in this strand of 
literature focus on specific country cases or engage in small sample cross-national 
comparisons. One of the strengths of the present study is the combination of a large 
cross-national sample (eight countries) over a considerable longitudinal extension (from 
the 1970s to the 2010s). 
 
Case selection 
 
This study focuses on eight West European countries: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. There are several 
reasons behind the selection of the countries. First, it is in Western Europe – among the 
world's established democracies – that populist actors are becoming increasingly 
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successful in elections (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008) and often manage to set the 
public debate with fiery statements and vicious attacks to their opponents (Mény and 
Surel 2000). In other words, populist actors often set the agenda of the political debate 
forcing mainstream actors to strategically adapt and react (Rooduijn 2014a). Therefore, 
the growing political impact of populism in Western Europe (Mudde 2013) is extremely 
relevant because it speaks to the nature and future of democracy itself.  
 
Second, Western Europe represents a privileged observation point on several varieties 
of populist discourses: from extreme left to extreme right actors, from niche to mainstream 
parties, in Western Europe countries virtually every possible type of populist discourse is 
articulated by political actors. Moreover, given the longitudinal and comparative 
dimension of this study, it is important to notice that in Western Europe the archives of 
party manifestos – both online and offline – are often complete and easily accessible. 
 
Third, the electoral success of populist parties is not uniform across the eight countries 
analyzed. While in countries such as Austria, Italy, Switzerland and France they are 
consistently successful over time, in other countries such as Sweden and Germany they 
are not, with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as intermediary cases (van Kessel 
2015b). As Rooduijn  has shown, the diffusion of populist discourses in the public debate 
varies according to the electoral success of populist parties (2014a), and therefore the 
variance in the selected countries is important. 
Fourth, following a most similar systems design (MSSD), these countries display different 
levels of populism, but share similar patterns of state formation, nation-building and 
84 
 
democratization.82 On the other hand, following a most different systems design (MDSD), 
it might be the case that countries with similar levels of populism have different political 
cultures. While Switzerland and Germany are consensus democratic systems and the 
United Kingdom is a clear majoritarian democracy, France is a unique example of a 
premier-presidential system and the other cases are parliamentary systems (Lijphart 
1999; Lijphart 2012).83 Moreover, the selected countries show a fair amount of variability 
in terms of accountability and responsiveness of the political system, perception of 
corruption, and economic performance. This variance is important in order to test which 
socio-economic and political-institutional conditions are necessary or sufficient for the 
social acceptability of populism.  
 
Finally, every West European country has been confronted – more or less directly – with 
fascism and World War II. Consequently, each country had to develop a narration of those 
events in order to define its new collective identity. This means that they have formed 
collective memories about the same authoritarian past, in this case the fascist past, 
therefore making possible to test the impact of stigmatization of the past on the presence 
of populist discourses. 
 
Moreover, on a pragmatic note, it was not possible to include every West European 
country in the content analysis, mainly because of practical reasons linked to the amount 
of time available and to obvious financial restrictions. However, the eight selected 
                                                           
82 See e.g. Bartolini (1993) and Sartori (1991) 
83 Papadopoulos (2002, 53) discusses in detail the impact of the institutional dimension on the 
degree of populism. 
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countries are supposed to represent other countries such as Denmark, Norway, Spain, 
Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Ireland since they show similar institutional 
features, political systems, socio-economic conditions, and collective memories of the 
fascist past compared to the included countries. 
 
On the longitudinal dimension, five time points have been selected. In particular, for 
each country has been chosen one national election per decade.84 The aim is to have, 
for each decade, elections as close as possible one to another in each country, in order 
to provide the maximum degree of comparability. Moreover, in France the first round of 
presidential elections is preferred to legislative elections, given France’s unique semi-
presidential system and the importance that presidential elections play in its political 
system.85 Moreover, Italy in the 2000s has been excluded since the two different electoral 
systems used in 2001 and 2006 forced the parties to form broad coalitions rather than 
participating alone, and therefore separate manifestos are not available.86  
                                                           
84 Although populist parties perform even better in the context of the elections for the European 
Parliament, National elections are more appropriate than European ones as the latter are mostly 
second-order national elections (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). 
85 In the first round of presidential elections all the candidates are still participating in the electoral 
campaign, and therefore it is possible to retrieve an electoral manifesto for each party. On the 
other hand, legislative elections are relatively less relevant given the French semi-presidential 
system. 
86 In 2006 the centre-left coalition "L'Unione", for example, counted 9 founding parties. The Italian 
election of 2008 would have been technically available, because the different parties presented 
separate electoral manifestos. However, this would have been in contradiction with one of the 
criteria stated above: since all the other countries considered hold elections in the period 2001-
2003, selecting an election from 2008 would have diminished the degree of comparability.  
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Table 5 – Corpus Manifestos: Overview 
 
The party manifestos issued before the election periods have been selected since they 
are supposed to be particularly suited in order to observe populist discourses. Indeed, 
during election campaigns political actors are particularly active in communicating their 
positions to voters, and in particular they might express more frequently their opinion 
concerning different ideas of power, and about the role of the elite and the people in the 
decision-making process. The party manifestos have been retrieved by the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2016) or from parties' websites. Alternatively, the 
Country Election Years N. Manifestos Statements in Manifestos 
Austria 1975, 1983, 1994, 
2002, 2013 21 1723 
France 1974, 1981, 1995, 
2002, 2012 
22 1812 
Germany 1972, 1983, 1994, 
2002, 2013 
19 1489 
Italy 1972, 1983, 1994, 
2013 
17 2470 
Netherlands 1972, 1982, 1994, 
2002, 2012 
24 2429 
Sweden 1973, 1982, 1994, 
2002, 2014 
29 1113 
Switzerland 1975, 1983, 1995, 
2003, 2011 
26 1185 
United Kingdom 1974, 1983, 1992, 
2001, 2010 
15 1843 
SUM  173 14064 
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author personally contacted the political parties and asked for the missing manifestos. As 
Table 5 shows, the content analysis concerns 173 party manifestos for a total of 14102 
coded statements. Appendix 1 provides some descriptive data about the manifestos, 
while Appendix 3 lists for each analyzed manifesto the total number of statements and 
populist statements.  
 
Measuring the social acceptability of populism  
 
The social acceptability of populism is here measured as the percentage of populist 
statements in a party manifesto, which is then weighted by two other factors: the degree 
of radicalism of the party and the vote share the party received in that election. Populist 
statements are identified according to the ad-hoc codebook produced in the context of 
the NCCR Democracy project, and six indicators are used to detect the presence of 
populist messages (Table 6). This section describes in detail the procedure for the 
measurement of populism in party manifestos. 
 
Populism is measured – in each party manifesto87 – as the percentage of populist 
statements compared to the total amount of political statements, which constitute the unit 
of measure. Those statements which do not contain either an evaluation of a social actor 
or a position regarding a political issue are removed from the total amount of political 
                                                           
87 Other authors use paragraphs as sample unit. I use the whole manifesto because, as explained 
by Aslanidis (2017, 10), paragraphs "frequently contain bullet-pointed lists and short motivational 
sentences or quotes, features that further undermine comparability. […] segmentation into 
paragraphs still involves a discount in semantic resolution, since mildly populist paragraphs 
receive identical scores with intensely populist ones that carry greater informative content." 
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statements because they do not contain any relevant information about the speaker's 
ideology, idea of power, or issue positioning.88 In other words, a speaker (in this case a 
political party) articulates a political statement as soon as an evaluation is expressed: 
 
1) About other social actors. These actors can be political actors (politicians, parties, 
parliaments, or governments), but also economic actors, national and supranational 
organizations, the people, judiciary actors, the police or the army, as well as religious 
actors or the media.  
 
2) About a political issue. It was used a set of 12 issue-categories which includes: 
economy, culture, welfare, budget, army, immigration, Europe, security, institutional 
reforms, army, ecology, infrastructures. Each statement in which a position on one of 
these issues is expressed has been coded. 
 
In order to make the measurement as strict and objective as possible, and with the aim 
of reducing if not eliminating type I errors (false positives), the coders have been trained 
to code only explicit statements. Implications, hints, and context knowledge is never 
applied to the coding process. Even if a coder realizes that, between the lines, a message 
has a certain implicit meaning, this is irrelevant, since the statement is only coded in case 
the meaning is explicit.89 Another relevant aspect concerns the absolute number of coded 
                                                           
88 A statement that is discarded from the coding process because it does not include any actor 
evaluation or issue positioning, might sound like: "Next year there will be elections and our party 
will participate" or "This manifesto aims at illustrating the goals of our party." 
89 The golden rule expressed in the codebook about this aspect reads as follows: "If you have to 
ask yourself whether a statement is explicit enough to code it, it is not." 
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statements. Indeed, only one statement toward each issue or target is coded for each 
speaker in a party manifesto. This means that if the speaker makes several statements 
on a specific issue (e.g. 'welfare') or target (e.g. 'the journalists'), these are considered as 
one single statement although the message is articulated over several sentences. If the 
speaker is criticizing the government because 'it does not listen to the people' several 
times in the text, this is only coded once. 
 
After having identified the main characteristics of the unit of measure (political 
statements), it is crucial to identify populist statements (Table 6). A statement is coded as 
populist – according to the conceptualization outlined in Chapter 1 – whenever a party: 
 
– Claims to be close to the people; 
– Mentions the people as a monolithic actor with a common will; 
– Stresses the virtues of the people; 
– Praises the positive achievements of the people; 
– Introduces a cleavage between the elites and the people  
– Demands more power for the people 
 
Moreover, three caveats are crucial in order to fully describe the operationalization of 
populism used in this study. First, "exclusion of the elite from the people" is coded as 
present only in case the target of the critique is the elite as a whole. Therefore, a critique 
targeting only part of the elite – like a specific party, or a certain politician – is not 
considered as a populist statement. 
90 
 
 
On the other hand, the type of elite as a whole which is criticized varies according to the 
broader ideology of the speaker. The critique might target political elites (‘established 
parties’ or ‘the government’), but also financial (‘the capitalists’), economic (‘the banks’), 
cultural (‘the academics’, 'the media'), or unspecified elites (‘the mighty ones’). Moreover, 
in this way a critique of the elites as a whole is coded as populist only if the critique is 
made with a reference to the people. 
 
Second, the concept of ‘people’ can also be declined in different ways according to the 
speaker's full ideology. The codebook includes generic expressions concerning the 
people, but also expressions defining the people as ethnos (‘the Dutch’), as a function 
(‘the voters’), as a hypothetical prototype of the people (‘the man in the street'), or any 
other term which can stand for ‘the majority in the society’. 
 
Third, contrary to other studies (Rooduijn 2014a, 734; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der 
Brug 2014, 567) the co-occurrence of people-centrism and anti-elitism is not required, 
since each statement containing one of the six elements can be considered as populist 
(alternative operationalization in Appendix 10, Table 36). 
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Table 6 – Operationalization of Populism 
Dimensions Questions in the Codebook 
Closeness to the 
people 
Does the speaker claim to belong / be close to / know / speak 
for / care for / agree with / perform everyday actions like / 
represent / embody the people? 
Stating a monolithic 
people 
Does the speaker describe the people as homogeneous, 
sharing common feelings, desires, or opinions? 
Stressing the virtues 
of the people 
Does the speaker describe the people in a positive way (moral, 
credible, competent, no lack of understanding, etc.)?  
Praising the 
people’s 
achievements 
Does the speaker stress positive actions and positive past and 
future impacts of the people (responsible for a positive 
development / situation, not being responsible for a mistake, 
etc.)? 
Exclusion of the 
elite from the people 
Does the speaker describe the elites as not belonging to / not 
being close to / not knowing the needs of / not caring about / 
not speaking on behalf of / not empowering / deceiving the 
people? 
Claiming power for 
the people 
Does the speaker argue that the people should have / gain / not 
lose power? Does the speaker give the people the competence 
to act or decide on a specific political issue? Does the speaker 
demand institutional reforms for more participation of the 
people in politics? 
 
This approach has several advantages. For example, it reduces the number manifestos 
with no populism, thus making more meaningful the quantitative comparison.90 Moreover, 
it eliminates cases in which a manifesto contains high levels of people-centrism but no 
anti-elitism thus resulting in a 'zero' as percentage of populism, while with just one anti-
                                                           
90 The number of manifestos that would have "zero" populism with the co-occurrence principle, 
but that in fact show populism with this operationalization is 57 (around 33% of the sample): 8 in 
the 1970s, 9 in the 1980s, 16 in the 1990s, 10 in the 2000s, and 14 in the 2010s. 
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elitist statement the percentage of populism would have been much higher.91 On the other 
and, since this study relies on a definition of populism based on both anti-elitism and 
people-centrism, this operationalization also requires several adjustments and 
clarifications.  
 
For example, a critique of the elites is not coded as populist unless it explicitly makes 
reference to the people. Since a critique of the elite can be sufficient to speak of populism 
following this operationalization, it would be highly problematic to code every critique to 
the elites as populist, and therefore this is done more restrictively: only in case the anti-
elitist critique is carried on in the name of the people (and, as explained before, in case 
the elite is considered as a whole and not a specific actor).  
 
On the other hand, the opposite is not necessarily true: a people-centric message, if 
coded as proposed here, does not require explicit anti-elitism in order to be coded as 
populist, because it already incorporates it. For example, political statements like "We are 
truly on the side of the people" (Closeness to the people, intending that other parties are 
not), "The people are tired of this dramatic situation" (Stating a monolithic people, as in a 
purely populist fashion), “The people should decide what is better for the future of this 
country” (Stressing virtues of the people, as opposed to those of the elites), “It is thanks 
to the courage of the common people if the situation improved” (Praising the people’s 
achievements, as opposed to a passive or negative role of the elites), or “The people 
                                                           
91 For example, the Labour Party (UK) and the ÖVP (CH) in the 2000s and 2010s, but also the 
FDP (CH) and the FPÖ (AT) in the 2010s would have been coded as having no populism, 
precisely because they show people-centrism but no explicit anti-elitism.  
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should decide on this issue through a referendum” (Claiming power for the people, as 
opposed to the power of the elites) are coded as populist even without an explicit critique 
of the elites, because they clearly embed it. Indeed, when a party takes the side of the 
people in its electoral manifesto, it is clearly doing so in opposition to the other parties.  
 
Moreover, not counting people-centric statements as populist would be highly 
problematic. Indeed, the vast majority of anti-elitist critiques are directed towards political 
elites (such as the government, the parliamentary majority, or the established parties) and 
therefore almost exclusively oppositional and non-mainstream parties would be able to 
articulate anti-elitist statements (hence being able to show traces of populism in their 
manifestos). This means that by using an operationalization of populism that relies on the 
co-occurrence of people-centrism and anti-elitism, governmental parties and mainstream 
parties would almost never turn out to be populist thus generating type II errors (false 
negatives).92  
 
Even with the operationalization applied in this study, which evens out differences 
between mainstream and non-mainstream parties, it clearly appears that new non-
mainstream parties (the 'usual suspects', so to speak) are anyway much more populist 
that established mainstream parties. The results are not much different from those that 
                                                           
92 Rooduijn et al. (2014, 567), for example, use the co-occurrence operationalization, and indeed 
nearly all mainstream parties have a very low populism score. 
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would have been obtained by using a co-occurrence principle, which are anyway fully 
reported in Appendix 10 (Table 37).93  
 
According to the description of the measurement offered above, the overall amount of 
populism for each manifesto can theoretically range from 0 (none of the coded statements 
is populist) to 100 (each coded statement is populist). The results of the content analysis 
are presented in Chapter 6, but for the moment it is possible to anticipate that 715 out of 
14,064 political statements (almost 5.1%) have been coded as populist. The populism 
scores of the manifestos empirically range from 0% (which is the case for 47 of the 173 
manifestos, 24 of which are from Swedish parties) to 30% (e.g. the Green Party of 
Germany in 2013)94 of populist statements, and on average a manifesto contains 4.9% of 
populist statements.  
 
In order to determine whether in a certain country populism is socially accepted, two 
additional steps are implemented. First, the percentage of populist statements is weighted 
by two additional factors: the vote share and the degree of radicalism of the party. Figure 
6 presents a three-dimensional overview of the composition of the outcome (or dependent 
variable). Second, the levels of populism in a certain country at a certain time in point 
(country-decade) are obtained by aggregating the weighted levels of populism form all 
the manifestos containing populist statements in that particular election.  
                                                           
93 Appendix 10 (Table 38) shows the raw and fuzzy values of populism according to the alternative 
operationalization; from Figure 37 to Figure 40 it is visualized the average percentage of populism 
per manifesto as well as the levels across countries. 
94 The Socialist Party in Italy in the 1970s has a score of 40%, but the populist statements are 2 
out of 5, therefore the reliability of such a measurement is questionable. 
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The percentage of populist statements is weighted by radicalism and vote share because 
what is relevant in this study is the degree of acceptability of populist discourses in a 
certain country. If a manifesto contains remarkable levels of populism 
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Figure 6: Salonfähigkeit of Populism in Three Dimensions 
 
 
(say 10%), but the party is not radical (1.5 in a 1-to-6 scale where 1 is non radical and 6 
is very radical) and it obtained only 5% of the vote share, the weighted level of populism 
for that manifesto will be 75 (10*1.5*5). On the other hand, if a manifesto containing the 
same amount of populism (10%) is written by a very radical party (say 5 out of 6) which 
obtained a striking electoral result (say 25% of the vote share), the weighted level of 
populism for that manifesto will be 1,250 (10*5*25). This means that a party can articulate 
more or less populist messages in its manifesto, but what also matters in order to 
understand how acceptable is populism in a certain country is how radical and successful 
is that party and therefore its discourse. If a very populist manifesto written by a very 
radical party obtains less than 1% of the votes, it is safe to assume that the party's 
message is insignificant in the public debate. 
      Populism  
    
     
Vote share Radicalism 
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Following a similar approach, the level of populism in a certain country is obtained by 
aggregating the weighted levels of populism of all the manifestos containing populist 
statements in that particular election. This means that if one single moderate party (say 
2 out of 6) with a populist manifesto (say 10%) obtains 40% of the vote share, while none 
of the other parties participating in that election articulates populism, the total amount is 
800 (2*10*40). The same amount is reached in case four moderate parties (2) with equally 
populist manifestos (10%) obtain each 10% of the vote share. Calculating the average 
amount of populist messages among all the manifestos would render irrelevant the fact 
that in a certain country there are several credible populist actors, and assign higher 
scores to countries with one mainstream party articulating populist discourses. On the 
other hand in this way it is possible to compare the United Kingdom to other countries, 
since one single party with a considerable vote share can count as much as several 
smaller parties. 
 
Theoretically a country in a certain time in point can have a level of weighted populism 
ranging from 0 to 60,000.95 The higher end is empirically unimaginable, since it describes 
a country in which extremely radical parties (6 in a scale from 1 to 6) obtained 100% of 
the vote share while only articulating populist statements in their manifestos (6*100*100). 
The observed values are, of course, much lower. The highest level of weighted populism 
                                                           
95 The levels of the outcome are then transformed in a 0 to 1 scale in order to perform the analysis 
and the thresholds for cases to be considered as being members of the outcome or not are 
explained in detail in the Operationalization and calibration section of Chapter 7. A simple 
logarithmic normalization form 0 to 100 based on maximum and minimum values would leave 
most of the cases below 50 for example, thus making the interpretation of the values even harder. 
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registered consists in the 3,418 total points scored by Austria in 2013. In particular, this 
level is linked to the presence of the manifesto of the Austrian Freedom Party 
(Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ), which alone scores 2,028 (more than 21% 
populist statements, 4.7/6 in radicalism, 20.5% of the vote share). Apart from the 
manifesto of the FPÖ, it is worth noticing that also the other five coded manifestos in the 
same election have significant levels of populism: SPÖ (3.3%), NEOS (5.1%), Grüne 
(7.1%); ÖVP (11.9%), Team Stronach (13.9%), and that all together these six parties 
cover 94.4% of the vote share.  
 
Methodology 
 
The hypotheses formulated are tested through fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA). This method postulates that the presence (or absence) of a dependent variable, 
called outcome, can be explained by a combination of different independent variables, 
called conditions, therefore identifying multiple causal patterns. This is in contrast with the 
concept of additivity, which postulates that single variables have their own independent 
impact on the dependent variable. This work follows the reasons brought by van Kessel 
in his book that employs QCA to study the conditions for the electoral success of populist 
parties in Europe (2015b, 29–30).  
 
Indeed, several key concepts of QCA are essential in explaining why this particular 
methodology fits the task of this study. The principle of equifinality states that the same 
outcome can be explained by different (combinations of) conditions. At the same time, 
QCA is also based on multifinality, meaning that the same (combinations of) conditions 
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can explain different outcomes. Another central concept in QCA is conjunctural causation, 
meaning that it is a configuration of combined conditions that relates to a certain outcome. 
This implies that single conditions are not supposed to affect the outcome independently, 
but in combination. Finally, QCA relies on the concept of causal asymmetry, meaning that 
the presence or absence of a certain outcome might be explained by different 
configurations of conditions. All these factors are particularly relevant considering that the 
literature examined in Chapter 2 clearly points to the presence of multiple factors and 
their combinations in order to explain the presence of populism.96 
 
Moreover, the ultimate goal of QCA is to analyse set-theoretic sufficiency relations. The 
aim is to verify whether a single condition always leads to the same outcome.97 Indeed, 
the main feature and aim of QCA consists in determining necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a certain outcome to occur (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The first step 
consists in assessing the presence of any explanatory condition that is necessary for the 
presence of the outcome. At the same time, it is also determined the presence of any 
condition necessary for the absence of the outcome (or, in other words, for the presence 
of its negation). In a further step, through Boolean minimization, the analysis determines 
the presence of (combinations of) conditions whose presence is sufficient for the 
presence (or absence) of the outcome. This normally brings to the definition of a solution 
formula showing the sufficient (combination of) conditions for the occurrence of the 
                                                           
96 The most important theoretical works about the concepts used in QCA are: Ragin 2008; Ragin 
1987; Ragin 2000; Schneider and Wagemann 2012. 
97 This is a general principle of every comparative method and it goes back (at least) to John 
Stuart Mill (1906), who anyway did not believe it was possible to apply the method to social 
sciences as explained in Caramani (2009). 
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outcome. The solution can be conservative, intermediate or parsimonious according to 
the assumptions made about the logical reminders (this aspect will be discussed in 
Chapter 7). Each solution has a value for consistency and a value for coverage, which 
illustrate how 'precise' is the solution formula in explaining the occurrence of the outcome 
(consistency or inclusion), and how many cases are covered by that solution formula 
(coverage). 
 
In this study the dependent variable to be explained, or outcome in the QCA terminology, 
is represented by the social acceptability of populist discourses, measured as the levels 
of populism in party manifestos weighted by the degree of radicalism and vote share of 
the party. In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the conditions linked to the social 
acceptability of populism (POP), it is also tested the impact of the conditions on the 
acceptability of left-wing (POP_L) and right-wing (POP_R) populism separately, for a total 
of three different outcomes. This is done because the social acceptability of right-wing 
populism might be explained by a different combination of conditions compared to left-
wing populism. 
 
The cases observed are represented by eight countries, each analysed during three 
election points in the period 1990-2015, bringing the total of cases to 24. Given the 
peculiar electoral law used in Italy for the elections of 2001, it was not possible to find 
electoral manifestos for the single parties but only the manifestos of the two main 
coalitions. Therefore the number of cases dropped to 23 (see in Chapter 6 the section 
about populism Italy). The first part of the QCA analysis presented in Chapter 7 is 
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performed in order to assess the impact of high levels of corruption, poor economic 
performance, low levels of accountability and responsiveness, and high ideological 
convergence on the social acceptability of populism. The second part of the analysis, 
presented in Chapter 8, introduces the level of stigma, a newly constructed condition 
aiming at assessing whether the level of stigmatization of the fascist past can contribute 
to better explain the same outcomes. 
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Chapter 5 – Populism in Eight West European Countries since the 1970s 
 
This chapter presents the descriptive results of the content analysis described in Chapter 
4. In particular, it illustrates the trend for the presence of populism in party manifestos in 
eight European countries since the 1970s up to now. Moreover, it disentangles between 
left-wing and right-wing variants of populism. Finally, it describes each country in detail 
explaining which party manifestos articulate populist discourses, giving examples and 
discussing whether the findings are in line with the literature on the topic.  
 
The data presented concern also two time points which are not used in the analysis 
because the data which are used to operationalize the conditions to be tested are 
inexistent or incomplete for the decades before 1990. Hence, only the 1990s, 2000s and 
2010s will be object of the QCA analysis. However, it is interesting to present a more 
long-term picture concerning the development of populism in Western Europe. In 
particular, by including the 1970s and 1980s three considerations can be made. First: the 
last elections (2010s) are characterized by unprecedented levels of populism. Second: it 
is not since the 1990s – as it is often argued – that populism started growing. In fact, the 
overall levels in the 1970s are higher than in the 2000s. Third, on average left-wing parties 
articulate populist discourses more often than right-wing parties. All the data are reported 
in Appendix 1 (Table 16 to Table 20). 
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Figure 7: Average Populism in Manifestos (Percentage) 
 
Figure 7 represents the average percentage of populist statements in each manifesto for 
every decade. It shows that, on average, a right-wing manifesto (dashed line) in the 2010s 
contains on average much more populism than in the 1970s (despite a slight downturn in 
the 2000s). The manifestos of left-wing parties, on the other hand, were on average more 
populist in the 1970s compared to the three following decades (dotted line). Overall, the 
percentage of populist statements in all party manifestos (solid line) shows that the 
manifestos written for the last elections have been the most populist, but the increase has 
not been steadfast: the percentage of populist statements in the 1970s and 1980s was 
higher compared to the 2000s. 
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Figure 8: Average Populism in Manifestos (Weighted) 
 
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the social acceptability of populist discourses. The 
average percentage of populist statements in each manifesto is here weighted by the 
degree of radicalism and vote share of the party author of the manifesto. Compared to 
Figure 7, it appears clearly that by considering the two additional parameters the 
difference between populism in left-wing and right-wing manifestos in the 1970s and 
1980s is even more accentuated. This makes the fall of populism in left-wing manifestos 
even more spectacular between the 1970s and the 2000s. Right-wing populism, on the 
other hand, has remained rather stable between the 1990s and the 2010s. Finally, the 
overall levels of populism were almost identical in the 1970s (295) and the 2010s (294), 
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with very constant levels in the 1980s and 1990s as well, and the usual downturn in the 
2000s. 
 
In Appendix 2, Table 21 and Table 22 show that the development over time is statistically 
not significant (only the 1980s compared to the 2010s show a significant negative 
coefficient with a confidence interval of 95%). Moreover, Appendix 10 shows the same 
descriptive data (including the statistical significance tests) based on the alternative 
operationalization implementing the co-occurrence principle. The main difference 
consists in the fact that the alternative operationalization based on co-occurrence raises 
the amount of right-wing populism in the 2000s.  
 
The main focus of this study, however, consists in understanding how much populist 
discourses are acceptable in a given country compared to other countries, rather than the 
average content of populism in manifestos over time. For this reason, Figures Figure 9 
and Figure 10 show the average amount of populism at the country level. Here the focus 
is on the average level of populism across the eight countries considered, and the unit of 
measure is country-decade, not manifestos. The amount of populism in a certain country-
decade is calculated as the sum of all populist manifestos, and finally the values reported 
describe the average value of populism across the eight countries analyzed. The data 
concerning the amount of populism per country-decade, both as a percentage of populist 
statements in manifesto (unweighted) and their combination with radicalism and vote 
share (weighted) are presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7 – Populism by Country-Decade Raw and Weighted 
Country Decade 
R.W. 
Populism 
(weighted) 
L.W. 
Populism 
(weighted) 
Total 
Populism 
(weighted) 
R.W. 
Populism 
(%) 
L.W. 
Populism 
(%) 
Total 
Populism 
(%) 
AT 1970 206.5556 790.0541 996.6096 3.703704 5.405405 9.109109 
AT 1980 353.0646 2281.856 2634.92 12.23602 15.46392 27.69994 
AT 1990 2341.717 523.5 2865.217 26.11945 7.142857 33.2623 
AT 2000 419.5641 205.5516 625.1158 4.248836 4.798535 9.047371 
AT 2010 2967.758 450.4299 3418.187 51.96133 10.38728 62.34861 
CH 1970 0 591.4167 591.4167 0 11.80556 11.80556 
CH 1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CH 1990 1269.662 800.0878 2069.75 26.66283 15.40149 42.06433 
CH 2000 1724.367 436.7815 2161.148 21.04998 6.430785 27.48077 
CH 2010 745.8495 1143.037 1888.887 22.83163 11.87522 34.70685 
DE 1970 0 196.2857 196.2857 0 1.785714 1.785714 
DE 1980 1312.933 2050.566 3363.499 12.77778 37.23077 50.00855 
DE 1990 331.6313 1264.726 1596.358 6.045874 17.15138 23.19725 
DE 2000 177.239 309.6667 486.9057 5.676063 5.121816 10.79788 
DE 2010 0 2546.252 2546.252 0 69.72222 69.72222 
FR 1970 381.4737 752.0015 1133.475 12.63158 12.78 27.98246 
FR 1980 459.7297 600.5217 1060.251 12.16216 8.122683 20.28485 
FR 1990 801.7422 1089.845 1891.587 16.38403 25.2571 41.64112 
FR 2000 1358.749 296.3123 1655.061 25.18881 9.561404 34.75021 
FR 2010 437.3862 295.4952 732.8814 8.070292 9.51021 17.5805 
IT 1970 0 2312.95 2312.95 0 45 45 
IT 1980 21.64265 277.7736 299.4162 3.089811 6.764032 9.853843 
IT 1990 1174.214 24.4 1198.614 29.72955 1.176471 30.90602 
IT 2010 637.4272 547.8737 1043.827 26.93498 14.5614 33.60165 
NL 1970 0 470.5475 470.5475 0 12.21627 12.21627 
NL 1980 0 866.5747 866.5747 0 9.195402 9.195402 
NL 1990 120.4819 108.9844 229.4663 2.409639 3.90625 6.315889 
NL 2000 562.8437 513.0619 1075.906 8.638752 22.92001 31.55876 
NL 2010 631.8984 183.9767 815.8752 12.21218 3.343671 15.55585 
SE 1970 0 258.6061 258.6061 0 3.030303 3.030303 
SE 1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SE 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SE 2000 73.2439 0 73.2439 2.439024 0 2.439024 
SE 2010 233.807 207 440.807 4.417582 11.11111 15.52869 
UK 1970 211.5455 1462.635 1674.18 4.545455 16.21563 20.76108 
UK 1980 438.284 720.213 1158.497 5.929229 5.325444 11.25467 
UK 1990 290.8128 972.6094 1263.422 1.826484 9.061738 10.88822 
UK 2000 516.3711 454.4821 970.8531 4.402516 12.84542 17.24793 
UK 2010 1093.857 472.8221 1566.679 9.774436 13.24143 23.01586 
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These data will be discussed in detail in the remainder of the chapter. For the moment it 
is interesting to observe that when considering the total levels of populism, summing left-
wing and right-wing populism (solid line), the last decade is remarkably "more populist" 
than any other before. In particular, this is made even more evident in comparison with 
the levels registered in the 2000s, which are consistent with the data on manifestos 
discussed sopra.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing populism (dotted line) was dominant, compared to right-
wing populism (dashed line), but the situation was reversed in the 1990s and 2000s. Since 
the 1990s right-wing populism becomes widely widespread, with an exponential growth 
compared to the previous decades, while left-wing populism seems to enter a phase of 
crisis in the same period. The 2010s elections, however, changed the scenario once 
again. Indeed, in absolute terms (Figure 9) left-wing populism has never been as much 
present as in the last elections, while right-wing populism has remained stable between 
the 1990s and the 2010s.  
 
When taking into consideration not only the amount of populism in party manifestos at the 
country level, but also the degree of radicalism of the parties as well as their electoral 
performance (Figure 10), in other words the Salonfähigkeit of populist discourses) the 
picture that emerges is even more distant from the expectations generated by the relevant 
literature. For example, the downfall in the 2000s is even 
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Figure 9: Average Populism per Country (Percentage) 
 
more unexplainable (although it does not occur with the operationalization based on co-
occurrence), given the steady increase in the decades preceding and following the 2000s. 
Moreover, when weighted, right-wing populism in the 2010s is actually higher than left-
wing populism, because of the degree of radicalism of right-wing parties but mainly 
because of their electoral success. 
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Figure 10: Average Populism per Country (Weighted) 
 
By comparing weighted and unweighted data, it appears that the total amount of populism 
for the last elections is unprecedented in absolute terms, but it is not particularly 
extraordinary if weighted (Figure 10). This might indicate that parties articulating populist 
discourses are becoming less and less radical, or in other words more mainstream. 
Indeed, if one considers only the 68 manifestos with at least 5% of populist statements, 
the average value of radicalism (in a scale from 1 to 6) was 3.1 in the 1970s, 3 in the 
1980s, 3.2 in the 1990s, 2.8 in the 2000s and down to 2.7 in the 2010s. 
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By observing these aggregated data, one can argue that several assumptions formulated 
in the relevant literature about populism in Western Europe are not correct. First, it is 
difficult to understand how globalization and mediatization of politics can be directly linked 
to the levels of populism in party manifestos and to the social acceptability of populism. If 
this would be the case, it would be possible to observe a sudden rise from the 1990s 
compared to the two previous decades, but this does not reflect the findings.98 One could 
argue that these mechanisms bear a stronger explanatory power in relation to right-wing 
populism only, but also in this case the effect is not particularly visible. Second, although 
most of the literature focuses on right-wing parties, populism is more present in 
manifestos of left-wing parties, and therefore this aspect should be investigated with 
greater attention. Third, if one considers also the elections held in France, Austria, and 
the Netherlands after 2015 (not included in this study), the electoral performance of highly 
populist and rather radical parties such as FPÖ, ÖVP, PVV and Front National, seems to 
indicate that the social acceptability of (especially right-wing) populism reached 
unprecedented new heights. Fourth, populism seems to grow over time but it could also 
be understood as a rather cyclical phenomenon, since its levels and its social 
acceptability go up and down over time.  
 
The remainder of the chapter presents the results country by country, describing which 
parties have consistently articulated populist discourses in their manifestos and whether 
this is in line with the relevant literature.  
 
                                                           
98 The measurement based on co-occurrence is different but gives similar results, and the rise 
over time is not statistically significant. See Appendix 14 (Table 47 and Table 48). 
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Austria 
Several factors are often used to explain the Systemverdrossenheit (alienation and 
hostility to those in power) and consequently the success of populist parties in Austria: 
e.g. partocracy (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), cartel politics (Müller 2002), lack of 
transparency, the structure of the proportional system (Heinisch 2002) and in general a 
process of de-alignment of the electorate. 
 
In particular, the literature points at the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs – FPÖ) as one of the main examples of populist party. The reason for its 
success seems to be in line with the expectations: in Austria the collective memory of the 
fascist past is based on victimization (Chapter 6). Indeed, as Heinisch argues, Austria's 
unapologetic stance about its own role during World War II "allowed the party to take 
political advantage when many Austrians were irritated by international criticism that the 
country had not come to terms with its culpability in World War II and the Holocaust − 
particularly during the ‘Waldheim affair’ in 1986" (2002, 70–71).  
 
In a similar vein, Bishof and Pelinka claim that the FPÖ, which was founded in the 1950s, 
offered representation to German nationalists who ended up being the political losers of 
post-war Austria (1997). Quite unsurprisingly, "the FPÖ’s political opponents have indeed 
claimed that its policy proposals conflict with those values central to liberal democracies" 
(Müller 2002, 173). 
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Its former leader, Jörg Haider – who died in a car crash in 2008 – insisted that the Austrian 
nation was an ideological miscarriage. Tellingly, Haider was born in Carinthia, considered 
Austrian’s stronghold of pan-German nationalist thinking. In 2005 Haider split from the 
FPÖ and founded a new political formation called Alliance for the Future of Austria 
(Bündnis Zukunft Österreich – BZÖ).  
 
Also the BZÖ is usually indicated as a populist radical right party, but since it failed to 
cross the electoral threshold in 2013 it is not included in the content analysis. Finally, the 
short-lived Team Stronach, launched by the millionaire Frank Stronach and already 
dissolved in September 2017, was supposed to articulate a populist discourse based on 
Euroscepticism and anti-bureaucracy when it participated in the 2013 elections 
(Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn 2016).  
 
The content analysis on party manifestos confirms that the FPÖ is highly populist. Its 
2013 manifesto is one of the most populist of the whole corpus (21%) and also the 1994 
manifesto is above average (10.6%). However, in the 1970s as well as in 2002 it was not 
particularly populist or not at all. To remain on the right-wing side, also the Christian 
Democratic Party (Österreichische Volkspartei – ÖVP) articulated populist messages on 
a consistent basis (almost 12% in 2013), while Team Stronach and NEOS show above 
average levels of populism in their manifestos for 2013. 
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Figure 11: Populism in Austria 
 
Also on the left-wing side, both mainstream and new left-wing parties emerge as 
extremely populist over time. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Österreichs – SPÖ) with the exception of 2002 articulated high levels of populism in its 
manifestos (with 15.5% in the 1980s), as well as the Green Party (Die Grünen). All in all, 
Austrian party manifestos appear to contain particularly high level of populism. Figure 11 
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presents the levels of populism's social acceptability for each country in grey, with the 
levels of Austria highlighted in red. 
 
Concerning right-wing populism's social acceptability, Austria has always very high levels. 
More in particular, while in 1994 and especially in 2013 the levels are above the average, 
in 2002 the levels are particularly low compared to the other decades.99 Concerning left-
wing populism's acceptability, once again the levels during the elections of 2002 are 
exceptionally low, but the levels are extremely high in the 1970s and 1980s. The other 
two elections points show levels of populism in line (1994) and above the average (2013) 
if compared to the other countries.  
 
France 
In France, the link between monarchism and fascist tendencies was already established 
before World War II: the factors cementing the union were the fascination for "an 
authoritarian order with anti-capitalist, anti-market sentiments" (Kitschelt and McGann 
1995, 92), which kept together Catholics, populist and Bonapartist movements. These 
traits were at the basis of Vichy France, which under Philippe Pétain collaborated with the 
Nazis from 1940 to 1944.100  
 
                                                           
99 In 2013 the weighted measure for right-wing populism in Austria is 2968, the highest recorded 
for every country in any decade, and Austria also holds the second position with 2341 in the 
1990s.  
100 Even before the beginning of the 19th century, the so-called Boulangism (from the founder 
Georges Boulanger) was considered a populist threat for the French Republic, although from 
rather left-wing positions (Chebel d’Appollonia 1996). 
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In the 1950s, the Poujadist movement, founded by Pierre Poujade, continued on this track 
combining anti-capitalism and authoritarianism. It peaked at the 1956 elections when it 
reached almost 13% of the vote share (under the name Union et fraternité française), and 
for a brief moment it seemed to constitute a serious threat to the very same foundations 
of the French Republic (Eatwell 1982). In the 1950s the process of memory building was 
still fluid, and therefore it is difficult to identify the type of mainstream collective memory 
that took ground so shortly after World War II. However, it might not be a coincidence that 
this type of movement was successful not only in France, but also in Italy with the 
Common Man's Front: yet another country characterized by a collective memory based 
on victimization (Chapter 6). 
 
The Poujadist experience, often labeled as populist (Winock 1997), was important also 
because the French populist par excellence – Jan-Marie Le Pen – started his career as 
a national delegate of Poujade's movement. Le Pen's party, the National Front (Front 
National – FN) was founded in 1972 and it was able to unite a fragmented right. It was 
not particularly successful in the 1970s but increasingly so from the 1980s. Kitschelt 
linked the party's success to two factors: on the one hand it abandoned the anti-capitalist 
approach of Poujadisme, and on the other hand – as a reaction to the movement of 1968 
– it showed that it was possible to have a new right-wing ideology beyond the traditional 
extreme right, similarly to what the Italian Social Movement (MSI) was doing in Italy at the 
time. While ethno-nationalism remained a core message of the party, other issues have 
been more or less relevant in the party's message over time, such as anti-communism, 
anti-immigration, and welfare chauvinism (van Kessel 2015b). 
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Figure 12: Populism in France 
 
 
Moreover, the party always maintained a strong anti-establishment stance in its 
discourses, calling the establishment "a nomenklatura that pursues its own interests at 
the expenses of the national good" (Flood 1998, 28) while claiming to be "the only force 
to defend the people", the "ordinary folk", and the "excluded" (Balent 2013, 177)  
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The structural reasons associated to the success of the FN and other populist movements 
in France, usually include the dissolution of the two major parties blocs, media attention, 
and the strategic response of the established parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 96 ff.). 
Rydgren mentions also political alienation and discontent, and argues that although 
ethno-nationalism has re-emerged periodically in France, it was not electorally successful 
before the FN because extreme right parties usually endorsed elements of the Nazi 
ideology (Rydgren 2008). Surel argues that the new Constitution from 1958 and its focus 
on the people can be considered as a condition for the re-emergence of populism in 
France, as well as economic difficulties, financial scandals, and the end of the traditional 
alignment across parties and within voters (Surel 2002, 144). 
 
The impact of the FN on French politics goes beyond its electoral performance. For 
example, Surel argues that in 1995 even Jacques Chirac "pursued the strategy of 
embracing a number of populist themes and ideas in order to create a space within the 
party system and to establish himself as the alternative candidate" (2002, 149). Mondon 
identifies also Sarkozy among those who followed the FN's message by trying to present 
himself as "the candidate of the people against the elite" (2014, 306). In other words, 
themes and messages which were typical of the French extreme right, over time have 
been exploited by mainstream parties as well. 
 
 
The FN survived a split in 2007, the replacement of Jean-Marie by his daughter Marine 
in 2011, and reached once again the second round at the presidential elections in 2017, 
118 
 
while the third-generation Le Pen, Marion-Maréchal, youngest MP in modern political 
history at the age of 22, seems to be ready to further distance the party from political 
extremism and anti-Semitism. 
 
The content analysis confirms that the FN articulates populist messages in its party 
manifestos: the level in 1995 is above average (5.9% of populist statements), the level of 
2002 is definitely high (10.4%), but it surprisingly drops down in 2012 (1.7%).101 The 
analysis reveals also that the mainstream right-wing party Rally for the Republic 
(Rassemblement pour la République – RPR)102 has been consistently very populist: from 
the 1970s to the 1990s the levels of populism in its manifestos have been very high 
(12.6%, 12.2% and 6.1%). It merged into the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) of 
Nicolas Sarkozy in 2002, and continued to show traces of populism (2.9% and 2.5%). 
Also the moderate and rather centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF) in the 1990s 
and 2000s showed high (4.4%) and very high (12%) levels of populism, thus confirming 
that the mainstream parties in France are not alien to populist discourses. 
 
Also mainstream parties on the left are prone to articulate highly populist messages, as 
the case of the Socialists (PS) illustrates. In the 1970s their manifesto shows a very high 
15.3% of populism (thus being the most populist of the French manifestos analyzed), and 
it constantly remained populist over time (2.3% in the 1980s, 13.9% in the 1990s, 7.9% 
in the 200s, and still 2.1% in 2012). 
                                                           
101 The election of 2017 is not included in the content analysis. 
102 Until 1976 it was called Union for the Defence of the Republic (Union pour la Défense de la 
République – UDR). 
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Concerning the non-mainstream left, also the Communist Party (PCF), which shared the 
same manifesto of the PS in the 1970s, remained populist over time. Workers' Struggle 
(Lutte Ouvrière – LO) and but also the Left Front (Front de Gauche – FdG) and The 
Greens (Europe Écologie Les Verts – EELV) show high levels of populism, but 
paradoxically less than the mainstream left. 
 
Concerning right-wing populism's social acceptability, France shows very high levels. The 
trend over time, however, goes against the general one: in fact, there is less and less 
populism in right-wing party manifestos since the 1990s. Concerning left-wing populism's 
acceptability the levels are rather high, but once again there is a rather consistent 
decrease over time. Figure 12 presents the levels of populism's social acceptability for 
each country in grey, with the levels of Austria highlighted in blue. 
 
Germany 
Germany is a country with a collective memory based on culpabilization (Chapter 6) and 
this is reflected in the historically very poor electoral performance and credibility of 
populist parties. The Historikerstreit, the controversy about the past, spanned the years 
1986-1989 and concerned the nature (uniqueness or comparability) of the atrocities 
committed by the Nazi regime. This already signals how Germany was the only country 
working through its past, taking full responsibility for its actions and making amendments, 
thus generating a strong stigma that was always a major disadvantage for right-wing 
populist actors. 
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The social stigma appears very clearly, for example, when examining the case of the 
Republicans (Die Republikaner – REP), an extreme right party quite popular during the 
1980s and 1990s founded by Franz Schönhuber (former Waffen-SS). They demanded to 
decriminalize the German past because they argued that it should no longer be reduced 
to Auschwitz and the gas chambers. The Republicans used the widespread resentments 
associated with the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung and suggested that Germany 
should hence historicize its Nazi legacy and be a normal country (Betz 2002, 200). This 
suggestion, however, was heavily criticized, and the party never entered the Parliament, 
constantly losing votes over time.  
 
More in general, after 1949 Germany never saw legislators of a Nazi successor 
organization, contrary to what happened, for example, in Italy. Since the international 
vigilance focused primarily on Germany, the new German democratic regime was forced 
to "exercise more political control when successor organizations of the Nazi party 
attempted to stage a comeback than the Italian postwar governments when facing 
neofascist movements" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 205). Also all the other extreme 
right parties failed to capture any significant vote share. For example the NPD 
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – National Democratic Party) never made it 
into the Bundestag, and the law and order Schill Party (Partei Rechtsstaatlicher 
Offensive) failed to expand nationally after having performed exceptionally well in 
Hamburg in 2001.  
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For these reasons, although Germany seemed to show the right conditions for populism 
to thrive, right-wing populist parties were never successful. In the 1980s, post-industrial 
transformations and a growing number of asylum seekers seemed to offer the perfect 
opportunity structure but in the 1990s, the emergence of right-wing populist parties "was 
constrained by the long-term historical legacy of Germany’s Nazi past" (Kitschelt and 
McGann 1995, 221). Also the process of European integration, which is normally 
associated to the success of populism, in Germany was not perceived as a threat to 
national identity and sovereignty. On the contrary, even left-wing intellectuals argued that 
it would have represented a complement of the national identity which might "release 
Germany from the legacy of the real trauma, the disastrous attempt to realize the utopia 
of völkish nationalism under Hitler" (Trägårdh 2002, 103). 
 
Decker, among the reasons at the basis of the weakness of right-wing populism in 
Germany, names the institutional framework and political opportunity structures, but also 
the "the historical burden that weighs on Germany’s political culture". In his words, the 
Nazi past and the way it was re-elaborated created "a deeper stigma attached to right-
wing extremism in Germany than in any other European country" (2008, 125). 
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Figure 13: Populism in Germany 
 
Indeed, the content analysis confirms that in Germany there are low levels of populism, 
and that no purely "populist" party ever collected more than 5% of the vote share. For this 
reason none of the Republicans' or NPD's manifestos have been coded, while Alternative 
for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland – AfD) almost made it in 2013 and entered the 
parliament at the next elections in 2017 (Arzheimer 2015). The content analysis shows 
therefore that only mainstream parties like the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the 
Free Democratic Party (FPD) articulate populist discourses in their manifestos. However, 
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the levels are usually way below the average (with an interesting exception in the 1980s, 
which however is not included in the following analysis).103 
 
The situation changes completely when analysing left-wing manifestos. In this case, 
populist discourses are present both in mainstream and niche party manifestos. More 
importantly, the levels are constantly in line with other countries presenting very high 
levels of populism. Indeed, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) always articulated populist 
discourses in its manifestos since the 1970s, with exceptionally high levels in the 1980s 
(29.2%) and 2010s (19.2%). The same applies to the Green Party (Grüne), always 
articulating populist discourses since the 1980s but scoring exceptionally high in the 
2010s (29.6%). Also The Left (Die Linke) in the 2010s presented an extremely populist 
manifesto (20.8%).  
 
Germany has usually high levels of left-wing populism, and in 2013 the amount of left-
wing populism is even the highest recorded in a single country. This seems to imply that 
the collective stigmatization of the Nazi past does not affect left-wing parties. Probably, 
Decker is right when he argues that Die Linke "is immune in every respect to any 
suspicion of fascism" despite its roots in the ruling socialist party of the German 
Democratic Republic. Therefore it can now address issues and resort to methods "that 
are normally associated with right-wing populism" (Decker 2008, 134). 
 
                                                           
103 This is the case because the analysis focuses on the last three decades only. This is the case 
because the data concerning the conditions to test are not available for the 1970s and 1980s. 
Moreover, measured according to the co-occurrence principle the value of populism would be 
zero (both CDU and FDP show only people-centrism but no anti-elitism).  
124 
 
On the other hand, the opposite scenario appears as soon as one considers only 
populism in right-wing party manifestos, and their social acceptability. As Figure 13 
shows, Germany (golden line), with the partial exception of the 1980s104 constantly scores 
way below the average of the other countries concerning the social acceptability of right-
wing populism. The already low levels of the 1990s continued dropping in the 2000s and 
in the 2010s. Moreover, it is not possible to argue that mainstream parties incorporated 
populist issues over time because there is no right-wing populism at all in the 2010s 
manifestos (unique case). All in all, it already seems safe to assume that the stigma 
associated to the Nazi past plays a crucial role in blocking right-wing populist parties, 
while this is not the case for left-wing parties. Possibly, the stigma associated with the 
Nazi past works only in one direction and leaves untouched the cultural opportunity 
structure for left-wing populism to thrive. This might be the case because the Nazi past 
resonates strongly with new radical right parties but not with the full ideology articulated 
by left-wing parties. 
 
Italy 
 
The historic development of populism in Italy has been completely different from the 
German case and much more similar to the French and Austrian ones, with which indeed 
Italy shares a collective memory based on victimization (Chapter 6). Immediately after the 
end of World War II, the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano – MSI) was 
founded by supporters of Benito Mussolini, and it was even more directly linked to ultra 
                                                           
104 The exception is only "partial" because with a different operationalization the value of right-
wing populism would be zero. 
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nationalist and anti-democratic positions than the FPÖ in Austria. This, however, was also 
the reason why the party could not adapt at the changing political scenario in the 1990s 
and eventually disappeared (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). It actually did not completely 
disappear, but it rather transformed itself into a more modern and post-fascist movement, 
National Alliance (AN), under the leadership of Gianfranco Fini. 
 
The party, after the "Fiuggi turning point" could finally present itself as fully democratic, 
and eventually became part of all three coalition governments led by Silvio Berlusconi 
together with the North League (Lega Nord). National Alliance finally merged into the 
People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà – PdL) in 2009. The North League, on the other 
hand, remained an independent party and continued its own transformation. Born as Liga 
Veneta and then Liga Lombarda, it became over time a national party insisting mainly on 
issues such as immigration and Euroscepticism but less and less on issues concerning 
regionalism and separatism. In other words, the party first "re-opened a centre-periphery 
cleavage which was never completely sealed" (Tarchi 2008, 87), but then became a more 
traditional populist party focusing on immigration and law enforcement. From the 1990s, 
they presented themselves as a populist movement of protest and identity (Taguieff 
1995). 
 
Populism in Italy seems to be so widespread that even Silvio Berlusconi, probably the 
most mainstream among the populist political actors usually identified in the literature and 
leader of Go Italy (Forza Italia – FI)105, continued through his all career to depict himself 
                                                           
105 Previously called "People of Freedom" (PdL). 
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as the embodiment of the popular will against the corrupt political parties, the 
Communists, the judiciary system, and the mass media. "Paternalistic and reassuring, 
Berlusconi never misses an opportunity to proclaim himself as the interpreter and 
defender of the popular will. [...] ‘Abstract principles’ and ‘complicated ideologies’ are, 
therefore, explicitly banned from Forza Italia which must remain ‘a movement’ and 
expresses an open ‘aversion to party politics’" (Tarchi 2008, 93). 
 
Anti-establishment positions, discourses against political, economic and media elites, 
appeals to popular sovereignty, post-fascist and regionalist movements: Italy seems to 
represent the perfect thriving ground for populist actors (Zanatta 2002). Indeed, many 
scholars pointed to a multiplicity of reasons for this: first of all partocracy and ideological 
convergence (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), as well as public disaffection and cynicism 
with the political system (Betz 1994), traits which already emerged in the 1940s with the 
populist movement Common Man's Front (L'Uomo Qualunque), similar in many regards 
to the Poujadist movement in France (Setta 2005).106 The general discontent was fueled 
among other things (Morlino and Tarchi 1996) by one of the most notorious corruption 
scandals of the 20th century: Tangentopoli (Bribesville). Between 1992 and 1994 all the 
previously existing political parties disappeared (apart from the North League). After ten 
                                                           
106 Qualunquismo "presented itself as the voice of ordinary people, those excluded from the 
division of power, fed up with greedy and corrupt politicians, indifferent to ideologies they saw as 
a mere cover for elite ambitions of domination, skeptical of any program and mistrustful of 
electoral promises they expected to be systematically broken by those elected" (Tarchi 2002, 
122). 
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years of pentapartito (controlled by the Christian Democrats), the first Republic 
collapsed.107 
However, despite all the most favourable conditions for the success of populist 
discourses, the content analysis shows that the social acceptability of populism in Italy is 
less outstanding compared to the expectations (Figure 14, light blue line). Moreover, it 
was not possible to measure the levels of populism in 2001 given the special conditions 
of those elections: because of the complex electoral law adopted at the time (the so-called 
"Mattarellum") the parties had to form broad coalitions rather than participating alone. 
Hence, the single parties did not even write separate manifestos in that occasion. Again, 
it is important to remind that the values for 2001 are reported as zero in order to visualize 
the line, but they are actually missing data (the same applies to right-wing populism in the 
1970s since most of the manifestos were not found). Therefore the only two time-points 
considered in the following analysis will be 1994 and 2013. 
 
Contrary to the expectations, populism does not emerge "as the basic feature in the 
programs and communicative style of Forza Italia" (Tarchi 2008, 133).108 Both in 1994 
and 2013 Berlusconi's party articulated some populist message in its manifestos (1.7% 
and 5.9%), but with much lower levels compared to other parties typically referred to as 
populist. In this sense it is possible to share the argument of McDonnel about the fact that 
Berlusconi's parties might be personal rather than populist (McDonnell 2013).
                                                           
107 The five-party coalition that governed Italy between June 1981 and April 1991.It comprised: 
Christian Democracy (DC), Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), 
Italian Liberal Party (PLI) and Italian Republican Party (PRI). 
108 Also other scholars consider Come on Italy (Forza Italia) as a populist party. Among others: 
Raniolo (2006), Pasquino (2007), Ruzza and Fella (2009). 
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Figure 14: Populism in Italy 
 
The fact that even the manifesto of Civic Choice (Scelta Civica – SC), the party founded 
by the former technocratic Prime Minister Mario Monti, scored an astonishing 13.1% in 
2013 speaks volumes about the unexpected levels for Berlusconi's party. The manifestos 
of National Alliance and North League in 1994 both show traces of populism (7.4% and 
5.3%), which is not low but once again below the expectations. On the other hand, each 
and every one of the eighteen coded manifestos contains traces of populism, meaning 
that right-wing populist discourses in Italy have always been largely acceptable. 
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Concerning left-wing party manifestos, they were highly populist in the 1970s, with a 
remarkable 40% for the Socialist Party (which can however be explained with the five 
total coded statements) and – to a lesser extent – with the Communist Party, which scored 
5% and 1.7% in the 1970s and 1980s. The Democratic Party (PD) led by Matteo Renzi 
scores 6.7% in 2013, in line with the PDS (PD's predecessor, the Democratic Party of the 
Left), which scored 7.5% in the 1990s.109  
 
The Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S), which is coded both as right-
wing and left-wing because it is the only unclassifiable party of the whole sample, scores 
7.9% in 2013, which is a rather average value, but it is comparatively high since it is the 
third highest level in Italy.  
 
Concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, Italy follows the expectations 
especially in 1994, while in 2013 the levels are lower than expected.110 The trend is similar 
for the levels of left-wing populism: they are pretty low in 1994, while they are closer to 
the average in 2013. All in all, it is already possible to claim that, compared to the 
expectations generated by the relevant literature and taking into consideration the 
collective memory based on victimization, Italy shows lower levels of populism but on the 
other hand every party in Italy seems to articulate populist messages to a certain extent. 
                                                           
109 The Democratic Party of the Left is oddly coded as right-wing in 1994 according to the Party 
Manifesto Project. For the purposes of the analysis, this does not make any difference, although 
it is clearly debatable to what extent the PDS was proposing a truly left-wing manifesto at the 
time. 
110 In 1994, even if the PDS would have been coded as left-wing (as it is normally considered), 
Italy would still belong to the outcome. On the other hand, it would still not belong to the outcome 
for left-wing populism, although it would be close enough to the crossover point. 
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Netherlands 
Concerning supply and demand side factors for populism, the Netherlands are probably 
the most interesting case among the eight countries included in this study. Here populism 
seems to be articulated mainly by flamboyant personalities able to exploit a favourable 
political-institutional context such as Pim Fortuyn or Geert Wilders. The perfectly 
proportional system and the fragmented party system, combined with economic 
stagnation and immigration (Lucardie 2008) are supposed to create a mix of favourable 
socio-economic and political-institutional factors, but the success of populist actors has 
always been discontinuous in the country. This is even more puzzling considered the 
country's collective memory based on cancellation (Chapter 6), but it might be linked to 
deeper traits of the country's political culture such as liberalism and multiculturalism. 
 
In 2002, Pim Fortuyn was among the most notable exceptions to the electoral failure of 
populist actors. Former Marxist and member of the Labour Party (PvdA), his movement 
gained 17% of the vote share, also because of the emotional situation provoked by 
Fortuyn's violent homicide ten days before the elections.111 In 2006 the list of Pim Fortuyn 
did not get any seat (only 0.2% of the votes) but Geert Wilders, founder of the one-man 
show Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid – PVV) and former VVD member 
(People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)112, gained six seats and replaced Fortuyn's 
list in the Parliament.  
 
                                                           
111 In 2002 also Fortuyn's former party – Liveable Netherlands – obtained two seats in the House 
of Representatives. 
112 Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie. 
131 
 
While Fortuyn's former party Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland) politically 
disappeared very quickly, Wilders continued the populist discourse centred on restoring 
democracy and returning the power to the people, while appealing to the ‘ordinary people’ 
even more explicitly (van Kessel 2015a). In 2010 Wilders received a surprising 15.5% of 
the vote share Fortuyn (entering also a short lived coalition government), his best result 
until now. All in all, as already mentioned, the electoral results of populist actors have 
never been particularly striking when compared to other European countries. Moreover, 
another peculiarity of Dutch right-wing populists is their relatively liberal attitude towards 
cultural issues such as the emancipation of women and gay people (Inglehart and 
Andeweg 1993). Pim Fortuyn – who was openly gay himself – was concerned about the 
preservation of the Dutch liberal values, and Wilders too embraces liberal values and 
stresses how Islam threatens them (Akkerman 2005). 
 
On the left, populist discourses were articulated before right-wing populism became 
successful in the country. During the 1970s and 1980s, indeed, populist discourses were 
articulated almost exclusively by left-wing parties such as the Labour Party (Partij van de 
Arbeid – PvdA). The Socialist Party (SP) is another case usually associated with 
populism, although it is included in the analysis only since the 2000s, when it already 
toned down its radicalism and dropped references to its communist past (March 2011). 
Before 2002 it never reached the 5% of the vote share, while in 2006 obtained its best 
result so far, with 16.6% of the votes. Its two analysed manifestos, indeed, contain 
medium (4.7% in 2002) and low (0.7% in 2012) levels of populism. 
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Figure 15: Populism in the Netherlands 
 
 
All in all, according to the content analysis visualized in Figure 15, the Netherlands (green 
line) represent a borderline case, and often it is difficult to classify the country and decide 
whether populist discourses are socially acceptable or not. Concerning right-wing 
populism, it shows a high acceptability in 2002 and 2012, when apart from Fortuyn and 
Wilders also the Christian Democrats and the mainstream VVD and the Christian 
Democrats (Christen-Democratisch Appèl – CDA) articulated populist discourses. In 
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1994, however, the levels were particularly low.113 Concerning left-wing populism, it was 
exceptionally acceptable in the 1970s and 1980s, but much less in the 1990s and 2010s. 
On the other hand in 2002, when all four left-wing parties articulate populism in their 
manifestos, the country has the highest levels of left-wing populism. 
 
Switzerland 
The Swiss Confederation is often portrayed as a populist paradise, because the peculiar 
features of the country's political system and culture make "the gap between democracy 
and populism […] very narrow, since self-determination and participation are part of the 
Swiss democratic system" (Albertazzi 2008, 102). In other words, the Swiss political 
system, based on direct democracy, already goes in the direction of a populist 
democracy. This means that political-institutional conditions have always been favourable 
for the presence of populism. Mechanisms such as consociationalism and direct 
democracy produce a constant bottom-up pressure on policy-making processes and in 
general on the established parties (Kriesi 2005). Moreover, the Swiss political culture is 
based on concepts such as self-government, participation, neutrality and localism, which 
also produced over time different forms of discrimination for the new minorities (Albertazzi 
2008). Finally, also the type of collective memory based on cancellation, is supposed not 
to block populism (Chapter 6). 
 
                                                           
113 In that occasion the centre party D66 (Democraten 66) is coded as left-wing according to the 
Comparative Manifesto Project. However, even if it was coded as right-wing, the Netherland sin 
1994 would still not belong to the outcome for right-wing populism. 
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The history of political movements and parties considered as populist is therefore quite 
bustling. Between the 1960s and 1980s two anti-foreigner movements were rather 
widespread: National Action, now Swiss Democrats (Schweizer Demokraten – SD), and 
the Republican Movement which dissolved in 1989 when most of its members joined the 
Federal Democratic Union (Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union – EDU). Between the 
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s the Automobile Party (Autopartei) and the Swiss 
Democrats were quite successful thanks to their message against established parties and 
state bureaucracy. In 1991 the Ticino League (Lega dei Ticinesi) was founded, exploiting 
the center-periphery cleavage and claiming to represent the interests of the common 
people against environmentalists, the state, and the political establishment (Betz 1994). 
However, none of these parties collected more than 5% of the votes during the 1970s or 
1980s. 
 
Populism started becoming part of mainstream politics in Switzerland since the 1990s, 
and populism in Switzerland nowadays means Swiss People's Party (Schweizerische 
Volkspartei – SVP), not only in terms of electoral results but also of organization and 
funding (Bornschier 2010a, 133; Zaslove 2012). The party was formed in1971 as a 
merging product of the Party of Farmers, Traders and Independents with the Democratic 
Party. It was only since the 1990s, however, that the party started a process of 
radicalization following the Zürich party-branch led by Christoph Blocher, and thus 
transforming into a populist party (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015).  
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In line with the SVP's campaigns, and in fact led by Blocher himself from 1986 to 2003, 
the organization "Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland" is very active in 
launching and opposing referenda. Among other things, the organization founded by 
Blocher and Otto Fischer from the Free Democratic Party (Freisinnig-Demokratische 
Partei – FDP) campaigned to maintain the Swiss military, opposed Switzerland joining 
the EU, and campaigned to end "mass immigration".  
 
The SVP is the first party in terms of vote share since 2003, and in 2015 it obtained its 
best result, with almost 30% of the votes. In 2005 the Geneva Citizens' Movement was 
founded, but like other Swiss populist movements they barely manage to obtain any seat 
in the parliament. The SVP, on the other hand, managed to change the Swiss magic 
formula, the unofficial way of dividing the seven executive seats of the Swiss Federal 
Council. Since 1959 the FDP, the Christian Democratic People's Party 
(Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz – CVP) and the Social Democratic 
Party (SP) each got two seats, while the SVP received the remaining one. The SVP took 
one seat form the CVP in 2003 and since 2008 some SVP members split from the party 
and created the Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland (Bürgerlich-
Demokratische Partei Schweiz – BDP). Nonetheless, the SVP obtained its best electoral 
results after the split, in 2015. 
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Figure 16: Populism in Switzerland 
 
 
As Figure 16 shows, Switzerland (red line) always had rather a high social acceptability 
of populism in the last three elections, while this was not the case in the 1970s and 1980s. 
On the right, there are no traces of populism until 1995, when three parties articulated 
highly populist messages: SVP (6.8%), CVP (12.1%), and FDP (7.7%). In the two 
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following decades, the CVP did not articulate any populist message in its manifestos, 
leaving FDP and SVP as the only two parties articulating populist messages. On the left, 
two parties have been constantly populist since the 1990s: the Social Democratic Party 
(SP) and the Green Party (Grüne Partei der Schweiz – GPS). The SP was populist 
already in the 1970s (but not in the 1980s) together with the Alliance of Independents 
(Landesring der Unabhängigen – LdU). In the 2011 elections, both the SP and the SVP 
have been extremely populist in their manifestos (9.7% and 18.7%). All in all, Switzerland 
emerges as one of the cases where populism is most socially accepted, in line with the 
expectations. 
 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom, having a collective memory of World War II based on heroization 
(Chapter 6), was supposed to show high levels of populism's social acceptability. 
However, a quick glance at the results of the content analysis (Figure 17) is enough to 
understand that this is not the case. Populism exists, and it is mainstream. This result is 
even more puzzling if one considers that in the 1990s the United Kingdom was supposed 
not to have favourable political-institutional conditions for the emergence of radical right-
wing parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). On the other hand, favourable opportunity 
structures subsequently developed: indeed there has been a decline in identification with, 
and support for, the two main parties, and the presence of tabloids like The Sun with a 
fierce populist agenda (Fella 2008). Populism in the United Kingdom seems to be 
unsuccessful when combined with radicalism, and it seems safe to assume that Britain 
entered the realm of populist democracy (Mair 2002). 
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The National Front, a far right party founded in 1967, has always been almost irrelevant 
in elections (it never reached 1% of the vote share) and never got any elected 
representative at any level. On the right-wing side, successful populism is never 
combined with radical and extreme parties, but rather to the mainstream Conservative 
party. It was the British conservatism that through Thatcherism, “their own unique right-
wing populism” (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 242) drained attention away from the 
National Front. No fringe or niche party ever used the so-called 'winning formula': 
economic liberalism combined with political and cultural authoritarianism. The British 
National Party (BNP), despite the fact that Nick Griffin became leader in 1999 and tried 
to distance the party from its fascist roots, also never had any seat and the best electoral 
result they achieved was the 1.9% of the vote share in 2010. 
 
About the failure of extreme right movements in the 1970s and 1980s, Kitschelt explains 
that contrary to what happened in Germany or Italy, "whatever constraints the extreme 
Right was facing had more to do with the position on the major parties in the dominant 
competitive arena than with the historical legacy of the extreme Right" (1995, 242). Apart 
from a British culture of deference which makes it unlikely for new parties to be able to 
challenge the political system (Almond and Verba 1963), there is indeed a further obstacle 
for populist parties: the first-past-the-post electoral system makes it almost impossible for 
new parties to effectively challenge the two major parties. Therefore, it should not come 
as a surprise that according to the content analysis populism in the United Kingdom is a 
permanent feature of the two mainstream parties: both the Conservatives and the Labour 
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Party constantly articulated populist messages since the 1970s, as well as the Liberal 
Party, for a total of 15 out of 15 manifestos showing traces of populism.  
 
The Conservatives have been moderately populist both in the 1970s (4.5%) and in the 
2000s (4.4%), very populist in the 2010s (9.8%), but showed almost no traces of populist 
messages in their manifestos in the 1980s (1.2%) and 1990s (1.8%). Also the Labour 
Party has been constantly populist, with rather average levels in the 1980s, 1990s, and 
2010s (5.3, 5.7, and 4.8%) and high levels in the 1970s and 2000s (7.6 and 8.1%). 
Because of the electoral system, UKIP never won any seat in the House of Commons 
until 2015, when for the first time it also scored better than the 5% threshold used for the 
content analysis.114 However, the last British election considered was 2010; therefore the 
only other political movement included in the analysis apart from the two mainstream ones 
is the Liberal Democratic Party which was the result of the union between the Liberal 
Party and the Social Democratic Party in 1988. The Lib Dems, always considered left-
wing apart for the 1983 elections, articulated levels of populism similar compared to the 
manifestos of the Labour Party, with particularly populist peaks in the 1970s (8.6%) and 
2010s (8.4%). 
 
All in all, the levels of populism's social acceptability in the United Kingdom are puzzling 
because if on the one hand there is no single manifesto showing more than 10% of 
populist statements, on the other hand that each and every manifesto shows traces of 
populism.
                                                           
114 UKIP, contrary to the other right-wing movements mentioned above, has the advantage of 
being free from any Fascist associations. 
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Figure 17: Populism in the United Kingdom 
 
 
Moreover, the levels of right-wing populism seem to be higher than expected for a country 
whose memory is based on heroization. In particular, the 2010 elections show very high 
levels of populism, with only Austria scoring higher. The levels of left-wing populism, 
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although never particularly elevated, are always high enough to declare that the country 
belongs to the outcome, thus composing a particularly puzzling situation. 
 
Sweden 
When dealing with populism in Western Europe, Sweden always represents an 
exceptional case (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Dahlström and Esaiasson 2013). Indeed, 
Sweden is often pointed out as a negative case: despite favourable conditions for the 
presence of populism, and while all comparable countries in the continent (and in the 
region) witness the growing success of populist actors, in Sweden there is virtually no 
trace of populism. This has been substantially true over several decades, but it might be 
no longer accurate since the last elections in 2014. 
 
Developed by the Social Democrats, the core concept of people's home (Folkhemmet) 
has been able to merge demos and ethnos in one concept, hence creating a strong link 
between being Swedish and being democratic (Trägårdh 2002, 77). This approach 
allowed the Social Democrats (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti) to fight the 
national socialist appeal of the Nazi by declining concepts revolving around the idea of 
folk (and not klass anymore after 1929) in a democratic way. By studying the national 
political culture of the country, it is possible to find several other reasons why Nazi groups 
in Sweden were never successful, and this might explain why despite its memory based 
on cancellation in the 1970s and 1980s the country never experienced high levels of 
populism, and eventually developed a memory based on culpabilization (Chapter 6). 
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For example, Sweden – together with Switzerland – claimed to have the most ancient 
tradition of popular rule, and the tradition of nation-statism became central after the war, 
contrary to Germany where civil society became the key figure of the new State. 
Moreover, concepts such as 'national community' have been invested with positive 
connotations because in the collective memory they are linked to the resolution of the 
political and social crisis of the 1930s. The process of nationalization went hand in hand 
with the concept of welfare and solidarity, thus gaining a positive connotation. 
 
The "lucrative neutrality" the country decided to adopt during World War II (Colla 2002) 
was never fully investigated and the country decided to rather impose itself a silence 
treatment on the issue and to describe itself as a 'moral superpower' always on the side 
of the oppressed, thus protecting the purity of the Folkhemmet (Dahl 2006). Nonetheless, 
Sweden apparently did not need to fully acknowledge its responsibility in order to develop 
a strong stigma attached to the fascist past. Probably other characteristics of the country's 
political culture can help explain the Swedish approach to populism.  
 
Also Kitschelt suggest that the lack of a credible far right in Sweden is linked to historical 
events and to the country's unique political organization: "[…] in Scandinavia there was 
little basis for a strong antidemocratic fascist mobilization in the Great depression of the 
late 1920s. The German occupation of Norway and Denmark during World War II and the 
puppet regimes set up by the Nazi state further discredited right-wing mobilization after 
the war and prevented any kind of extremist mass appeal” (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 
124). However, while this is true for Sweden, it was not the case for Denmark and Norway 
143 
 
where extreme right-wing parties have been relatively successful already since the 1970s 
(Betz 1994). 
 
One party which is usually labelled as populist might have not been included in the content 
analysis: New Democracy (Ny Demokrati), which gained 6.7% of the vote share in 1991, 
while for the 1990s in Sweden were has been selected the 1994 election. Considered as 
a typical right-wing party against the establishment, New Democracy was launched in 
1991 by two media personalities but rapidly disappeared and never repeated its first 
electoral exploit.  
 
In general, however, Figure 18 clearly shows that populism in Sweden is almost non-
existent and therefore unacceptable. Only five out of twenty-nine analysed manifestos 
show any trace of populism, and three of them are from the 2014 elections. The manifesto 
of the Moderate Party contain very low levels of populism (0.6%), while the manifestos of 
the Swedish Democrats in 2014 (3.8%), Christian Democrats in 2002 (2.4%) and Centre 
party in the 1970s (3%) contain average amounts of populism. The only manifesto which 
could be considered as clearly populist is the Green Party's manifesto in 2014 (11.1%).115  
 
                                                           
115 Miljöpartiet de gröna (M). 
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Figure 18: Populism in Sweden 
 
 
The other right-wing populist party apart from New Democracy, the Swedish Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna), articulates populist messages in its manifesto, but the levels 
seem to be rather low compared to the manifestos of other right-wing populist parties. 
The Swedish Democrats, since the second half of the 1990s tried to build a respectable 
façade and break the links with fascism (Rydgren 2008b), and this translated in better 
electoral performances but probably not in higher levels of populism. 
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They have been the third party at the 2014 elections, with almost 13% of the vote share, 
although they have been participating in elections since 1988. This shows that the existing 
socio-cultural situation might now be exploited by a party insisting on anti-immigration. It 
is quite remarkable, however, that so far despite political discontent, alienation, declining 
party identification, de-alignment and re-alignment processes providing favourable 
political opportunity structures for emerging populist parties, populism is virtually absent 
in Sweden. Since the 1990s the country never displayed high levels of populism neither 
on the left nor on the right. This is a unique case among the eight countries analyzed. It 
remains to be seen whether the favourable conditions will eventually make populism 
thrive also in Sweden: "First, widespread xenophobia exists in Sweden. […] Second, 
Sweden has a high level of political distrust in and discontent with political parties and 
other political institutions […]. Third, there is possibly potential for an emerging RRP party 
to exploit anti-EU sentiments" (Rydgren 2002, 48). So far, this does not seem to be the 
case, and populism remains largely unacceptable. 
 
Conclusions 
The content analysis of 173 party manifestos from eight countries in five elections reveals 
that five of the six manifestos containing the highest percentage of populist statements 
have been written either in the 1970s or in the 2010s116, and they are mainly from left-
wing parties: the Socialist Party Italy (40%) in the 1970s, The Green, The Left, and the 
                                                           
116 With the exception of the SPD (Germany) in the 1980s. 
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Social Democrats in Germany in 2013 (29.6%, 20.8%, and 19.2%), and finally the FPÖ 
in Austria in 2013 (21%).117  
 
Concerning the social acceptability of populism (which considers vote share and degree 
of radicalism) the picture is similar but not identical. Once again, in the top-6 there are 
mainly left-wing parties from the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the right-wing FPÖ in the 
1990s and 2010s. This also confirms that left-wing populism is available to mainstream 
parties, while right-wing populism is mainly articulated by niche or extreme parties and 
not by mainstream and established parties.  
 
Concerning right-wing populism, among the twelve most populist manifestos, eleven 
come from only three countries: France (4), Austria (4), and Switzerland (3). Quite 
surprising the remaining one is from the Italian Civic Choice, Monti's (technocratic) party. 
Among them, only two are not from the 1990s-2010s and they are both French: the UDR 
(in the 1970s) and the RPR (in the 1980s). Around 69% of the coded manifestos from 
right-wing parties contain populism (63 out of 91).  
 
Concerning left-wing populism, among the fifteen most populist manifestos all the eight 
countries are represented: Germany (5), France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (2), 
Italy, Austria, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (1). Among them, nine are either from the 
                                                           
117 47 (around 27%) of the coded manifestos did not show any trace of populism. They are mainly 
manifestos of Swedish parties (23), as well as Swiss manifestos from the 1970s and 1980s (11), 
and Dutch manifestos from the 1970s-1990s (6). 
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1970s or the 2010s, while none is form the 2000s. Around 77% of the coded manifestos 
from right-wing parties contain populism (64 out of 83).  
 
Concerning the expectations at the country-level, the results seem to be in line with the 
type of collective memory assigned in the next Chapter, but with some remarkable 
exception. The countries characterized by a memory based on victimization display a high 
social acceptability of populism, and this is especially true for right-wing populist parties. 
Austria and France seem to follow this pattern more precisely compared to Italy, which 
has slightly lower levels than expected. The countries characterized by a memory based 
on cancellation are on the other hand more difficult to interpret. Switzerland has very high 
values of populism, even higher than Italy for example. The Dutch case is a puzzling one 
because the levels of populism vary significantly over time in ways which do not follow 
the general trend, and they are often lower than expected. On the other hand Sweden in 
the 1970s and 1980s, also characterized by cancellation, does not show any trace of 
populism, a phenomenon that becomes more understandable from the 1990s when the 
country's memory is characterized by culpabilization. Germany, on the other hand, is in 
line with the expectations concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, but 
shows exceptionally high levels of left-wing populism. Finally, the United Kingdom, only 
case characterized by heroization, registers a surprisingly high social acceptability of 
populism over time, concerning both right-wing and left-wing parties. These aspects are 
fully investigated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 – Memory and stigma in eight West European countries 
 
This chapter assigns to each country a type of collective memory and possibly one or 
more secondary narratives. This is done by analysing the relevant secondary literature 
about each country's collective memory of the fascist past.118 Longitudinal variations, 
potential secondary narratives, and disagreement among sources are taken into 
consideration, and eventually the levels of stigmatization of the fascist past are assigned to 
each country over a time-span of four decades. 
 
To determine which types of collective memory are present in a country and how they 
develop over time, secondary sources are used. By relying on a large bulk of single-
country and comparative studies it is possible to determine the outcome of decades of 
research in each country from several and complementary approaches such as history, 
sociology, and political science. The process of memory building – understood as the 
dynamic relationship between conflicting narratives in the public debate, school 
programs, and popular culture – here remains as a black box. The present study does 
not aim at looking inside the box, but rather at analysing the outcome of that process, 
understood as the type of mainstream and (possibly) secondary narratives that emerged 
from that conflictual process. Only major academic publications are used as sources, and 
despite the impossibility to include every relevant publication it is safe to assume that the 
                                                           
118 It builds on (and expands) the analysis already presented in Caramani and Manucci (under 
review). 
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type of collective memory and the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past are correctly 
identified.119  
 
This approach is case-oriented and the intensive knowledge of cases is decisive in the 
attribution of values and it can be defined as direct method of calibration (Verkuilen 2005; 
Ragin 2008). Each country can display each type of collective memory in a scale from 0 
to 1, where 0 (full non-membership) means that the country does not have any trace of 
that type of collective memory, 1 (full membership) means that the country fully belongs 
to that category, and 0.5 (crossover value) means that the country does neither belong to 
that category nor it is excluded from it. When secondary narratives are present, the sum 
of the values cannot exceed 1.  
 
This type of grading might be considered as too fine-grained. However, a deep qualitative 
knowledge of the cases grants credibility to the values assigned while constituting a pillar 
of the logic on which QCA relies. The assignment of the values is not at all arbitrary. First 
of all, it is transparently discussed and justified. Second, it derives from informed 
decisions that are based on a substantive familiarity with the topic. One might be 
conservative and assign only coarse thresholds such as 0–0.33–0.66–1 to indicate full 
membership and non-membership (1 and 0), or 'more in than out' and 'more out than in' 
(0.66 and 0.33). However, rather than constituting an advantage for the analysis, this 
approach would represent an unjustified loss of information. 
                                                           
119 The advantage of this method consists in effectively addressing two of the caveats identified 
in Chapter 3: the presence of secondary narratives and the variation over time of collective 
memories. 
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Table 8 – Types of Memory and Levels of Stigma in Eight Countries 
Country Year CULP VICT HERO CANC Stigma 
Austria (AT) 
1975 0 0.7 0 0.3 0.1 
1983 0 0.7 0 0.3 0.1 
1994 0.3 0.7 0 0 0.3 
2002 0.3 0.7 0 0 0.3 
2013 0.3 0.7 0 0 0.3 
Switzerland 
(CH) 
1975 0 0 0 1 0.3 
1983 0 0 0 1 0.3 
1994 0 0 0 1 0.3 
2003 0 0.4 0 0.6 0.2 
2011 0 0.4 0 0.6 0.2 
Germany 
(DE) 
1972 1 0 0 0 1.0 
1983 1 0 0 0 1.0 
1994 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 0.9 
2002 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 0.9 
2013 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 0.9 
France (FR) 
1974 0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 
1981 0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 
1995 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 
2002 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 
2012 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Italy (ITA) 
1972 0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 
1983 0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 
1994 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 
2001 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 
2013 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Netherlands 
(NL) 
1972 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3 
1982 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3 
1994 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3 
2002 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3 
2012 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3 
Sweden (SE) 
1973 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.6 
1982 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.6 
1994 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8 
2002 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8 
2014 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8 
United 
Kingdom  
1974 0 0 1 0 0.7 
1983 0 0 1 0 0.7 
1992 0 0 1 0 0.7 
2001 0 0 1 0 0.7 
2010 0 0 1 0 0.7 
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Moreover, the final amount of stigma of the fascist past is calculated in a way that further 
reduces the disputability of the values assigned. Indeed, in order to establish the level of 
stigma towards the fascist past present in each country, the values of culpabilization is 
multiplied by 1 (highest stigma), victimization by 0 (lowest stigma), while heroization and 
cancellation are multiplied respectively by 0.66 and 0.33 (see Figure 5). This means that, 
for example, whether a country displays 0.6, 0.7 or 0.8 of victimization and 0.4, 0.3, or 0.2 
of cancellation, the level of stigma remains 0.1.  
 
The next section assigns different type of collective memories to the eight countries 
starting from the lowest levels of stigma and progressively moving towards the highest 
levels of stigma. Table 8 summarizes the findings. 
 
Italy 
 
In Italy the collective memory is one of victimization (De Luna 2011, 43) based on 
selective amnesia (Oliva 2006) and removal (Del Boca 1996) in order to forget the fascist 
past (Fogu 2006). The main recurrent element of this narration consists in portraying 
Italians as "brava gente" (good folks), thus creating a myth which allows to differentiate 
Italy from Germany and distance itself from the guilt and responsibility associated to the 
Nazi and fascist regime (Bidussa 1994; Del Boca 2005; Focardi 2013). Another goal of 
this myth consists in trying too whitewash the massacres of the Italian occupation 
perpetrated in Africa and the Balkans (Consonni 2011; Sluga 1999). 
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Italy's historical narrative revolves around victimization with the aim of portraying the 
country not as perpetrator but as victim of the fascist regime and its propaganda, victim 
of Hitler's decisions, and essentially victim of history. The paradigm of victimization is 
effectively illustrated by Berger (2010, 122): "official memory policy […] concentrated on 
Italian victims, above all the victims of German-occupied Italy after 1943, thereby 
highlighting the national struggle against a foreign enemy. The history of Italian fascism 
was presented as a struggle of the Italian people first against fascism and then against 
foreign occupants." This passage already shows how the victimization narrative works 
hand in glove with cancellation and heroization.  
 
Italians, according to the mainstream victimization narrative, were not supporting fascism 
but rather its victims and they heroically fought to free themselves from its yoke. This 
narrative is possible because the real role of Italy and Italians is denied (Franzinelli 
2002).120 While prefects, superintendents, and public security commissioners remained 
largely the same after 1945 – Battini (2003) speaks of a missed 'Italian Nurnberg trial' – 
the government granted several amnesties to former fascist: in 1946, 1948, and 1966 
(Franzinelli 2006; Ponzani 2008). 
 
                                                           
120 Italy describes as 'victims' even the fascist soldiers killed in the North-East by Tito's partisans. 
Neo-fascist organizations, indeed, can openly celebrate the "victims of Communism" each 10th 
February, during the recently institutionalized "National Memorial Day of the Exiles and Foibe". 
To diminish the atrocities of the fascist regime the mantra of those "killed in the foibe" is very 
recurrent and not only among extreme right-wing activists. See Tenca Montini (2014). Tellingly, a 
picture that often circulates to represent "the atrocities against the poor Italian victims" actually 
depicts Italian soldiers killing civilians in Slovenia. In this way twenty years of fascist violence in 
the Balkans are removed. What remains is the victimization of a country that pretends not to 
remember what Italians did in Istria and Dalmatia (Focardi and Klinkhammer 2004). 
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As summarized by Fogu (2006, 159) the victimization memory in Italy was based on the 
following memory-building procedure: "hide the black ventennio below the glorious carpet 
of the red biennio." In other words, the political exploitation of the Resistance movement 
made it possible to portray the country as essentially antifascist and therefore to foster a 
narrative of heroization. In this way Italians reinvented themselves as antifascist by 
selectively remembering certain aspects of the past linked to the resistenza while deciding 
to forget others (Poggiolini 2002, 224). As Consonni (2011, 215) stresses, Italians 
constructed a national memory as one of occupation "through the memory of patriotic 
resistance and the total negation of any aspect of collaboration with Germany." 
 
The victimization narrative was questioned only by some isolated voices in the 1960s and 
1970s (S. Berger 2010), which however did not manage to challenge the main narrative. 
After the end of the so-called 'First Republic', caused among other things by the corruption 
scandal 'Bribesville', more critical voices were present. De Luna (2011) defined that 
critical moment as the end of the "memorial pact" of the old parties. However, rather than 
losing its hegemony, the mainstream narrative based on victimization fully succeeded in 
marginalizing any other narrative. As it will emerge clearly in analyzing other countries, 
debates do not always imply a re-definition of the mainstream narrative and they can even 
lead to its reinforcement. 
 
Elements of denial and cancellation of the past have become so strong over time that the 
victimization narrative made it possible for post-fascist parties such as AN (National 
Alliance – Alleanza Nazionale) to obtain the institutionalization of a 'memory day' to 
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remember the Italian victims in the context of the conflict between Italy and Tito’s 
Yugoslavia while the requests of the left-wing parties to commemorate the victims of 
fascism and Italian colonialism were not even discussed (Focardi 2013). Not even the 
discovery of the so-called "armoire of shame" changed the mainstream narrative.121  
 
To sum up, one can conclude that the myth of the "good Italian" is functional to the 
removal of every uncomfortable national memory (cancellation) thus fostering the idea 
that Italian fascism was less brutal than Nazism, and that the movement for liberation has 
washed away the sins and redeemed the popular support to fascism (heroization). 
 
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in 
Italy are the following: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed mainly by 
victimization (0.6) and secondarily by both cancellation (0.2) and heroization (0.2). From 
1992, after the end of the first Republic and, the victimization narrative became even more 
prominent (0.8) and in parallel the actions of the Resistance movement became even less 
relevant (0.1) and cancellation was eroded (0.1) by an even stronger victimization. 
Therefore, the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past passed from an already low 0.2 
to an even lower 0.1. 
 
France 
 
                                                           
121 In 1994, 695 documents about war crimes perpetrated by fascist and Nazi soldiers (composing 
the memorandum titled Atrocities in Italy) were discovered in a wooden cabinet (Franzinelli 2002). 
This did not diminish the social and political acceptability of post-fascist parties 
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The memory of fascism and the Second World War in France is characterized by a 
process of cancellation and heroization similar to the one described for Italy. The main 
difference consists in the fact that in France the national myth created by De Gaulle 
describing French people as "all participating to the resistance" was even stronger. This 
was the case because – in France – the Resistance movement was considered as 
homogeneous and national, while in Italy it was considered as a divisive heritage due to 
the prominent role of the communists. 
 
The Vichy regime is portrayed in the French collective memory as an "aberration", an 
"interlude", something totally alien to the national history and culture (Judt 1992, 96; S. 
Berger 2010, 123). Moreover the fascist Vichy regime, which collaborated with the Nazis, 
is considered as imposed by the Germans although this is historically inaccurate and 
ignores the fact that the head of that regime – Philippe Pétain – was hugely popular in 
France (Jackson 2014).  
 
During the 1980s, the president Mitterand strategically developed the Gaullist myth of the 
good German to portray both French and Germans as victims of the Nazi regime, thus 
fostering both cancellation and heroization (Gildea 2002). Since France decided to 
describe itself as inherently anti-fascist and not to question its own political culture but 
rather to create a myth of resisting French (similar to the one describing Italians as 
inherently "good folks"), it follows that France can only be described as victim of the Nazi 
regime (Gildea 2002, 75). This narrative made possible to avoid and block out any type 
of responsibility (Michel 2011, 182). 
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A narrative based on victimization, like in the case of Italy, relies in parallel to elements 
of cancellation and heroization. On the one hand, the Gaullist myth of Resistance portrays 
the French population as heroically opposed to the fascist regime (Golsan 2006, 78). On 
the other hand, it presents a positively accentuated national history which denies the 
support for Vichy as well as the country's responsibilities towards former colonies (Bell 
2013, 156; S. Berger 2010, 131).  
 
Since the 1960 the "mythe résistencialiste" (Rousso 1990, 101) crystallized into a national 
monument which could not be broken even when France was confronted with its past. 
The Barbie trial (1972-84), Paxton's publication (1972), or the movie "Le Chagrin et la 
Pitié" (1969), put the controversial role of France during World War II more or less at the 
center of the public debate, but instead of entailing a change of narrative this resulted in 
a lost occasion (Rousso 1990). Even when in 1995 Jacques Chirac for the first time 
publicly acknowledged French participation in the Holocaust (Art 2011a, 363), this did not 
result in taking responsibility and the victimization narrative even got reinforced.122 
 
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in 
France are the following: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed mainly by 
                                                           
122 Things might further evolve in the near future. In July 2017, French President Emmanuel 
Macron publicly denounced France’s collaboration in the Holocaust, and declared that "It is 
convenient to see the Vichy regime as born of nothingness, returned to nothingness. Yes, it’s 
convenient, but it is false. We cannot build pride upon a lie." 17 July 2017, The New York Times, 
"Macron Denounces Anti-Zionism as ‘Reinvented Form of Anti-Semitism'", by Russell Goldman, 
July 17, 2017 available online (consulted in July 2017): 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/world/europe/macron-israel-holocaust-antisemitism.html. 
157 
 
victimization (0.6) and secondarily by both cancellation (0.2) and heroization (0.2). From 
the 1990s the victimization narrative became even more prominent (0.7) and in parallel 
the cancellation narrative was eroded (0.1) because the past was confronted but altered 
and therefore considered acceptable. Accordingly, the degree of stigmatization of the 
fascist past passed remained always at a low level of 0.2. 
 
Austria 
 
Similarly to the cases of Italy and France, the type of collective memory established in 
Austria is based on victimization (Ludi 2004), amnesia (Art 2007, 338), self-delusion (Pick 
2000, 198), distancing (Berger 2010, 121), and avoidance of any responsibility (Judt 
1992). The main difference consists in the fact that Austria could not develop any heroic 
narrative due to the lack of a Resistance movement.  
 
The victimization narrative revolves around the Anschluss ("annexation") as a central 
element. Since in 1938 the country was invaded and incorporated in the Third Reich, the 
mainstream narrative goes, Austria cannot be blamed for World War II and the Holocaust 
(Pick 2000, 198). The tone of the narrative is apologetic and avoids any type of 
responsibility or admission of guilt, and goes along with the strategy of the Allies and their 
effort to avoid any excessive emphasis on Austria's past in order not to alienate them 
from the Western bloc (Judt 1992, 88).123  
                                                           
123 A telling joke about Austria's collective memory is attributed to Billy Wilder, Austrian-born 
Jewish American filmmaker: "The Austrians have accomplished the feat of turning Beethoven into 
an Austrian, and Hitler into a German." Der Spiegel, May 16, 1994. Author: Hellmuth Karasek. 
Title: "Späte Heimkehr".  
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Uhl (2006) identifies the Rot-Weiß-Rot-Buch (Red-White-Red Book), a governmental 
publication from 1946, as the official source for the "victim theory". Collective memory has 
been developed, since the beginning, on the idea that Austria was not just a victim of 
Nazism, but rather as the first victim of Hitler (Berger 2010, 120). This narrative, however, 
has no historical confirmation (Art 2006, 42) and ignores several facts such as the 
overwhelming support of Austrians for the Anschluss.  
 
Two critical points can be identified in the evolution of collective memory in Austria: the 
"Waldheim affair" in 1986 and the speech of then Chancellor Franz Vranitzky in 1991. 
Kurt Waldheim became the ninth President of Austria although it emerged during the 
electoral campaign that he previously lied about having being drafted into the Wehrmacht. 
This sparked a long and heated debate. On the one hand it produced a partial revision of 
the victim theory and "mainstream public opinion internalized the idea of Austrian 
responsibility" (S. Berger 2010, 126) introducing a modified "co-responsibility thesis" (Uhl 
2006, 63). On the other hand, Heinish (2002) stresses that despite the international 
community criticized Austria, Waldheim won those elections and as a reaction the FPÖ 
gained consensus. In fact, the debate in a first moment produced a rather nationalistic 
and Anti-Semitic answer (Art 2006; Wodak 1990).  
The change in the mainstream narrative is however certified in 1991, when for the first 
time in history that Austrian Chancellor, Franz Vranitzky, highlighted live on TV Austrian 
culpability (Pick 2000, 199). The country had to make a very formal amend for the past 
and this created more debate which was translated into more polarization (Art 2011a). 
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The fact that it constituted such a delayed apology confirms how rooted and difficult to 
challenge was the victimization narrative. However, it also stresses how important it was, 
at least at the symbolic level, an official admission of guilt and a partial adoption of the 
culpabilization narrative. Bischof argues that since then, Austria can no longer be 
considered the "black sheep of Europe" when it comes to dealing with the Nazi past 
(Bischof 2004, 25). In sum, it is possible to claim that a new secondary narrative based 
on culpabilization emerged between 1983 and 1994 replacing cancellation, while the 
narrative based on victimization remained mainstream and provided a greater electoral 
success for the party insisting on that narrative: the FPÖ.  
 
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in 
Austria are the following: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed mainly by 
victimization (0.7) and secondarily by cancellation (0.3). From 1994 the victimization 
narrative remained prominent (0.7) but cancellation was not possible anymore and was 
replaced by culpabilization. Therefore, the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past 
passed from 0.1 to 0.3.  
Switzerland 
 
Contrary to victimization narratives, cancellation narratives imply that the past is not 
altered but rather neglected or denied. This is precisely what happened in Switzerland, 
where neutrality during the World War II has been considered for decades as a sufficient 
reason not to look closely at the country's active and passive collaboration with 
authoritarian regimes at least until 1995 (Kellerhals-Maeder 2000).  
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As Ludi puts it "the common representations of the past have been highly selective, and 
most efforts to address thorny questions have been doomed" (2004, 119). Similarly, Judt 
describes the Swiss memory as "purged" (1992, 96). Among the thorny issues that 
Switzerland decided to exclude from the public debate there are the distinction the country 
made between Jews and non-Jewish Germans, with the former returned to the Nazis 
whenever they attempted cross the border (Judt 1992, 96), as well as the delivery of 
Swiss arms to Nazi Germany and the dismissal of Jews from Swiss companies (Berger 
2010, 129). 
 
For the Swiss, neutrality is a pillar of their national identity (Lebow 2006, 20) and this is 
at the base of the mainstream narrative describing Switzerland as a small country unable 
to defend itself against external enemies (Berger 2010, 124). The idea of the Helvetic 
Confederation as the charitable home of the Red Cross with a long tradition of neutrality 
allowed the formation and consolidation of a traditional national identity and fostered the 
Sonderfall Schweiz myth, describing Switzerland as a 'special case' and therefore helping 
to avoid the debate (Ludi 2004, 126). 
 
The absence of a debate can be linked directly to the fact that the government restricted 
the access to archives and documents – Berger claims that the Swiss state "was 
extraordinary active in preventing a different memory" by restricting access to archives 
and documents and sponsoring official publications. It seems safe to assume that the 
memory based on cancellation was an intended consequence of the government’s policy 
(Ludi 2004, 124).  
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Although critical voices such as Edgar Bonjour existed at least since the 1970s124, 
Switzerland could afford not to officially face its past until the 1990s, when (mostly 
external) pressures forced the country to take action. Already in 1995 the Swiss president 
Kaspar Villiger apologized to the Jewish people for the country's asylum policy during 
World War II, but the confrontation of the past became particularly pressing in 1996 when 
Jewish organizations forced Swiss banks to undercover dormant accounts of Holocaust 
victims, an issue that had been ignored for a long time and that created irritation. As a 
reaction the Swiss government refused to acknowledge its dark past while outburst of 
antisemitism characterized the public debate (Ludi 2004, 120–22).125  
 
The reports published between 1998 and 2002 by the Volcker Commission (also known 
as 'Independent Committee of Experts' or ICE) did not help to settle a real mainstream 
narrative, also because the media barely took notice of them. The Swiss collective 
memory remained based on denial and removal because the revision of the country's 
history was driven by "the urge to exculpate Switzerland", to "deny the necessity of 
acknowledging responsibility", and "to refuse to feel ashamed of what had happened in 
the Nazi era" (Ludi 2004, 138). 
In parallel to the constantly mainstream narrative based on cancellation, a secondary 
narrative based on victimization developed after 1995. Ludi claims that being forced to 
face its past between 1995 and 2002, and by refusing the allegations of wartime 
                                                           
124 Edgar Bonjour, a Swiss historian, questioned the neutrality of the country and examined its 
implications. See Bonjour (1970). 
125 Similarly to what happened in Austria after the Waldheim's affair. 
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accommodation, Switzerland had to "turn the table" generating a secondary victimization 
narrative – similarly to the Austrian one – minimizing the country's culpability and 
responsibility (2006, 212).  
 
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in 
Switzerland are the following: a value of 1 to cancellation between 1970s and 1994, while 
for the 2000s and 2010s they are 0.4 (victimization) and 0.6 (cancellation) since the 
debate about the country's responsibilities was revitalized from 1996 but instead of 
resulting in culpabilization it generated a secondary narrative based on victimization. The 
overall level of stigma therefore passed from 0.3 to 0.2.  
 
Netherlands 
 
Similarly to the Swiss case, the Dutch national collective memory has been highly 
selective and, in line with the Italian and French narratives, fostered the inaccurate image 
of the "Good Dutch". This image was instrumental in distancing the Netherlands from the 
Nazi regime and made it possible to avoid controversial aspects of the country's role 
during World War II (Brants 2000; De Haan 2011; Judt 1992). In other words, the main 
narrative in the Netherlands portrayed the Dutch as reluctant collaborators despite the 
complicity of the population (Brants 2000, 229).  
 
The Dutch self-portrayal focuses on the narrative of 'a small country without a choice' 
against an external aggression, and consequently ignores its collaboration with the Nazi 
regime. As Judt explains, "the active and enthusiastic collaboration of some Flemings and 
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Dutch was stricken from the public record" (1992, 96).126 Moreover, two other important 
and embarrassing elements were excluded: the fact that in the Netherlands Jews had the 
lowest chances to survive compared to any other European country, and the fact that 
Queen Wilhelmina could have done more in fostering anti-German and pro-Jews 
interventions during her radio speeches (Bovenkerk 2000). 
 
The narrative distinguishing between the categories of goed Dutch and fout collaborators 
remained the main paradigm in Dutch historiography and collective memory for 
decades.127 Like in other countries, only in the 1970s and 1980s "more critical voices 
highlighted the extent of Dutch collaboration with the Nazi occupiers" (S. Berger 2010, 
127). Although the country's role during World War II had become salient in the public 
debate this was not enough to change the mainstream narrative while in fact it rather 
reinforced it (De Haan 2011, 85).  
 
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in 
the Netherlands are the following: a value of 0.8 to cancellation and 0.2 to victimization. 
The two values remain stable over time because there is no trace in the literature of a 
change of narrative. Even after an increase of the saliency of the country's past, it seems 
like denial and amnesia remained the glue of the national collective memory. The level of 
stigma, therefore, remains constantly at 0.3 during the whole period. 
 
                                                           
126 Tellingly, only a small amount of collaborators were prosecuted and none of them served a 
sentence of more than fifteen years (De Haan 2011, 78). 
127 De Jong (1978). 
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Sweden 
 
In Sweden, the collective memory about the country's role vis-à-vis fascism revolves 
around the "small state realism" narrative (Johansson 1997, 175). Similarly to Switzerland 
and the Netherlands, the country depicted itself as a small victim, a bystander without any 
choice against the German aggression: limited concessions and neutrality were 
considered as the best possible outcome for the nation and its neighbors (Östling 2011, 
128).  
 
This narrative of cancellation is based on denial and removal and therefore, as Johansson 
puts it, difficult questions were "swept under the carpet" (1997, 176). According to Colla, 
many elements of the country's history were not only excluded by the national collective 
memory, but conveniently forgotten (2002). Similarly, Judt claims that abiding memories 
were "purged from the national collective memory" (1992, 96). The country decided not 
to address issues such as: the Wehrmacht being allowed to use Sweden for military 
transport; the trade of iron, wood, and coal which maintained alive the German war 
machine; last but not least, the eugenics program of compulsory sterilization established 
since the 1930s. These and other memories were removed in the name of realpolitik 
(Gilmour 2010, 70; Spektorowski and Mizrachi 2004).  
 
Through a process of cancellation, according to Östling, "small-state realism became 
Sweden’s patriotic narrative of the Second World War" (2008). This originated a myth 
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which describes values of solidarity and humanism as inherently Swedish.128 The 
collective memory established wide "repressed areas" in order to protect the idea and 
purity of the folkhemmet (the "people's house", in other words Sweden and its welfare 
state as political culture). In parallel to cancellation, the myth of Sweden centered on 
humanitarian efforts originated a secondary narrative of heroism (Östling 2008, 203). 
 
It is precisely this deeply rooted idea of folkhemmet that characterises the Swedish 
collective memory and its uniqueness. Indeed, contrary to other cases of cancellation 
such as Switzerland and Netherlands, pre-existing political cultural elements linked to the 
idea of folkhemmet closed the door for a nationalist interpretation of the events linked to 
World War II and enhanced the levels of stigmatization of that past (Trägårdh 2002). For 
this reason, Sweden interestingly displays a higher degree of stigma compared to other 
cases of cancellation. 
 
This also explains the presence of another, and stronger, secondary narrative based on 
culpabilization, which became dominant especially from the 1990s. The culpabilization 
narrative was articulated and legitimated by several schools of thought and not 
necessarily for the same reasons: "The leitmotiv of this critical interpretation was that the 
coalition government, with its concessions to Nazi Germany, had pursued a morally 
irresponsible policy, whose only purpose had been unconditionally to keep Sweden out 
of the great power conflict" (Östling 2011, 132). 
 
                                                           
128 Although the myth does not necessarily contain only truth, since "myth and historical 
consciousness tend to be mutually exclusive as approaches to reality" (Colla 2002, 131). 
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Although the culpabilization narrative was present already in the years immediately 
following the war, it was only since the "decade of debates" (Östling 2011, 139) – the 
1990s – that it became prominent. In parallel, the small-state narrative progressively lost 
its monopoly. A book in particular originated much debate about the country's role: 
Boëthius' "Sweden and the Second World War" (1991). It paved the way for a more critical 
narrative and marked the beginning of the gradual transition from a narrative based on 
cancellation to a narrative based on culpabilization (Östling 2011, 137).  
 
Sweden was reticent in developing a clear culpabilization narrative (or it might have been 
given for granted) but after decades of cancellation, culpabilization became the 
mainstream narrative and the stigma of Nazism became "a powerful weapon in domestic 
debates" (Östling 2016, 152). This was also visible in the government's research program 
"Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust" started in 2000.129  
 
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in 
Sweden are the following: a value of 0.6 to cancellation, 0.1 to heroization, and 0.3 to the 
culpabilization in the 1970s and 1980s. From the 1990s the small-state realism narrative 
lost its monopoly and Sweden was more resolute in facing its past, hence culpabilization 
increased (reaching 0.6) while cancellation went down to 0.3. The levels of stigma thus 
increased from 0.6 to 0.8. 
 
                                                           
129 It also included a survey published (in English) in 2003 and titled "Sweden’s Relations with 
Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust: A Survey of Research." 
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United Kingdom 
 
The British narrative of the country's role during World War II is unanimously considered 
as one of heroization. The fight against fascist regimes is described as Britain's "finest 
hour" (S. Berger 2010, 124; Reynolds 2016, 11–14), in line with the topos introduced by 
Winston Churchill in one of his speeches from 1940 (commonly referred to as ' Their 
Finest Hour').130 
 
The British collective memory is based on the narrative of World War II as a 'good' war 
liberating Europe from evil (Bell 2013, 156), a people's war with epic and heroic 
connotations depicting Britain as a fortress standing alone against hostility (Reynolds 
2013, 204), linked to the idea of British heroism as "totemic of an indomitable Albion" 
(Tombs 2013, 3).  
 
The collective memory of the country's role is extremely consistent over time and does 
not contain any secondary narrative. Some elements have been omitted or underplayed, 
such as the contribution of the Commonwealth (Reynolds 2013, 204) or the question of 
whether Britain could have done more to protect European Jews (Bell 2013, 156). 
However, the total opposition to fascist regimes and the defense of liberal values has 
never been at stake. 
                                                           
130 A few passages of the speech delivered in Parliament at Westminster, 18 June 1940, are worth 
being mentioned to better understand the British heroization narrative (author's italics): "Upon this 
battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and the 
long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. (…) Hitler knows that he will have to break us 
in this island or lose the war. (…) Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear 
ourselves, that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still 
say: "this was their finest hour." 
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The heroization narrative has remained the only accepted one in the public discourse, 
and it has never been questioned over time. As Berger claims (2010, 130) heroic and 
positive memories of the war and remembrances of solidarity in suffering "continued to 
dominate memory discourses up to the present day." It is therefore safe to claim that the 
main narrative of heroization has not been undermined by passage of time (Bell 2013).  
 
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in 
the United Kingdom is the following: a value of 1 to heroization through the whole time 
span. Therefore, the level of stigma remained stable at 0.7. 
 
Germany 
 
Germany constitutes a textbook case of culpabilization. A large literature on 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung (or 'coming to terms with the past') shows that Germany 
decided to face the past and to take responsibility for it (Art 2006, 19–20; T. Berger 2012, 
63–64; Reichel 2001; Niven 2002; Olick 2007), while “the historical experience of other 
countries before and after the Nazi regime suggests that silence, avoidance, repression 
of the memory and past crimes are the norm rather than the exception” (Herf 2002, 184). 
As Judt puts it, the decision to blame everything on Germany "was one of the few matters 
on which all sides, within each country and among the Allied powers, could readily agree" 
(Judt 1992, 87). 
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Collective re-elaboration in Germany formed a memory built upon pillars such as 
collective guilt (Maier 1988), culture of contrition (Art 2007, 338), Nie Wieder or 'never 
again' (Art 2006, 20), Aufrechnung or 'settling of accounts' (Moeller 2006, 111) and 
Aufarbeitung Der Vergangenheit or 'working through the past' (Adorno 1977).131 The 
German approach to the events which led to World War II and the Holocaust is based on 
the acceptance of its own responsibility (Judt 1992, 87). However, it was not an immediate 
and spontaneous achievement. The pre-condition for the creation of a self-culpabilizing 
memory of the Holocaust was the Allied military victory which the resulted in the Nurnberg 
trials and the de-Nazification process (Herf 2002, 185).  
 
Initially, under Konrad Adenauer, Germany produced a victimization narrative portraying 
the people as victim of the Nazi regime (Moeller 2005; Niven 2010; S. Berger 2010, 91; 
Gregor N. 2008). In 1952, however, the Bundespräsident Theodor Heuss said: “Diese 
Scham nimmt uns niemand ab! No one will lift this shame from us", a speech which 
entered in the German political culture and "began an elite tradition of political recollection 
that would eventually contribute to broader public discussion and action" (Herf 2002, 190–
92), although it is not until the end of the 1950s that the country established its process 
of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (Kansteiner 2006, 102).  
 
The culpabilization narrative was never seriously challenged in Western Germany, and 
the main contrast was represented by the possibility of comparing the Holocaust with 
other events. In the period 1986-87 this debate was particularly intense, to the point that 
                                                           
131 For an overview: Assmann and Frevert (1999). 
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it was labelled Historikerstreit, the "historians’ dispute" (S. Berger 2010, 131; Baldwin 
1990). Subsequently, according to several authors the country went through a process of 
'normalization' (Olick 1998; T. Berger 2002, 99) which led to the possibility to show once 
again some degree of patriotism and to shed the ghosts of the past, for example with the 
2006 football World Cup or with or the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo.132 Therefore, it 
is possible to claim that – in an effort to normalize the country's past – cancellation 
became part of the official narrative, in particular as a result of a politics of memory 
(Geschichtspolitik) fostered by the Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Art 2006, 50). 
 
Another factor to consider is the impact of reunification on the country's collective 
memory, given the different memories that for decades developed within the same 
territory (T. Berger 2002, 99; Herf 2002, 192). In the East the collective memory was one 
of heroization, because "Eastern Germany argued that it represented the opposition to 
fascism and thus bore no responsibility for the crimes of the regime it replaced" (Olick 
1998, 559). Therefore, "the communist narrative presented East Germans as heroic 
antifascists who had liberated themselves from the Nazi capitalists" (Art 2006, 43). This 
heroic narrative made it possible for the East to reject and deny any responsibility (Herf 
1997, 161; Herf 2016). 
 
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in 
Germany are the following: a value of 1 to culpabilization for the 1970s and 80s. After 
reunification in 1989, the level goes down to 0.8 because it starts the process of 
                                                           
132 It is very difficult to determine to what extent the process of normalization is linked to the 
Historikerstreit, but it might be a result of a more nuanced interpretation of the country's past. 
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normalization of the German past, introducing cancellation (0.1). Moreover, the 
reunification introduces in Germany of yet another type collective memory: the Eastern 
German narrative, which is one of heroization for the fight against the Nazi. For these 
reasons there is a 0.1 of both heroization and cancellation from the 1990s. 
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Chapter 7 – Explaining Populism "The Usual Way" 
 
This is the first of two analytical chapters aiming at understanding which factors, or 
combination of factors, explain the different levels of populism's social acceptability in 
different countries over time. It presents the results of the fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) testing the impact of four conditions: levels of corruption, 
accountability and responsiveness, levels of ideological convergence of the political 
system, and levels of economic performance. The selection of these conditions was 
derived from the vast literature on the electoral performance of populist parties and it has 
been adapted to the scope of this study as explained in detail in Chapter 2. The next 
chapter will introduce the role of stigmatization of the fascist past because, as argued in 
Chapter 3, these four conditions are supposed to leave partially unexplained the cross-
country variation concerning the presence of populism.  
 
Operationalization and calibration  
 
In fsQCA the data is expressed in fuzzy set membership scores ranging from 0 to 1. 
Therefore the aim is to obtain the raw data for each country concerning each of the 
conditions as well as for the outcome, and in a second step to calibrate the raw data into 
fuzzy set scores. Fuzzy rather than crisp membership scores offer the possibility to 
overcome a pure dichotomization of data (Ragin 2000), and the calibration procedure is 
a key element in order to obtain fuzzy set memberships as adequate as possible, and for 
this reason a deep qualitative knowledge of the cases is an essential precondition. Rather 
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than arbitrarily, in fact, calibration should be done in an informed way through a 
substantive familiarity with the topic.  
 
This section discusses the operationalization conditions and outcomes, as well as their 
calibration.133 According to the different situations, both substantive theoretical 
knowledge and empirical evidence have been used as parameters for the calibration. 
When the direct method of calibration is used, by means of a logarithmic function the 
software calculates the membership scores for each case in the different sets. A value of 
1 is assigned to cases which are fully member of that set, while 0.5 is the point of 
maximum ambiguity, which means that it is not possible to establish whether the case is 
member or non-member of the set, and 0 indicates full non-membership (Ragin 2008). 
As much as possible, purely data-driven calibrations are avoided since they usually are 
void of any substantive meaning (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). On the other hand, 
a great amount of attention is devoted to the location of qualitative anchors. Table 9 
summarizes the calibration process for the conditions as well as for the outcomes, while 
the Appendix 4 shows raw and fuzzy values for the four conditions (Table 24) and the 
three outcomes (Table 25). 
 
Outcome: social acceptability of populism 
The outcome to be explained is the social acceptability of populism, which is also further 
disentangled in left-wing and right-wing populism, for a total of three outcomes that will 
                                                           
133 Next chapter relies on the same conditions, operationalization and calibration, therefore the 
will not be explained again.  
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be tested. It is measured as the percentage of populist statements in a manifesto and 
then weighted by the degree of radicalism of the party as well as its vote share in that 
election, as explained in Chapter 4. The values are displayed in Appendix 3 (Table 23). 
In case, during an election, more than one party manifesto had traces of populism, the 
percentages were aggregated.  
 
In order to assign the full membership or non-membership of the cases in the outcomes, 
as well as the crossover points, it is essential to observe the empirical data. Each choice 
is here justified and explained in detail, in order to transparently expose the process of 
calibration and link it to the intensive knowledge of each case. 
 
Social Acceptability of Populism 
 
A country displays high levels of social acceptability of populism, and therefore is a full 
member of the outcome, in case it shows a value which is equal or higher than the one 
displayed in France in 1995 (1,891). Cases with even higher values than France in 1995 
are considered as outliers and extraneous variation. France in 1995 is considered as fully 
member of the outcome because each and every manifesto analyzed contains populism. 
Three are from left-wing parties, and three from right-wing parties. On the left, both 
mainstream (PS) and non-mainstream parties (PCF, LO) show average or very high 
levels of populism in their manifestos (between 4% and 13%). On the right, the situation 
is similar, with the mainstream RPR and UDF articulating populist messages (6 and 4%) 
as well as the Front National (5%). Moreover, the PS and the RPR obtained together over 
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44% of the vote share, and the degree of radicalism of the non-mainstream parties is 
extremely elevated (between 4.3 and 6). These factors combined bring to the conclusion 
that France in 1995 is a case which deserves full membership in the outcome. Switzerland 
in 2011 shows very similar values (1,888) and it could have been chosen as well. 
Moreover, there is a clear gap in the scale since both cases precede a jump in the values. 
Indeed, the next case (Switzerland in 1995) shows a much higher level (178 points 
difference).  
 
The crossover point is identified in a value of 816, meaning that the United Kingdom in 
2003 is considered as being member of the outcome but not the Netherlands in 2012. 
There is an obvious gap in the levels of populism of these two cases, but also more 
substantial reasons. It is true that all six coded manifestos in the Netherlands in 2012 
show traces of populism, but all six are definitely below the average (5.7% for right-wing 
manifestos and 7.6% for left-wing ones), with only the PVV goes close to it (5.1%). This 
makes it particularly difficult to interpret the actual level of social acceptability of populism 
in the country at that time. Moreover, in the Netherlands the levels of radicalism are low 
or very low, once again with the exception of the PVV. On the other hand, in the United 
Kingdom in 2003 the three coded manifestos have average or high levels of populism 
(The Labour's manifesto reaches 8.1%), and they together cover more than 90% of the 
vote share. All the cases with values higher than the one of the Netherlands in 2012 are 
therefore considered as more in than out of the category concerning the social 
acceptability of populism, while those below are more out than in.134 
                                                           
134 The point at which a country has full non-membership in the outcome is 0 for all the examined 
types of populism (total, right-wing, and left-wing). 
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Only 8 cases are below the crossover point, while 14 are above it. The fact that only a 
few cases are more out than in simply reflects the fact that, in Western Europe in the last 
three decades, populism is a constant feature of party manifestos. Moreover, considering 
the levels of radicalism and the voter share received by parties articulating populist 
messages, it is possible to observe how populism has become socially acceptable. This 
confirms how important details and characteristics of each case are in order to perform 
calibration. Finally, the low number of cases which do not belong to the outcome suggests 
that it would be interesting to expand the analysis to countries with a lower social 
acceptability of populism in order to produce more generalizable results.  
 
Social Acceptability of Left-Wing Populism  
 
A country displays high levels of social acceptability of left-wing populism, and therefore 
is a full member of the outcome, in case it shows a value which is equal or higher than 
the one displayed in Switzerland in 1995 (800). Cases with even higher values are 
considered as outliers and extraneous variation. Switzerland in 1995 can be considered 
as a full member of the outcome because both coded manifestos from left-wing parties 
display levels of populism close to or extremely above the average percentage of 
populism in left-wing manifestos (5.6%). In particular, the Green party has a level of 3.8%, 
while the Socialist Party displays a remarkable 11.6% that, combined with the medium 
level of radicalism (3) and a good electoral result (21.8%), confirms that in Switzerland 
mainstream left-wing parties can be highly populist, and therefore left-wing populism is 
socially acceptable. On the other hand the case below, Austria in 1994, cannot be 
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considered as a full member because there is only one left-wing populist manifesto (SPÖ, 
7.1%).  
 
The crossover point is identified in a value of 435, meaning that Switzerland in 2003 is 
considered as being member of the outcome while Germany in 2002 (310) is not. Apart 
from the clear gap in the levels, other substantial reasons for the calibration exist. In 
Switzerland both party manifestos contain populism: although the levels are below the 
average (they show levels of 3.1% and 3.3% compared to an average level of 5.6%), the 
mainstream left-wing party (SP) is not only populist but also highly radical (4.8).135 On the 
other hand, it is true that also in Germany both coded manifestos contain populism, but 
in lower percentages (3.6% and 1.5%). Moreover, the mainstream left-wing party (SPD) 
is very moderate compared to the Swiss socialist party (2 in the radicalism scale). All the 
cases with values higher than the one of Germany in 2002 are therefore considered as 
more in than out of the category concerning the social acceptability of left-wing populism, 
while those below are more out than in.  
 
This time, the distribution is more even: while 11 cases are below the crossover point, 12 
are above it. Compared to the overall levels of acceptability of populism, left-wing 
populism seems to be less socially accepted as displayed in Figure 10. It would be 
interesting to expand the analysis to South-European countries such as Spain, Greece, 
and Portugal in order to produce more generalizable results. 
 
                                                           
135 For Switzerland the data are derived from the Party Manifesto Project, since the Chapel Hill 
survey does not include the country.  
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Social Acceptability of Right-Wing Populism  
 
A country displays high levels of social acceptability of right-wing populism, and therefore 
is a full member of the outcome, in case it shows a value which is equal or higher than 
the one displayed in France in 1995 (802). Cases with even higher values are considered 
as outliers and extraneous variation. France in 1995 can be considered as a full member 
of the outcome because all three coded manifestos from right-wing parties display levels 
of populism close to or above the average percentage of populism in right-wing 
manifestos (4.5%). Moreover the three parties combined obtained more than 54% of the 
vote share, with the Front National showing the highest possible degree of radicalism. 
Switzerland in 2011 has similar values, and could have been used as well.  
 
The crossover point is identified in a value of 418, meaning that Austria in 2002 is 
considered as being member of the outcome while Germany in 1994 is not. In Austria 
both right-wing party manifestos contain populism, although the level is below average 
(3.5% and 0.7% compared to an average of 4.5%). Moreover, they both present a high 
degree of radicalism and the two parties combined obtained more than 46% of the vote 
share. On the other hand, although also in Germany both party manifestos show traces 
of populism (actually slightly higher than in Austria, 2.4% and 3.7%) the parties are less 
radical and obtained a smaller part of the vote share. All the cases with values higher 
than the one of Austria in 2002 are therefore considered as more in than out of the 
category concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, while those below are 
more out than in. It follows that only 8 cases are below the crossover point, while 15 are 
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above it. It would be interesting to expand the analysis to countries with a low social 
acceptability of right-wing populism in order to produce more generalizable results. 
Appendix 5 shows the distribution of cases in the three outcomes (Figure 26 to Figure 
28).  
 
Condition 1: corruption 
The first condition refers to the levels of corruption. The row data are obtained scaling 
and standardizing the values from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by 
Transparency International – measuring the overall extent of perceived corruption in the 
public and political sectors) – and the data published by the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) – assessing the levels of corruption within the political system.136 I take 
into account the average levels of corruption for the last four years before the election 
and then reverse them in order to obtain a value of 1 in case the level of corruption is very 
high and 0 in case it is very low, because populism is supposed to become more socially 
accepted when corruption scandals are widespread and corruption is perceived as 
problematic.  
 
The determination of full membership and non-membership of the cases is based on the 
most extreme cases in the distribution. Sweden and Switzerland in the 1990s are the two 
countries with the lowest perception of corruption, scoring values above 90, while Italy 
both in 1994 and 2013 has the lowest values (12). The average value for all countries is 
                                                           
136 Normalization and Standardization are operated by the Democracy Barometer in the indicator 
"Absence of Corruption". It is considered as parts of the features determining the governmental 
capabilities and in particular its transparency. 
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68, and it is used to determine the crossover point. Hence, 8 cases are below average, 
while 15 cases are above it. Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands are always 
members of the outcome; Austria, Germany, United Kingdom two times out of three. Italy 
(2) and France (3) are never members of the outcome. This distribution mirrors the fact 
that in West European countries the levels of corruption are generally low, while at the 
same time it takes into consideration the average value in order to set a threshold. 
 
Condition 2: accountability and responsiveness 
The second condition refers to the levels of accountability and responsiveness, here 
unified in a single measure. The two concepts are intertwined and both insist on 
democratic elements that play a prominent role in the populist critique of liberal 
democracy. While responsiveness consists in "reflecting and giving expression to the will 
of the people" (Pennock 1952, 790), accountability refers to politician's capability to 
respond to citizens for the decisions taken, and it is assessed in terms of the "ends 
achieved" and the "means employed" to achieve them (Moncrieffe 1998, 388–89).  
 
Determining these aspects is a particularly complex task, and it was necessary to 
construct a (certainly rough) proxy by combining four indicators present in the Democracy 
Barometer (DB).137 For responsiveness, two indicators have been selected from the 
Democracy Barometer: governmental capability and representation. The former 
combines measures for the government's length, stability, and popular support, while the 
                                                           
137 Merkel, Wolfgang and Daniel Bochsler (project leaders); Bousbah, Karima; Bühlmann, Marc; 
Giebler, Heiko; Hänni, Miriam; Heyne, Lea; Müller, Lisa; Ruth, Saskia; Wessels, Bernhard (2016). 
Democracy Barometer. Codebook. Version 5. Aarau: Zentrum für Demokratie. 
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latter combines measures for anti-government actions, political interference by the 
military and religion, and effective implementation of government decisions. For 
accountability, two indicators have been selected from the Democracy Barometer: 
transparency of the political process and fairness of competition. The former combines 
measures for freedom of information, informational openness, and the transparency of 
government policy, while the latter combines measures for the openness and 
competitiveness of elections.138  
 
The goal is to measure the quality of democratic mechanisms regulating the relationship 
between the people and their representatives, a key element of the populist critique to the 
liberal idea of democracy. The stronger are accountability and responsiveness, the less 
space there should be for a populist critique, therefore making populism less socially 
acceptable. 
 
The final value of the condition is obtained by calculating the average values of the four 
indicators (two for accountability and two for responsiveness) in the four years before the 
elections (Appendix 4, Table 26). The distribution of cases was considered to obtain the 
anchors for calibration. Since a low level of accountability and responsiveness is 
supposed to trigger populism, the DB's values have subsequently been reversed. 
                                                           
138 The codebook provides all the information concerning the sources of the data, their scaling 
and standardization. Moreover, it offers detailed definitions of the concepts employed and notes 
about the measurements. The dataset of the Democracy Barometer does not directly refer to 
concepts such as responsiveness and accountability, therefore I use their dataset by interpreting 
the type of information it contains in order to adapt it to the scope of this analysis.  
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Table 9 – Conditions and Their Calibration 
 
Conditions Description Calibration 
POP Percentage (combined) of populist statements 
in the party manifestos per country in each 
decade (weighted by radicalism and vote 
share) 
1= 1,891 
0.5= 816 
0= 0 
POP_L Percentage (combined) of populist statements 
in left wing party manifestos per country in 
each decade (weighted by radicalism and vote 
share) 
1= 800 
0.5= 436 
0= 0 
POP_R Percentage (combined) of populist statements 
in right wing party manifestos per country in 
each decade (weighted by radicalism and vote 
share) 
1= 802 
0.5= 418 
0= 0 
C High levels of corruption 1=12 
0.5=68 
0=92 
D Poor democratic performance in terms of 
accountability and responsiveness 
1=48 
0.5=65 
0=75 
 
E Poor economic performance: slow growth GDP 
per capita, high Gini Household Disposable 
Income coefficient, high unemployment rate 
1=16 
0.5=10 
0=5 
 
CNVG High ideological convergence of the political 
parties 
1=0.22 
0.5=0.45 
0=0.67 
 
S Low levels of stigmatization of the fascist past 1= 0 
0.5= 0.5 
0= 1 
See Chapter 3  
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Switzerland in 2011 scores better than any other country (75), therefore it is taken as the 
anchor for full non-membership. The United Kingdom in 1995 has the lowest value (48) 
and it is therefore selected as anchor for full membership. The average value for all 
countries is 62.5 but the selected crossover point is 65. This is due to the fact that Austria 
and Germany in 2013 would have been members of the outcome by taking into 
consideration just the overall average, but if one considers the average for the specific 
decade (64.6) they fall below that level. The same applies to Austria in 2002, which scores 
below the average for the decade (64.7). Therefore, the crossover point is established at 
65, and the only three countries included in the set are Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands. On the other hand Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
are always non-members of the condition. This shows a clear demarcation between 
countries delivering in terms of accountability and responsiveness, and countries that do 
not deliver. Moreover, it suggests that – despite every Western Europe country can be 
considered as fully democratized – some democratic mechanisms such as those 
considered here can and should be improved. 
 
Condition 3: economic performance 
The third condition concerns the economic performance of the countries. It includes the 
average values in the four years before elections for three parameters: unemployment 
rate, Gini household disposable income, and the growth of GDP per capita. The final 
value consists of the sum of the data for unemployment and Gini coefficient, minus the 
value for unemployment (since the first two have high values when the situation is 
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negative, while the last works in the other direction). High values indicate a poor economic 
performance, which in turn is supposed to trigger populism.  
 
The data for unemployment are obtained from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)139 and from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)140 
for the missing cases. The Gini household disposable income is considered more precise 
than the general Gini coefficient because it measures inequality after redistribution, and 
it is obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database.141 It is important 
to consider inequality since the gap between the poor and the rich which is supposed to 
be a key element in triggering populism, otherwise the presence of populism in rich 
countries would remain unexplainable. Finally, the data concerning the growth of GDP 
per capita are obtained from the World Bank.142  
 
The determination of full membership and non-membership is based on the most extreme 
cases in the distribution (Appendix 4, Table 27). Sweden in 2002 scores better than any 
other country (5), therefore it is taken as the anchor for full non-membership in the 
condition 'poor economic performance'. Italy in 2013 has the worst value (16) and it is 
therefore selected as anchor for full membership. The average value for all countries is 
10.2 and this is used as crossover point, making of Switzerland in 2011 the most 
ambiguous case. This reflects the importance of including in the measure the levels of 
inequality after redistribution, in which Switzerland in 2011 scores rather poorly, while for 
                                                           
139 OECD (2017), Unemployment rate (indicator). Accessed on October 2017. 
140 International Financial Statistics, June 2015. 
141 Solt (2016) SWIID version 5.1. 
142 World Development Indicators, December 2015. 
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example its unemployment rate was very low. All in all, the distribution of cases is 
homogeneous (11 cases are member of the condition while 12 are not). Interestingly, no 
country is always a member or a non-member (apart from Italy, which is a member two 
time out of two). Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden are non-members in 
two cases out of three. Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom are members in two 
cases out of three. 
 
Condition 4: ideological convergence 
The fourth condition refers to the ideological convergence of the party system, and it is 
calculated following Dalton's formula (2008) which takes into account the number of 
parties, their vote share and their positioning on the right-left scale.143 The degree of 
radicalism is provided as explained in Chapter 4. The measurement includes all the 
parties which obtained at least 5% of the vote share. Since the formula measures 
polarization (going from 0 when all parties are located at the same position on the Left-
Right scale to 10 when all parties are located at the extreme positions), the values for 
ideological polarization are reversed in order to provide the degree of ideological 
convergence in a scale from 0 (lowest) to 1 (maximum convergence). This is done 
                                                           
143 Dalton measures the Polarization Index (PI) as follows.  
PI = SQRT{Σ(party vote sharei)*([party L/R scorei – party systemaverage L/R score]/5)2}.  
In particular, "i" represents individual parties. Here the formula is slightly adjusted. First, the left-
right score is calculated according to the Chapel Hill survey or, since the survey does not cover 
the 1990s, the Party Manifesto Project is used (see notes of Appendix 3). Second, the effective 
number of parties is here intended as the number of parties which obtained at least 5% of the 
vote share, in order to include only those parties whose electoral manifestos are included in the 
analysis. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides all the information 
needed to measure the polarization index: http://www.cses.org (consulted in October 2017). 
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because the ideological convergence of the political spectrum is often considered as a 
trigger for the social acceptability of populism. 
 
One might argue that the ideological convergence of the political system (measured with 
Dalton's formula and therefore taking into consideration the parties' vote share and 
degree of radicalism) is endogenous to populism's social acceptability (which also 
includes the parties vote share as well as their degree of radicalism). This, however, it is 
not necessarily true. First, it is hard to think of any potential uncontrolled confounder 
causing both the ideological convergence and the social acceptability of populism. 
Second, it is unlikely that the social acceptability of populism can cause the convergence 
of the ideological space.144 For example, Ezrow et al. (2010) show that mainstream and 
niche political parties rely on different strategies to adjust their position on the left-right 
scale as a reaction to the shift of voters' positions. Therefore it would be difficult to imagine 
that the social acceptability of populism explains the convergence of the ideological 
space. To be completely sure about the fact that including this condition does not alter 
the results because of endogeneity, a robustness test that excludes convergence is 
performed.145  
 
The determination of full membership and non-membership is based on the most extreme 
cases in the distribution. The Netherlands in 1994 have the lowest value of polarization 
                                                           
144 It might rather cause ideological polarization, because parties would have an incentive to 
become more extreme as soon as populism is more widespread and socially accepted. 
145 The results remain consistent, both with the normal operationalization (Appendix 9, Table 
34and Table 35) and with the alternative one based on the co-occurrence principle (Appendix 13, 
Table 45 and Table 46). 
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(0.22) and therefore it represents the anchor for full membership. On the other hand, 
Switzerland in 2003 has the highest values of polarization (0.67) and it represents the 
anchor for full non-membership. The average is 0.45 and there are no theoretical reasons 
not to use it as crossover point. Accordingly, 14 cases belong to the outcome while 9 
cases do not. This means that a majority of the cases analysed shows a (relatively) high 
level of ideological convergence. Appendix 5 (Figure 29) shows the distribution of the 
cases in the four conditions. 
 
Condition 5: stigma of the fascist past 
The levels of stigma are assigned to each country in Chapter 5, where the choices made 
are explained in detail and justified according to the existing literature. Since the 
relationship hypothesized is between the presence of high levels of social acceptability of 
populism and low levels of stigma, the values assigned in Chapter 5 are reversed: in this 
way a level of stigma equals to 1 becomes a 0 and vice versa. Indeed, a country is a full 
member if its levels of stigma are extremely low, which is supposed to trigger a high social 
acceptability of populism. 
 
Results 
 
This section presents the results of the fsQCA analysis. First it tests whether it is possible 
to assess any necessary condition for the presence of the social acceptability of populism. 
Second, it tests whether any combination of conditions is sufficient for the presence of 
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the outcome. The analysis is then repeated with the same conditions but considering first 
only left-wing and then only right-wing parties.146 
 
According to the common notation system in QCA, all the conditions as well as the three 
outcome variables are indicated by a capital letter to indicate their presence (D), and a 
lowercase for the absence (d). Moreover, in Boolean algebra the signs + (addition) and * 
(multiplication) are used to explain the relation between several conditions. The addition 
sign (+) stands for the logical ‘or’, while the multiplication sign (*) means a logical ‘and’. 
Finally, there are three possible solutions in QCA that can be reported: conservative (or 
complex), intermediate and parsimonious solution. They differ with regards to the 
assumption they make about logical remainders.147 They are fully reported in the 
Appendix 6, but the analysis focuses on the most parsimonious solution. Since the aim is 
to confront the results with or without the introduction of the levels of stigma of the fascist 
past, the assumptions made would be the same and the results are easier to interpret. 
Moreover, Appendix 9 shows the parsimonious solution for the analysis performed 
without the condition measuring the ideological convergence of the political spectrum 
(with similar results). 
 
According to the principle of causal asymmetry, necessity and sufficiency are tested also 
for the absence of the three outcomes, as well as the absence of conditions is tested both 
for the outcomes and their absence. Only relevant results (over the conventional 
                                                           
146 In Appendix 11 are reported all the solution formulas for the alternative operationalization 
(Table 39 to Table 41). 
147 Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 165–77). 
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consistency threshold of 0.75) will be reported. Deviant and typical cases are analysed in 
Chapter 8 in order to assess whether the introduction of the levels of stigma is a 
difference-maker in explaining the social acceptability of populism. All analyses are 
performed using the free software R, in particular the package 'Set methods: Functions 
for Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research and Advanced QCA' (Medzihorsky et al. 2016). 
 
Explaining the social acceptability of populism 
This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social 
acceptability of populism (it includes all manifestos analysed, both right-wing and left-
wing). The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and responsiveness (D), poor 
economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C) and of ideological convergence 
(CNVG). The levels of stigma associated to the fascist past will be introduced in Chapter 
8. 
 
The analysis for necessity evaluates whether the outcome is a subset of any of the 
analysed conditions, meaning that the condition appears every time the outcome is 
present. I check whether each condition has an inclusion coefficient possibly close to 1 
and never below 0.9. This is not the case, and the same applies to the absence of the 
outcome. The analysis for the absence of the conditions, in line with the theoretical 
expectations, does not produce any significant result. This means that none of the four 
conditions (neither their absence) is a necessary condition for the presence or the 
absence of the outcome. The plot between the outcome and each individual condition is 
reported in Appendix 5 (Figure 30). 
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The next step consists in assessing sufficiency, in other words to determine which 
(combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. 
If a condition (or configuration of conditions) is sufficient, it means that it is a subset of the 
outcome, and this implies that when the configuration is present, also the outcome must 
be present. Each case, a certain country in a certain time-point, can be a member of only 
one configuration of conditions (following the crisp approach that for each condition a 
case can only be in or out, below or above the 0.5 threshold).  
 
This is visualized in the truth table (Table 10), which displays 16 rows because the tested 
conditions (k) are 4 and this means that there are 16 possible configurations (2k). The 
column "Populism" indicates whether a certain configuration leads to the outcome (1: high 
social acceptability of populism) or to its absence (0: low social acceptability of populism). 
 
The logical reminders, configurations which are not covered by any empirically observed 
case, are represented by the last four rows. They represent configurations of conditions 
which are not covered by any empirical case here analysed. In the most parsimonious 
solution, assumptions are made about the outcome attributed to these configurations. 
The level of inclusion shows to what extent each configuration is sufficient for the 
outcome, and the last column indicates which cases cover that configuration.
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Table 10 – Truth Table: Total Populism 
 
This analysis considers only configurations with an inclusion coefficient higher than 0.88. 
This means that the first nine rows indicate the configurations that are considered as 
sufficient for the outcome: 17 out of 23 cases are therefore covered. All the other rows 
are not considered as sufficient configuration for the outcome. The inclusion threshold is 
rather high (.88) because of the distribution of the cases concerning the outcome.  
 
Since a majority of cases is more in than out for the presence of the outcome, only those 
rows with a higher explanatory power are included. Normally a clear jump in the 
Conditions  Outcome    
C D E CNVG Populism n Inclusion Cases 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0.9859 AT_94 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0.9627 FR_12 
0 1 1 0 1 2 0.9613 DE_13,UK_95 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0.9375 AT_13 
0 0 1 1 1 2 0.9246 CH_95,CH_11 
1 1 1 1 1 4 0.9246 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10 
1 1 0 1 1 2 0.9070 DE_02,FR_02 
0 1 0 0 1 2 0.8992 AT_02,DE_94 
0 0 1 0 1 2 0.8874 NL_12,SE_94 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0.8710 CH_03 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0.8703 UK_03 
0 0 0 1 0 4 0.7548 
NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_
14 
1 0 0 0 ? 0 -  
1 0 0 1 ? 0 -  
1 0 1 0 ? 0 -  
1 0 1 1 ? 0 -  
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coefficients would be used, but in this case there is no clear jump.148 Therefore .88 seems 
to provide a reasonable cutting point. Importantly, the same criteria will be applied when 
explaining the two outcomes: populism in right-wing and left-wing party manifestos. 
Moreover, the choice of the cut point is not the most relevant for the type of analysis 
performed in this study: since the crucial point is the difference between the two models, 
with and without the levels of stigma of the fascist past, what ultimately matters is that the 
same inclusion point is selected in the two models in order to observe whether more or 
less cases can be explained. 
 
The truth table is then logically minimized through a Boolean process (performed via 
software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular configuration. The first solution 
is called complex or conservative, and it makes no assumptions on the configurations for 
which there are no observed cases (logical reminders). The intermediate solution, on the 
other hand, includes directional expectation: in other words each condition is supposed 
to trigger high levels of social acceptability of populism. Finally, for the most parsimonious 
solution a hypothetical outcome is allocated to the configurations without observed cases 
as long as this leads to a simpler (more parsimonious) solution. For this type of solution, 
it is important there are no simplifying assumptions (certain configurations without an 
observed outcome might be assumed to explain both the outcome and its absence, which 
would be a contradiction).149  
 
                                                           
148 Other inclusion cuts have been tested but they are not reported for reasons of space. The 
results remain consistent with the expectations. 
149 See Ragin (1987) about different ways to treat logical reminders. 
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All the sufficient rows with inclusion higher than .88 were included after checking also 
for contradictory rows (configurations with observed cases leading both to the outcome 
and to its absence). For reasons of space I will avoid presenting here the conservative 
and intermediate solutions (Table 28 in Appendix 6) as well as all those solutions failing 
to display levels of inclusion and coverage beyond a coefficient of .75. The formula 
obtained for the most parsimonious solution is:  
 
C + E + D*cnvg=> POP 
 
This means that high levels of corruption (C), or (+) a low economic performance (E), or 
a combination of low accountability and responsiveness with (*) a low ideological 
convergence of the political space (D*cnvg) are sufficient to explain the social 
acceptability of populism. Figure 19 represents the plot between the solution formula and 
the social acceptability of populism.150 
                                                           
150 All the cases are displayed in Figure 19. However, typical cases and deviant cases consistency 
(in relation to sufficient terms or single terms) are not interpretable through this plot. When 
relevant, this is done separately (e.g. Appendix 8). What is interpretable and relevant for process 
tracing and causality mechanisms when plotting the whole solution like in this case, is the 
comparison between deviant cases coverage and individually irrelevant cases (Rohlfing and 
Schneider 2013).  
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Figure 19: Plot with Solution for Total levels of Populism 
 
 
This solution has an inclusion coefficient of .791 indicating that generally cases fall quite 
close to the line (the effect of the configuration is predicted quite precisely), and a 
consistency coefficient of .767 indicating that some deviant cases coverage have a higher 
score in the solution rather than in the outcome (upper-left quadrant): Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom in 2003, and the Netherlands in 2002. They are therefore truly logically 
contradictory cases, because despite the absence of the solution they do have a high 
social acceptability of populism, therefore there must be another condition that was not 
included in this model but that explains the presence of the outcome. Moreover, there are 
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several deviant cases for consistency. They should be members of the outcome, but for 
some reason they are not: Sweden in 1994, Austria and Germany in 2002, France in 2012 
and Italy in 2013.  
 
Explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism 
This section repeats the analysis, but this time trying to explain the social acceptability of 
right-wing populism only. Once again, all the conditions are tested, apart from the levels 
of stigma. The analysis does not indicate any necessary condition for the presence (or 
the absence) of the outcome. Also the absence of conditions does not give any result. All 
the coefficients are far from the .9 threshold typically assumed to positively indicate 
necessity. This means that none of the four conditions (neither their absence) is a 
necessary condition for the presence or the absence of the outcome. The plot between 
the outcome and each individual condition is reported in Appendix 5 (Figure 31). 
 
The next step consists in assessing sufficiency, in other words the aim is to determine 
which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the 
outcome. The analysis reveals that no configuration is sufficient for the absence of the 
outcome. The truth table presents the results for the presence of the outcome, and it is 
composed of 16 rows displaying all the possible configurations. For the subsequent 
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Table 11 – Truth Table: Right-wing Populism 
 
minimization only configurations with an inclusion coefficient of at least 0.83 are 
included.151 This means that only the first five rows indicate the configurations that are 
considered as sufficient for the outcome: 9 out of 23 cases are therefore covered. The 
other rows are not considered as sufficient configuration for the outcome.  
 
                                                           
151 An inclusion cut of .81 (closer to the jump in the values) gives extremely similar results. 
Conditions  Outcome    
C D E CNVG Right-Wing Populism n Inclusion Cases 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0.9327 AT_94 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0.9266 FR_12 
1 1 1 1 1 4 0.9121 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10 
0 0 1 1 1 2 0.8399 CH_95,CH_11 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0.8356 AT_13 
0 0 1 0 0 2 0.8257 NL_12,SE_94 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0.8233 CH_03 
1 1 0 1 0 2 0.8184 DE_02,FR_02 
0 1 1 0 0 2 0.7887 DE_13,UK_95 
0 1 0 0 0 2 0.7829 AT_02,DE_94 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0.7740 UK_03 
0 0 0 1 0 4 0.6914 NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14 
1 0 0 0 ? 0 -  
1 0 0 1 ? 0 -  
1 0 1 0 ? 0 -  
1 0 1 1 ? 0 -  
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The truth table (Table 11) is then logically minimized through a Boolean process 
(performed through the software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular 
configuration. The conservative and the intermediate solutions are reported in Appendix 
6 (Table 29). A high social acceptability of right-wing populism is explained by the 
following parsimonious formula:  
 
C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_R 
 
However, the solution plotted in Figure 20 cannot be accepted since the coefficient for 
coverage is too low (.600). This indicates that this solution formula explains just 60% of 
the cases. Although it can be considered a sufficient path to explain the outcome because 
the empirical information does not deviate much from a perfect subset relation (.896 the 
coefficient for inclusion), it also covers a small part of the outcome.  
 
In fact, as the plot shows, many cases are in the upper-left quadrant, thus being deviant 
in kind because their high social acceptability of populism remains unexplained by the 
solution formula. The deviant cases with a higher score in the solution rather than in the 
outcome represent around a third of the cases, and this indicates the necessity to include 
another condition in the model 
. 
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Figure 20: Plot with Solution for Right-wing Populism 
 
 
Explaining the social acceptability of left-wing populism 
This section repeats the analysis, but this time trying to explain the social acceptability of 
left-wing populism only. Once again, all the conditions are tested, apart from the levels of 
stigma. The analysis does not indicate any necessary condition for the presence (or the 
absence) of the outcome. Also the absence of conditions does not give any result. This 
means that none of the four conditions (neither their absence) is a necessary condition 
for the presence or the absence of the outcome. The coefficients are always way below 
the conventional .9 threshold for necessity. 
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Table 12 – Truth table: Left-wing Populism 
 
The plot between the outcome and each individual condition is reported in Appendix 5 
(Figure 32). 
 
The next step consists in assessing sufficiency, in other words to determine which 
(combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. 
The truth table (Table 12) is composed of 16 rows displaying all the possible 
configurations, and for the subsequent minimization only configurations with an inclusion 
Conditions  Outcome    
C D E CNVG 
Left-Wing 
Populism n Inclusion Cases 
0 1 1 0 1 2 0.9128 DE_13,UK_95 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0.9125 AT_13 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0.8854 AT_94 
0 0 1 1 1 2 0.8645 CH_95,CH_11 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0.8450 UK_03 
0 1 0 0 1 2 0.8418 AT_02,DE_94 
0 0 1 0 0 2 0.8123 NL_12,SE_94 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0.8078 FR_12 
1 1 0 1 0 2 0.7978 DE_02,FR_02 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0.7555 CH_03 
1 1 1 1 0 4 0.7388 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10 
0 0 0 1 0 4 0.7022 
NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_
14 
1 0 0 0 ? 0 -  
1 0 0 1 ? 0 -  
1 0 1 0 ? 0 -  
1 0 1 1 ? 0 -  
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coefficient higher than .84 are included.152 This means that only the first six rows indicate 
the configurations that are sufficient for the outcome: 9 out of 23 cases are therefore 
covered, the other rows are not considered as sufficient configuration for the outcome.  
 
The truth table is then logically minimized through a Boolean process (performed through 
the software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular configuration. Both the 
conservative and the intermediate solutions are identical, and they are reported together 
with the details concerning the parsimonious solutions in Appendix 6 (Table 30). There 
are four different most parsimonious solutions, none of which reaches a satisfactory 
coefficient for coverage, and therefore none of them can be accepted:  
 
S1: c*D + (c*E*CNVG + C*e*cnvg) => POP_L 
S2: c*D + (c*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) => POP_L 
S3: c*D + (C*e*cnvg + d*E*CNVG) => POP_L  
S4: c*D + (d*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) => POP_L  
 
None of the solutions can be used given the low coverage. Moreover, even if the 
coefficient for coverage would have been acceptable (above .750), these solutions are 
extremely difficult to interpret. What they all share is the first term of the solution: c*D.
                                                           
152 Again, there is no clear jump in the inclusion. Given the membership of the cases in the 
outcome a rather high threshold is used. Higher thresholds have been tried as well, but they give 
less interpretable solutions.  
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Figure 21: Plot with Solution for Left-wing Populism 
 
 
It represents a combination of low corruption and low accountability and responsiveness. 
Alternatively, a very complex combination of two terms (d*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) 
constitutes the second term of the solution. In Figure 21, it is represented the plot between 
the outcome and the fourth solution, which has an inclusion coefficient of .782 and a 
coefficient for coverage of .708 (the highest among the four solutions).
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Conclusions 
 
The first step of analysis, consisting in assessing necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the outcome to occur, produced mixed results. The model tested in this chapter focuses 
on short-term supply and demand side factors derived from the relevant literature, and 
seems to explain quite well the overall levels of social acceptability of populism. None of 
the single conditions is necessary for the outcome to be present (or absent), but high 
levels of corruption, or a poor economic performance, or a combination of low 
accountability and responsiveness with a low convergence of the ideological space 
(expressed in Boolean algebra as C + E + D*cnvg => POP) are sufficient to explain the 
social acceptability of populism in more than 75% of the cases (.767) while having an 
acceptable coefficient for inclusion (.791).  
 
Three cases do not display high levels of populism's social acceptability although they 
are member of the solution: the Netherlands in 2002, Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
in 2003. The goal is to explain these cases by introducing the levels of stigma in the 
model, because the idea is that short-term supply and demand side factors interact with 
cultural opportunity structures in determining the social acceptability of populism. 
 
Concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, once again none of the single 
conditions is necessary for the outcome to be present (or absent), and it was also 
impossible to find a sufficient path to explain the social acceptability of right-wing 
populism. In fact, the parsimonious solution cannot be accepted, since only a very small 
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part of the cases is explained (coverage .600). Also populism in left-wing manifestos is 
not explained by any solution formula since no conditions are necessary for the outcome 
(or its absence) and the coverage of the four, all very complex, final solution formulas is 
always lower than the conventional .75 threshold.  
 
From this first step of analysis, one can conclude that the short-term conditions typically 
linked to the presence of high levels of populism have indeed some resonance with the 
overall social acceptability of populism. However, when trying to disentangle the different 
types of populism, this model seems to fail explaining the social acceptability of both left-
wing and right-wing populism. This might reflect the choice of the conditions which aimed 
at explaining, indeed, the overall social acceptability of populism. 
 
 The aim of the next chapter consists in combining the four conditions already tested, with 
a long-term, cultural element: the levels of stigma attached to the fascist past. The model 
is tested a second time with the addition of the stigma levels, in order to find a 
configuration of conditions which can better explain (inclusion) a broader range of cases 
(coverage) for the social acceptability of populism as well as for its right-wing and left-
wing manifestations. 
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Chapter 8 – The Stigma of the Fascist Past: a Game-Changer 
 
This chapter repeats the analysis of the conditions for the social acceptability of populism, 
this time introducing into the model a fifth variable: the levels of stigma attached to the 
fascist past. The three outcomes and all the other conditions remain the same, as well as 
their calibration. Also the cases remain the same: eight countries taken in three time 
points, with the exclusion of Italy in 2001, for a total of 23 cases. 
 
The chapter follows a structure identical to the one used for the previous step of analysis. 
The results of the fsQCA are presented first for the overall social acceptability of populism, 
and then for the two sub-categories. In addition, it is discussed whether the new solutions 
are able to explain some of the cases that in the previous step of analysis deviated for 
coverage or inclusion. In case the coefficients of inclusion and coverage improve after 
introducing the new condition, this is not automatically a sign that the causal mechanism 
works as hypothesized. In fact, it is necessary to examine which deviant cases can be 
explained with the new model compared to the previous one without levels of stigma as 
a condition. 
 
The relevant row lines of the truth tables are presented, and the plots illustrating where 
the cases fall when considering the relationship between the most parsimonious solution 
and the outcome. The inclusion cut for the process of minimization is maintained exactly 
the same as the one used in Chapter 7 in order to grant a perfect comparability of the 
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results. Appendix 8 (Figure 33) shows the distribution of cases in the newly introduced 
condition.153 
 
Explaining the social acceptability of populism 
This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social 
acceptability of populism. The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and 
responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C) and of 
ideological convergence (CNVG). Moreover, low levels of stigma are included in the 
model (S). Appendix 8 shows the plot between each of the three outcomes with stigma 
alone (Figure 34: Total Populism and Stigma to Figure 36). 
 
The analysis for necessity does not produce any result. Low levels of stigma are not, in 
isolation, a necessary condition for the presence of high levels of social acceptability of 
populism. This is a first, important, result. In isolation, the levels of stigma cannot explain 
the social acceptability of populism. If they do so, this can only be the case when there is 
an interaction with other conditions. 
 
This time, since the conditions included in the model are 5, the possible configurations 
are 32. Hence, only the rows above the inclusion cut (0.88) are displayed (Table 13).154 
                                                           
153 In Appendix 12 all the solution formulas for the alternative operationalization are reported 
(Table 42 to Table 44). 
154 The inclusion cut is maintained identical to the one used in Chapter 7 for maximum 
comparability. 
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Configurations which are considered as not sufficient for the outcome (below the inclusion 
cut) as well as logical reminders (which will be considerably more since the 
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Table 13 – Truth Table: Total Populism with Stigma 
Conditions Outcome 
C D E CNVG S Populism n Inclusion cases 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.9975 FR_02 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.9851 AT_94 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.9657 UK_10 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.9608 FR_12 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.9573 NL_12 
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 0.9569 CH_95,CH_11 
0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0.9561 DE_13,UK_95 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9525 AT_13 
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.9384 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.9349 DE_94 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.9216 CH_03 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.9050 UK_03 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.8911 DE_02 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.8883 AT_02 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0.8815 NL_94,NL_02 
 
number of cases is stable while the number of possible configurations doubled) will not 
be displayed for reasons of space. The logical reminders are now 15, and assumptions 
made about them for the parsimonious solution are reported in Appendix 7 (Table 31) 
together with the most conservative solution. Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, 
by including the levels of stigma, the most parsimonious solution is now more elegant, 
interpretable, and composed of two terms:  
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Figure 22: Plot with Solution for Total Populism (With Stigma) 
 
 
S + D => POP 
 
The inclusion coverage has a coefficient of .782, which is slightly lower than before (.791), 
but a coverage coefficient of .859, which is considerably higher than before (.767).155 
Now, testing the model with the inclusion of stigma, a low level of accountability and 
responsiveness (D) or a low stigmatization of the fascist past (S) are both relevant paths 
                                                           
155 This is not surprising, since the coefficients for inclusion and coverage are a trade-off between 
the two measures (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). 
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for the presence of the outcome (plotted in Figure 22). Interestingly, the presence of S 
alone has a coefficient for inclusion of .800, one for raw coverage of .683 (indicating which 
share of the outcome is explained by S) and one for unique coverage of .180 (indicating 
which share of the outcome is exclusively explained by a certain term).156 
 
At this stage of the analysis, there is an additional element which should be considered: 
the variation of the deviant cases between the first model without the levels of stigma, 
and the deviant cases in the model after the introduction of the levels of stigma (Bennett 
and Elman 2006; Schneider and Rohlfing 2016). In other words, it is crucial to observe 
which cases that were not explained by testing the four conditions extrapolated from the 
literature can now be explained by taking into consideration the levels of stigma, in order 
to assess whether the new condition improves the explanatory power of the model. There 
are two categories of deviant cases: consistency (or inclusion) and coverage. The former 
constitutes a puzzle because it points to cases that should be members of the outcome 
but, in fact, they are not. The latter is a puzzle because it includes cases that, conversely, 
are members of the outcome for reasons not disclosed by the QCA solution. 
 
The previous model produced three deviant cases coverage: the Netherlands in 2002, 
the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 2003. They displayed high levels of populism's 
social acceptability for reasons not explained by the solution C + E + D*cnvg => POP. 
However, with the new solution formula D + S => POP, they are not deviant cases 
coverage anymore. Low levels of accountability and responsiveness combined or a low 
                                                           
156 See Ragin (2006). 
210 
 
stigma, can now explain why these three cases show high (the Netherlands 2002 and 
United Kingdom 2003) or very high (Switzerland 2003) levels of social acceptability of 
populism. By looking at the truth table, it is clear that in the cases of CH_03 and NL_02 
the change is due to the low levels of stigma, since their levels of accountability and 
responsiveness were not problematic. In the case of UK_03, however, the presence of 
the outcome could be explained by the low quality of the democratic process.157 
 
Finally, the model with four conditions did show several deviant case consistency (or 
inclusion). Five cases which were members of the solution were not members of the 
outcome. The model with the levels of stigma of the fascist past produces very similar 
results, with the only exception of the Netherlands in 1994 becoming a deviant case 
consistency while Sweden in 1994 is no longer one.  
 
Explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism 
This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social 
acceptability of right-wing populism. The conditions tested are low levels of accountability 
and responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C) 
and of ideological convergence (CNVG). Moreover, the also low levels of stigma of the 
fascist past are included in the model (S).  
                                                           
157 Going even further into the details, the United Kingdom shows alarmingly low levels of 
government capability (pertaining to responsiveness) and competition (pertaining to 
accountability), and this is true not only for the 2003 elections but also for the other two decades. 
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Table 14 – Truth Table: Right-wing Populism with Stigma 
Conditions Outcome 
C D E CNVG S 
Right-Wing 
Populism n Inclusion cases 
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.989457 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.98745 AT_94 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.985736 FR_02 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.9742 FR_12 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.953105 NL_12 
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 0.94606 CH_95,CH_11 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.940492 AT_13 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.934618 CH_03 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.919191 AT_02 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0.881093 NL_94,NL_02 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.87253 UK_10 
 
The analysis for necessity does not produce any result. Low levels of stigma are not, in 
isolation, a necessary condition for the presence of the outcome. This is a first, important, 
result. In isolation, the levels of stigma cannot explain the social acceptability of populism. 
If they do so, this can only be the case when there is an interaction with other conditions. 
 
Once again, since the conditions included in the model are five, the possible 
configurations are 32. Hence, only the rows above the inclusion cut (0.83) will be 
displayed (Table 14). Configurations which are considered as not sufficient for the 
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outcome (below the inclusion cut), as well as logical reminders, are not be displayed for 
reasons of space. 
 
The logical reminders (configurations with no observed cases) are now 15, and 
assumptions made about them for the parsimonious solution are reported in Appendix 7 
(Table 32) together with the most conservative solution. The cases assigned to the 11 
sufficient configurations are now 15. Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, by 
including the levels of stigma, the two most parsimonious solutions are:  
 
S1: S + (C*E) => POP_R 
S2: S + (E*CNVG) => POP_R 
 
The two solutions have respectively an inclusion coefficient of .856 and .846, and a 
coverage coefficient of .804 and .819. Both solutions constitute a remarkable 
improvement compared to the solution obtained without stigma levels, which had a 
coverage coefficient lower than .750.158 The first term of the two solutions indicates that 
a low level of stigma (S) is sufficient for the social acceptability of right-wing populism 
(POP_R), while a combination a bad economic performance with either high levels of 
corruption (C*E) or with a high ideological convergence (E*CNVG) constitute the second 
term of the two solutions. Even more importantly, it is possible to argue that a low level of 
stigma is per se a sufficient condition for the presence of the outcome, since  
 
                                                           
158 Before it was C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_R, with a coefficient for inclusion of .896 and a 
coefficient for coverage of .600. 
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Figure 23: Plot with Solution for Right-wing Populism (With Stigma) 
 
 
it has an inclusion coefficient of .885 and a raw coverage of .773 (with a unique coverage 
of .241, meaning that stigma alone can explain almost a quarter of the cases).  
 
Concerning the variation of the deviant cases, in this particular case, it makes no 
difference which of the two parsimonious solutions is selected. Figure 23 represents the 
second solution, which has a slightly higher coverage. It is crucial to observe which cases 
that were not explained by testing the four conditions extrapolated from the literature can 
now be explained by taking into consideration the idea of stigma, in order to assess 
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whether and possibly how the new condition improves the explanatory power of the 
model. The model with four conditions produced six deviant cases coverage: Switzerland 
in 2003, the Netherlands in 2002 and 2012, Austria and France in 2002, the United 
Kingdom in 2003. Tellingly, with the new solution formulas only the United Kingdom in 
2003 is still a deviant case coverage, while all the other five cases can now be explained.  
 
While before these cases were in the upper-left quadrant, leaving the presence of the 
outcome unexplained by the solution, now only one case remains. At this stage, none of 
the conditions analysed explains the high social acceptability of right-wing populism in the 
United Kingdom in 2003. However, the case is also rather close to the crossover point, 
therefore a different operationalization or cutting point might have produced different 
results. On the other hand, given the fact that also the United Kingdom in the 2010s shows 
rather high levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability, one might consider the 
possibility that the type of collective memory assigned to the country, heroization, actually 
does not produce the high level of stigmatization of the fascist past that was expected. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the levels of accountability and responsiveness in the 
country are particularly low. 
 
Apart from the United Kingdom in 2003, however, high levels of right-wing populism's 
social acceptability are now explained much better, and this is clearly linked to the 
inclusion of stigma of the fascist past of the model. Austria, France, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands have low or very low levels of stigma of the fascist past because of their 
collective memories based either on cancellation or victimization, and this makes it 
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possible to explain why they right-wing populism is socially acceptable although the other 
conditions were not supposed to trigger populism. After the inclusion of stigma in the 
model, these cases moved from the upper-left quadrant and now the outcome is 
explained. 
 
Finally, the previous model with only four conditions did not show any deviant case 
consistency (or inclusion). All the cases which were not members of the outcome were 
also not members of the solution. The new model, in contrast, produces a deviant case 
coverage: the Netherlands in 1994 (bottom-right quadrant). Although it is a member of 
the solution, it is not member of the outcome. This time it is not a borderline case, because 
the case clearly belongs to the solution but displays a very low social acceptability of right-
wing populism. One might argue that the measurement was biased by the fact that the 
party D66 has been coded as left-wing according to the degree of radicalism of its party 
manifesto and not as centre or right-wing as it is often described by experts. In case it 
was coded as right-wing, however, the social acceptability of right-wing populism would 
have still been lower compared to the expectations (the level would have been around 
230, with the crossover point still very distant at 418).  
 
Explaining the social acceptability of left-wing populism 
This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social 
acceptability of left-wing populism. The conditions tested are low levels of accountability 
and responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C) 
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and of ideological convergence (CNVG). Moreover, also low levels of stigma (S) are 
included in the model.  
 
The analysis for necessity does not produce any result. Low levels of stigma are not, in 
isolation, a necessary condition for the social acceptability of populism. Once again, since 
the conditions included in the model are 5, the possible configurations are 32. Hence, 
only the rows above the inclusion cut (0.84) are displayed (Table 15). Configurations 
which are considered as not sufficient for the outcome (below the inclusion cut) as well 
as logical reminders will not be displayed for reasons of space. The logical reminders 
(configurations with no observed cases) are now 15. The conservative and intermediate 
solutions are reported in Appendix 7 (Table 33). The cases assigned to the 10 sufficient 
configurations are now 12. Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, by including the 
levels of stigma, the most parsimonious solution path is now:  
 
C*e + D*s + c*E*S => POP_L. 
 
The solution (plotted in Figure 24) has an inclusion coefficient of .761 and a coverage 
coefficient of .733. Therefore it is not a solution that can be accepted as sufficient for the 
presence of the outcome. Three solution terms appear in the most parsimonious solution: 
high corruption and good economy (C*e), bad accountability and responsiveness but high 
stigma (D*s), low corruption with a bad economic performance and low stigma (c*E*S). 
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Table 15 – Truth Table: Left-wing Populism with Stigma 
Conditions Outcome 
C D E CNVG S 
Left-Wing 
Populism n Inclusion cases 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.9443 UK_10 
0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0.9253 DE_13,UK_95 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9053 AT_13 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.8813 DE_02 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.8782 AT_94 
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 0.8779 CH_95,CH_11 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.8772 UK_03 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.8769 DE_94 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.8689 NL_12 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.8430 FR_02 
 
The solution (plotted in Figure 24) has an inclusion coefficient of .761 and a coverage 
coefficient of .733. Therefore it is not a solution that can be accepted as sufficient for the 
presence of the outcome. Three solution terms appear in the most parsimonious solution: 
high corruption and good economy (C*e), bad accountability and responsiveness but high 
stigma (D*s), low corruption with a bad economic performance and low stigma (c*E*S). 
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Figure 24: Plot with solution for left-wing populism with stigma 
 
Compared to the solutions obtained before the introduction of stigma the coefficient for 
coverage is higher, but still not high enough. Interestingly, moreover, the role of stigma 
seems to be conflicting: both high and low levels of stigma are present in the solution.  
 
Taking into consideration deviant cases, it appears clearly that a higher coefficient for 
coverage is not the only parameter to observe. In fact, while the previous model produced 
four deviant cases coverage, they are now five. Moreover, while before there was only 
one deviant case consistency (or inclusion), now there are five cases which were 
supposed to display high levels of social acceptability of left-wing populism but do not: 
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France (2002 and 2012), Germany (2002), and Italy (1994 and 2013). In general, it the 
new model does not seem to work better.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The second step of analysis tested the same conditions and outcomes, but also 
introduced a fifth condition: the levels of stigmatization of the fascist past. The results can 
be considered as more or less satisfactory according to the three different outcomes that 
are included in the model. Results are satisfactory to explain the overall social 
acceptability of populism, very satisfactory for right-wing populism, and unsatisfactory for 
left-wing populism. Moreover, none of the models produced any necessary condition for 
any of the outcomes, which might signal the importance of considering new conditions in 
future research, and on the other hand testifies the extreme variance when dealing with 
empirical manifestations of populism and its social acceptability across countries. 
 
Concerning the overall social acceptability of populism, by introducing the levels of stigma 
the old and rather complex solution (C + E + D*cnvg => POP) is replaced by a new, more 
elegant one: S + D => POP. The levels of stigma now help explaining 14 cases, thus 
making the new solution more precise but also able to explain more cases: the 
Netherlands in 2002, the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 2003 can now be explained 
thanks to the introduction of the levels of stigma.  
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Concerning the social acceptability of left-wing populism, after introducing the levels of 
stigma the solution still fails to reach an acceptable coefficient for coverage, thus making 
the solution itself not strong enough to denote sufficiency. This aspect will be further 
investigated in the conclusions, but it seems safe to assume that left-wing populism 
answers to different logics and thrives under different conditions compared to right-wing 
populism, and future research should try to understand which are the specific conditions 
triggering left-wing populism.  
 
The most outstanding results, however, concern the social acceptability of right-wing 
populism. After introducing the levels of stigma the old solution (C*cnvg + E*CNVG => 
POP_R) is replaced by the alternative new, better ones:  
1) S + (C*E) => POP_R;  
2) S + (E*CNVG) => POP_R. 
Low levels of stigma are in both cases sufficient in isolation to explain the social 
acceptability of right-wing populism (raw coverage is .773). Both solutions, moreover, can 
explain five deviant cases coverage: Switzerland in 2003, the Netherlands in 2002 and 
2012, Austria and France in 2002. The United Kingdom in 2003, however, remains 
unexplained, and it should be used for a case-study in future research. 
 
From this second step of the analysis, one can conclude that when considering the levels 
of stigma of the fascist past, the social acceptability of populism can be better explained. 
More in detail, while the previous model produced a particularly unsatisfactory coefficient 
for the coverage of the solution which was supposed to explain the social acceptability of 
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right-wing populism, it is precisely this aspect that the new model contributes to grasp. It 
seems that the stigma of the fascist past is mainly linked to the acceptability of right-wing 
populism. The fact that the overall model seems to improve after the introduction of stigma 
levels should be lined mainly to the fact that of right-wing populism is better explained, 
while the acceptability of left-wing populism is poorly explained before as well as after the 
introduction of stigma. 
 
Looking at the typology of collective memory previously elaborated, some remarks can 
be made at this stage. Countries characterized by a narrative based on victimization 
display a high social acceptability of populism and more in particular of right-wing 
populism. This is true also when other conditions seem not to constitute the perfect 
thriving ground for populism. In Austria and France the social acceptability of right-wing 
populism can be explained only after the introduction of the levels of stigma in the model, 
and indeed they are both characterized by collective memories based on victimization. 
Italy seems to follow the same trend, but the social acceptability of right-wing populism is 
lower than expected. This can be linked to two possible explanations: either to the 
presence of additional conditions which were not considered or to the fact that Italian 
political parties are more populist in the daily communication rather than in their 
manifestos. 
 
Countries characterized by a narrative based on cancellation also display a high social 
acceptability of populism. This remains true also when other conditions seem not to 
constitute the perfect thriving ground for populism. In Switzerland and the Netherlands, 
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the social acceptability of right-wing populism can be explained only after the introduction 
of the levels of stigma in the model, and indeed they are both characterized by collective 
memories based on cancellation. Italy seems to follow the same trend, but the social 
acceptability of populism is lower than expected. This can be linked to two possible 
explanations: either to the presence of additional conditions which were not considered 
or to the fact that Italian political parties are more populist in the daily communication 
rather than in their manifestos.  
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Conclusions 
 
American historian Robert Kagan wrote: "This is how fascism comes to America, not with 
jackboots and salutes […] but with a television huckster, a phony billionaire, a textbook 
egomaniac tapping into popular resentments and insecurities."159 Kagan is describing 
Donald Trump, but the portrait fits many European populist actors. Ten years after 
witnessing a populist Zeitgeist, in 2017 it is possible to speak of a fascist Zeitgeist. 
Fascism can eventually gather large crowds in Piazza Venezia or the Nuremberg 
Stadium, but it usually starts by tapping into popular resentments and insecurities. Last 
time it was the aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression, this time it might be 
the exploitation of the so-called 'refugee crises' combined with yet another economic 
crisis. Right-wing populist movements all over the world are doing precisely this: they 
mobilize resentment by offering redemption from the 'old politics'. They promise to deal 
with problems more effectively, faster, and of course in line with the volonté générale. 
 
In Hungary a well as Poland, in the United States and the Philippines, many are 
concerned with the illiberal turn of the democratic process. Indeed, refusing the 'old 
politics' usually means to refuse and to contest liberal democracy: its pluralism, minority 
protection, and division of powers. At stake, there is the very idea of democracy that 
Europe developed after 1945 as a reaction to fascism, Nazism and World War II. It is 
important to celebrate the vox populi and to denounce the intrigues and corruption of the 
                                                           
159 Washington Post May 18, 2016: "This is how fascism comes to America." Available online 
(consulted in October 2017): https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-is-how-fascism-
comes-to-america/2016/05/17/c4e32c58-1c47-11e6-8c7b-
6931e66333e7_story.html?utm_term=.a86427aa3905 
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elites. This is actually an essential part of democracy itself. Doubtfully, however, the return 
in contemporary Germany of the Nazi slogan Lügenpresse ('lying press') should be 
welcomed as a sign of a healthy liberal democracy. 
 
Compared to previous waves of populism that characterized Russia, Europe, and the 
Americas in the 19th century, socio-economic turbulence and political disenchantment are 
not the only elements that should be considered when trying to make sense of the 
presence of populist discourses. After World War II, right-wing populist discourses have 
become socially unacceptable in certain countries but not in others. While Germany and 
Sweden have restricted illiberal political ideas to a no-go area of the public debate, other 
countries such as Italy, Austria, and France did not stigmatize the fascist past and 
therefore right-wing populism maintained its Salonfähigkeit.  
 
The most important lesson that one should learn from this study, is that memory matters. 
The process of memory-building is here analyzed as a sort of 'black-box', without 
investigating in detail how the collective memory of the fascist past was formed, but rather 
the outcome of that conflict. The way in which a country collectively remembers its past 
defines its new identity and national political culture by tracing a red line between 
acceptable and taboo ideas of power. School manuals, movies, TV shows, debates, civic 
education, parliamentary debates, laws, holydays, street names, official celebrations, 
debates among historians, and in general all the cluster of ideas conveyed by popular 
culture: all of this matters, and it can generate the collective antibodies to resist against 
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the fascist idea of power, or it can leave a country ready to fall again down the same, 
tragic mistakes that led to World War II. 
 
This topic is more relevant than ever because the volatile, short-term socio-economic 
conditions for the success of populism are all lined up. The Great Recession made 
inequalities grow while feeding citizens with insecurities based on feelings such as 
relative deprivation and loss of social status. The constant flow of migrants has been 
labelled as an 'invasion' or as a 'crisis' and many political entrepreneurs took advantage 
of the fears thus generated. After Brexit, the process of European integration seems to 
be less a political project and more an economic marriage that can be broken as soon as 
it is seen as disadvantageous, thus rewarding Eurosceptic actors. The recent political 
developments seem to confirm that populist actors are increasingly successful. Without a 
political culture that strongly stigmatizes illiberal elements typical of populism, fascism is 
not only a ghost from the past but a threat for the future. 
 
Indeed, this study clearly shows how the boundaries of 'what can be said' in the public 
debate heavily vary across countries. Different national political cultures ultimately define 
these boundaries. Many other factors can be studied in order to grasp the contingent, 
short-term opportunity structures for populism to thrive, but cultural opportunity structures 
operate on the long-term and generate a decisive impact on the social acceptability of 
populist discourses. Therefore, it is essential to link in a more systematic way the literature 
on populism and the studies on political culture, social stigma, and collective memory. 
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Figure 25: Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Populism Over Time 
 
Figure 25 shows that populism in recent years is even more present than in the 1970s, 
when it was mainly a left-wing phenomenon. In particular, it is because of new or niche 
parties (dotted line) that the presence of populist discourses increased in Western 
Europe, while mainstream parties (dashed line) do not seem to have followed a process 
of populistization. After almost a century since fascism took power in Italy, most of the 
people living in Europe today can only have a second-hand experience of what that past 
meant for millions of people. However it is crucial that each country's role is critically 
examined, and that responsibilities are not avoided. 
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The collective re-elaboration of the fascist past can provide a valuable tool to defuse 
dangerous political discourses when the memory of those events is based on a process 
of Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit. On the other hand, if a country prefers to cancel those 
memories through selective amnesia or even self-victimization, right-wing populism finds 
no obstacles and becomes socially acceptable. In other words, different political cultures 
shape the bounds of the legitimate discursive space. For this reason, ideas previously 
associated with the fascist past now seem acceptable in certain countries but not in 
others. 
 
Importantly, the memory and therefore the stigma associated to the fascist past are 
effective in explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism, but not of left-wing 
populism. The social acceptability of left-wing populism follows a different path and cannot 
be explained by the stigma associated with the fascist past. In Germany, for example, 
left-wing populism is highly acceptable while right-wing populism has remained 
completely taboo until the 2017 elections (and is now present mainly in the East, which 
did not go through a process of culpabilizaiton).  
 
This could be linked to the fact that the fascist past resonates strongly with the present 
right-wing populist discourses, and therefore the stigma attached to the illiberal elements 
of fascism does not affect left-wing populist discourses. Nativism and its definition of the 
people based on exclusionary criteria, for example, is not a characteristic of left-wing 
populism. This means that the other illiberal elements present in left-wing populist 
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discourses are not socially penalized because they are not declined in a nativist and 
nationalist way. 
 
Therefore the social stigma applies to nativist forms of populism, but not to left-wing 
populism. Liberal democratic regimes are more or less well equipped (according to their 
own political culture) to reject right-wing populism as a dangerous ideology. It is possible 
to argue that by building a collective memory in which the whole country takes 
responsibility and condemns the fascist past, right-wing populism becomes less 
acceptable. However, there seems to be no answer concerning the acceptability of left-
wing populism. Although this might not appear as a problem in contemporary Europe, 
also left-wing populism proposes an essentially illiberal vision of democracy.  
 
Another issue, only partially explored in this study and that might constitute a fertile 
ground for future research, is represented by the memory based on heroization. A 
collective memory of heroization has been attributed here to the United Kingdom, and it 
is also supposed to be present in Eastern Europe. This type of memory, however, should 
be further investigated because it seems to entail rather low levels of stigma of the fascist 
past. The United Kingdom displays high levels of social acceptability of both left-wing and 
right-wing populism, and this has become even clearer after the public debate about 
Brexit. In absence of a clear stigmatization of the fascist past due to an objective lack of 
responsibilities and guilt, pre-existent elements of the national political culture might play 
a crucial role in determining the degree of stigmatization of populism. Indeed, it might be 
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precisely for this reason that East European countries display high levels of social 
acceptability for right-wing populism. 
 
The most obvious application of the theory developed in this work is precisely Eastern 
Europe. Does the legacy of Communism block the social acceptability of left-wing populist 
discourses? And is there a link with the acceptability of right-wing populism? As already 
mentioned concerning Eastern Germany, the collective memory developed in the East is 
based on heroization because the Soviet Union represented the opposition to fascism 
and thus claimed to have no responsibility for the crimes of the regime it replaced. This 
could explain why, given the absence of a strong stigma of the fascist past, countries like 
Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic show alarming authoritarian and nativist 
tendencies in the context of an institutionalized form of populist democracy. Moreover, it 
might be the case that the memory of Communism made left-wing populist discourses 
socially unacceptable.  
 
The link between the legacies of authoritarian regimes and populist discourses can be 
investigated also in relation to other countries and regions. Fascism in Europe is only one 
example of the many authoritarian regimes that characterized the 20th century. The 
Communist past and the collective memories about it, for example, can be investigated 
not only in Europe but also in Asia. In Latin America, on the other hand, it is possible to 
study the presence of right-wing and left-wing populism in relationship to different 
authoritarian regimes such as Chavismo in Venezuela and Peronismo in Argentina or to 
the Pinochet regime in Chile, just to mention a few examples. 
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Also Southern Europe offers interesting possibilities to study the impact of collective 
memories on the social acceptability of populism. For example, it would be extremely 
interesting to include in future research cases such see Spain, Portugal and Greece which 
experienced extremely long-lasting authoritarian regimes. As the other cases examined 
confirm, soon it will be possible to observe what kind of collective memory has developed 
in those countries. While for other West European countries the time for critical debates 
was mature between the 1970s and the 1990s, now that more than thirty years passed 
since the end of those regimes it will be possible to assign a type of mainstream narrative 
and potential secondary narratives to these three countries. 
 
By studying the legacies of different authoritarian pasts in other regions of the world, it 
might be necessary to expand or reformulate the typology of collective memory proposed 
in this study. Moreover, it is possible to imagine that the social acceptability of different 
ideas of power is linked not only to the legacies of authoritarian regimes, but also to other 
critical junctures such as colonialism, revolutions, civil wars, and regime changes.  
 
Another element that could be relevant for future research consists in determining the 
social acceptability of populist discourses by analysing not only party manifestos but also 
additional elements of the public debate. Political discourses, indeed, circulate on a 
variety of channels such as TV shows, radio programs, newspapers, websites, and social 
media. Indeed, political actors still communicate their ideas and programs to the voters 
through their party manifestos, but the role of other channels is increasingly important. 
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Moreover, it would be possible to test whether different media cultures (and not only 
political cultures) are linked to different levels of populism's social acceptability. 
 
Democracy is a theoretical utopia, and each achievement on the path towards a more 
inclusive, just, and representative form of democracy should be defended rather than 
given for granted. Moreover, even in Western Europe democratic quality can still spread 
and better incorporate minorities and women into politics, guarantee better income 
equality, and strengthen the chain of accountability and responsiveness that link the 
people to their representatives. 
 
The tension between populism and liberal democracy is a crucial element that might 
determine the types and shapes of future political systems. It is important to observe 
whether European and non-European countries will choose to stigmatize the illiberal 
elements of populism or whether, on the other hand, the same illiberal features will 
become increasingly acceptable also in countries like Germany where they have 
remained for decades at the periphery of the public debate. Ringing the bell of the End of 
History has never appeared as premature as now, and the future of democracy depends 
also on how we decide to remember the past. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Populism in Manifestos 
Table 16 – Descriptive Data about Manifestos 
  Number 
Manifestos 
Number 
Statements 
Number 
Populist 
Statements 
Percentage 
Populism 
Average 
Populism by 
Manifesto 
1970s 27 1304 84 6.44 4.87 
1980s 30 3061 112 3.65 4.27 
1990s 39 2718 139 5.11 4.82 
2000s 35 3297 148 0.85 4.48 
2010s 42 3684 229 6.21 6.51 
Total 173 14064 712 1.06 1.21 
 
Table 17 – Average Percentage of Populism in Manifestos (unweighted) 
 Total Populism 
Right-Wing 
Populism 
Left-Wing 
Populism 
1970s 4.303147 2.088074 6.518221 
1980s 4.276575 3.079667 5.473483 
1990s 5.099442 4.549077 5.649806 
2000s 3.804168 3.980221 3.628116 
2010s 6.620512 5.675102 7.565923 
 
Table 18 – Table Average Populism in Manifestos (weighted) 
 
Right-Wing 
Populism 
Left-Wing 
Populism Total Populism 
1970s 72.68861 517.7319 295.2103 
1980s 172.377 439.0941 305.7355 
1990s 263.7608 318.9435 291.3522 
2000s 268.4654 123.1031 195.7843 
2010s 281.166 307.7309 294.4484 
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Table 19 – Average Populism per Country (unweighted) 
 
Right-Wing 
Populism 
Left-Wing 
Populism Total Populism 
1970s 2.610092 13.52986 16.46131 
1980s 5.774376 10.26278 16.03716 
1990s 13.64723 9.887161 23.53439 
2000s 10.23485 8.811138 19.04599 
2010s 17.0253 17.96907 34.00753 
 
Table 20 – Table Average Populism per Country (weighted) 
 
Right-Wing 
Populism 
Left-Wing 
Populism Total Populism 
1970s 99.94684 630.3958 730.3426 
1980s 323.2068 823.7027 1145.469 
1990s 791.2825 595.7903 1387.073 
2000s 690.3396 316.5509 1006.89 
2010s 843.4979 673.2416 1516.74 
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Appendix 2 – Populism in Manifestos: Statistical Significance  
 
Table 21 – Statistical Significance Unweighted Populism  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Percentage of populist statements in manifestos 
 
All Parties                           Mainstream Parties 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 8.35*** 11.35*** 9.41*** 9.36*** 
 (2.33) (2.32) (2.09) (2.09) 
1970s -0.08 -3.07 -0.65 -0.60 
 (1.90) (1.86) (1.87) (1.87) 
1980s -1.13 -4.12* -1.03 -0.99 
 (1.78) (1.74) (1.81) (1.81) 
1990s  -2.99  0.05 
  (1.60)  (1.73) 
2000s 0.79 -2.20 0.13 0.18 
 (1.72) (1.67) (1.82) (1.81) 
2010s 2.99  -0.05  
 (1.60)  (1.73)  
Length (cent) 0.56 0.56 -0.18 -0.18 
 (1.40) (1.40) (1.49) (1.49) 
AIC 1168.50 1168.50 746.16 746.16 
BIC 1215.89 1215.89 787.72 787.72 
Log Likelihood -569.25 -569.25 -358.08 -358.08 
Num. Obs. 174 174 118 118 
Num. Groups: Parties 65 65 41 41 
Var: Parties (Intercept) 1.83 1.83 0.80 0.80 
Var: Residual 52.17 52.17 37.75 37.75 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party 
manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). The 
observations are 174 because the 5 Star Movement's manifesto is coded both as left-
wing and right-wing. 
 
266 
 
Table 22 – Statistical Significance Weighted Populism  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Percentage of populist statements in manifestos (weighted) 
 
      All Parties                             Mainstream Parties 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 742.43*** 753.96*** 822.59*** 741.12*** 
 (175.09) (174.07) (181.34) (182.34) 
1970s -63.12 -74.65 -148.52 -67.05 
 (139.67) (136.70) (133.17) (134.69) 
1980s -5.77 -17.30 -37.35 44.12 
 -63.12 -74.65 -148.52 -67.05 
1990s  -11.53  81.47 
  (117.99)  (123.83) 
2000s 59.94 48.41 -92.72 -11.25 
 (126.43) (122.94) (127.41) (128.34) 
2010s 11.53  -81.47  
 (117.99)  (123.83)  
Length_cent -25.19 -25.19 -110.49 -110.49 
 (103.08) (103.08) (108.21) (108.21) 
AIC 2553.89 2553.89 1650.13 1650.13 
BIC 2601.28 2601.28 1691.69 1691.69 
Log Likelihood -1261.95 -1261.95 -810.07 -810.07 
Num. Obs. 174 174 118 118 
Num. Groups: Parties 65 65 41 41 
Var: Parties 
(Intercept) 14444.77 14444.77 43751.16 43751.16 
Var: Residual 281201.45 281201.45 182489.18 182489.18 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party 
manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). 
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Appendix 3 – Measurement of Populism in Manifestos 
Table 23 – Measurement of Populism in Manifestos 
Country Decade Party-Decade Statements 
Populist 
Statements Vote Share Ideology Radicalism Populism (%) 
Populism 
(weighted) 
AT 1970 SPÖ_70 37 2 50.4 L 2.9 5.405405 790.0541 
AT 1970 ÖVP_70 27 1 42.9 R 1.3 3.703704 206.5556 
AT 1970 FPÖ_70 15 0 5.4 L 2.2 0 0 
AT 1980 SPÖ_80 97 15 47.6 L 3.1 15.46392 2281.856 
AT 1980 ÖVP_80 35 2 43.2 R 1.1 5.714286 271.5429 
AT 1980 FPÖ_80 46 3 5 R 2.5 6.521739 81.52174 
AT 1990 SPÖ_90 98 7 34.9 L 2.1 7.142857 523.5 
AT 1990 ÖVP_90 110 10 27.7 R 3.5 9.090909 881.3636 
AT 1990 FPÖ_90 104 11 22.5 R 5.8 10.57692 1380.288 
AT 1990 GrÙne_90 31 2 7.3 R 1.7 6.451613 80.06452 
AT 1990 LIF_90 22 0 6 R 4.4 0 0 
AT 2000 SPÖ_00 105 1 42.3 L 2.2 0.952381 88.62857 
AT 2000 ÖVP_00 170 6 36.5 R 3 3.529412 386.4706 
AT 2000 FPÖ_00 139 1 10 R 4.6 0.719424 33.09353 
AT 2000 GrÙne_00 52 2 9.5 L 3.2 3.846154 116.9231 
AT 2010 SPÖ_10 60 2 26.8 L 2.1 3.333333 187.6 
AT 2010 ÖVP_10 92 11 24 R 2.1 11.95652 602.6087 
AT 2010 FPÖ_10 19 4 20.5 R 4.7 21.05263 2028.421 
AT 2010 GrÙne_10 241 17 12.42 L 3 7.053942 262.8299 
AT 2010 NEOS_10 79 4 4.96 R 2 5.063291 50.22785 
AT 2010 TS_10 144 20 5.73 R 3.6 13.88889 286.5 
CH 1970 CVP_70 106 0 20.1 R 1.4 0 0 
CH 1970 FDP_70 19 0 22.1 R 2.4 0 0 
CH 1970 SVP_70 14 0 9.9 R 4.3 0 0 
CH 1970 SP_70 18 1 24.7 L 3.9 5.555556 535.1667 
CH 1970 LdU_70 16 1 6 L 1.5 6.25 56.25 
CH 1980 CVP_80 25 0 20.2 R 1.2 0 0 
CH 1980 FDP_80 30 0 6.9 R 5.6 0 0 
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Country Decade Party-Decade Statements 
Populist 
Statements Vote Share Ideology Radicalism Populism (%) 
Populism 
(weighted) 
CH 1980 SVP_80 42 0 11.1 R 1.3 0 0 
CH 1980 SP_80 17 0 22.8 L 4.4 0 0 
CH 1990 CVP_90 33 4 16.8 R 1.3 12.12121 264.7273 
CH 1990 FDP_90 26 2 20.2 R 4.3 7.692308 668.1538 
CH 1990 GPS_90 53 2 5 L 2.1 3.773585 39.62264 
CH 1990 SVP_90 73 5 14.9 R 3.3 6.849315 336.7808 
CH 1990 SP_90 43 5 21.8 L 3 11.62791 760.4651 
CH 2000 CVP_00 23 0 14.3 R 4.9 0 0 
CH 2000 FDP_00 47 6 17.3 R 2.6 12.76596 574.2128 
CH 2000 GPS_00 32 1 7.4 L 2.9 3.125 67.0625 
CH 2000 SVP_00 169 14 26.7 R 5.2 8.284024 1150.154 
CH 2000 SP_00 121 4 23.3 L 4.8 3.305785 369.719 
CH 2010 BDP_10 3 0 5.4 R 2.3 0 0 
CH 2010 CVP_10 42 0 12.3 R 1.3 0 0 
CH 2010 FDP_10 49 2 15.1 R 3.2 4.081633 197.2245 
CH 2010 GPS_10 91 2 8.4 L 3.1 2.197802 57.23077 
CH 2010 GLP_10 14 0 5.4 L 3.1 0 0 
CH 2010 SVP_10 48 9 26.6 R 1.1 18.75 548.625 
CH 2010 SP_10 31 3 18.7 L 6 9.677419 1085.806 
DE 1970 CDU/CSU_70 31 0 35.2 R 1.5 0 0 
DE 1970 FDP_70 2 0 8.4 R 3.7 0 0 
DE 1970 SPD_70 56 1 45.8 L 2.4 1.785714 196.2857 
DE 1980 CDU/CSU_80 36 3 38.1 R 4 8.333333 1270 
DE 1980 FDP_80 45 2 6.9 R 1.4 4.444444 42.93333 
DE 1980 GrÙnen_80 25 2 5.6 L 3.4 8 152.32 
DE 1980 SPD_80 65 19 38.2 L 1.7 29.23077 1898.246 
DE 1990 CDU/CSU_90 42 1 34.2 R 3.7 2.380952 301.2857 
DE 1990 FDP_90 191 7 6.9 R 1.2 3.664921 30.34555 
DE 1990 GrÙnen_90 149 9 7.3 L 3 6.040268 132.2819 
DE 1990 SPD_90 54 6 36.4 L 2.8 11.11111 1132.444 
DE 2000 CDU/CSU_00 91 2 29.5 R 1.9 2.197802 123.1868 
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Country Decade Party-Decade Statements 
Populist 
Statements Vote Share Ideology Radicalism Populism (%) 
Populism 
(weighted) 
DE 2000 FDP_00 115 4 7.4 R 2.1 3.478261 54.05217 
DE 2000 GrÙnen_00 129 2 8.6 L 2.6 1.550388 34.66667 
DE 2000 SPD_00 112 4 38.5 L 2 3.571429 275 
DE 2010 CDU/CSU_10 37 0 34.1 R 1.9 0 0 
DE 2010 GrÙnen_10 54 16 8.4 L 2.4 29.62963 597.3333 
DE 2010 Linke_10 120 25 8.6 L 4.8 20.83333 860 
DE 2010 SPD_10 135 26 25.7 L 2.2 19.25926 1088.919 
FR 1970 PS_70 228 35 43.2 L 4.1 15.35088 2718.947 
FR 1970 UDR_70 95 12 15.1 R 2 12.63158 381.4737 
FR 1980 PCF_80 69 4 15.3 L 4.2 5.797101 372.5217 
FR 1980 PS_80 43 1 25.8 L 3.8 2.325581 228 
FR 1980 RPR_80 74 9 18 R 2.1 12.16216 459.7297 
FR 1990 LO_90 28 2 5.3 L 5 7.142857 189.2857 
FR 1990 PCF_90 71 3 8.6 L 4.3 4.225352 156.2535 
FR 1990 PS_90 72 10 23.3 L 2.3 13.88889 744.3056 
FR 1990 RPR_90 130 8 20.9 R 1.3 6.153846 167.2 
FR 1990 FN_90 17 1 15 R 6 5.882353 529.4118 
FR 1990 UDF_90 23 1 18.6 R 1.3 4.347826 105.1304 
FR 2000 LO_00 33 0 5.3 L 5 0 0 
FR 2000 PS_00 76 6 16.2 L 2.1 7.894737 268.5789 
FR 2000 EELV_00 60 1 5.2 L 3.2 1.666667 27.73333 
FR 2000 UMP_00 35 1 19.9 R 3 2.857143 170.5714 
FR 2000 FN_00 164 17 16.9 R 5.9 10.36585 1033.579 
FR 2000 UDF_00 117 14 6.8 R 1.9 11.96581 154.5983 
FR 2010 PS_10 94 2 28.6 L 3.2 2.12766 194.7234 
FR 2010 FdG_10 149 11 5.25 L 2.6 7.38255 100.7718 
FR 2010 Modem_10 78 3 9.1 R 1.1 3.846154 38.5 
FR 2010 UMP_10 40 1 27.1 R 3.2 2.5 216.8 
FR 2010 FN_10 116 2 17.9 R 5.9 1.724138 182.0862 
ITA 1970 PCI_70 20 1 27.1 L 2.9 5 392.95 
ITA 1970 PSI_70 5 2 9.6 L 5 40 1920 
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Country Decade Party-Decade Statements 
Populist 
Statements Vote Share Ideology Radicalism Populism (%) 
Populism 
(weighted) 
ITA 1980 PCI_80 515 9 29.9 L 1.7 1.747573 88.82913 
ITA 1980 PRI_80 486 3 5.1 R 1 0.617284 3.148148 
ITA 1980 PSI_80 274 3 11.4 L 1.7 1.094891 21.21898 
ITA 1980 DC_80 102 4 32.9 L 1.3 3.921569 167.7255 
ITA 1980 MSI_80 364 9 6.8 R 1.1 2.472527 18.49451 
ITA 1990 LN_90 112 6 8.4 R 1.9 5.357143 85.5 
ITA 1990 RC_90 85 1 6.1 L 3.4 1.176471 24.4 
ITA 1990 FI_90 118 2 21 R 4.8 1.694915 170.8475 
ITA 1990 AN_90 121 9 13.4 R 1.7 7.438017 169.438 
ITA 1990 PDS_90 53 4 20.4 R 1.7 7.54717 261.7358 
ITA 1990 PPI_90 26 2 11.1 R 5.7 7.692308 486.6923 
ITA 2010 PD_10 45 3 25.4 L 2.4 6.666667 406.4 
ITA 2010 PdL_10 68 4 21.6 R 2.7 5.882353 343.0588 
ITA 2010 M5S_10 38 3 25.6 R 0.7 7.894737 141.4737 
ITA 2010 M5S_10 38 3 25.6 L 0.7 7.894737 141.4737 
ITA 2010 SC_10 38 5 8.3 R 1.4 13.15789 152.8947 
NL 1970 VVD_70 98 0 14.4 R 3.1 0 0 
NL 1970 PvdA_70 61 1 27.3 L 5.5 1.639344 246.1475 
NL 1970 ARP_70 104 11 8.84 L 2.4 10.57692 224.4 
NL 1970 KVP_70 40 0 17.65 L 2.4 0 0 
NL 1980 VVD_80 63 0 23.1 R 3.1 0 0 
NL 1980 PvdA_80 87 8 30.4 L 3.1 9.195402 866.5747 
NL 1980 CDA_80 8 0 29.4 L 2.2 0 0 
NL 1990 VVD_90 83 2 20 R 2.5 2.409639 120.4819 
NL 1990 PvdA_90 7 0 24 R 1.4 0 0 
NL 1990 D66_90 128 5 15.5 L 1.8 3.90625 108.9844 
NL 1990 CDA_90 9 0 22.2 L 1.3 0 0 
NL 2000 VVD_00 84 1 15.4 R 3.4 1.190476 62.33333 
NL 2000 PvdA_00 110 7 15.1 L 2 6.363636 192.1818 
NL 2000 D66_00 137 7 5.1 L 1.4 5.109489 36.48175 
NL 2000 SP_00 91 4 5.9 L 4.4 4.395604 114.1099 
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Country Decade Party-Decade Statements 
Populist 
Statements Vote Share Ideology Radicalism Populism (%) 
Populism 
(weighted) 
NL 2000 CDA_00 87 3 27.8 R 2.1 3.448276 201.3103 
NL 2000 GL_00 156 11 6.9 L 3.5 7.051282 170.2885 
NL 2000 LPF_00 25 1 17 R 4.4 4 299.2 
NL 2010 VVD_10 162 4 26.6 R 3.9 2.469136 256.1481 
NL 2010 PvdA_10 308 8 24.8 L 2.3 2.597403 148.1558 
NL 2010 D66_10 222 2 8 R 1.6 0.900901 11.53153 
NL 2010 PVV_10 116 6 10.1 R 5.3 5.172414 276.8793 
NL 2010 SP_10 134 1 9.6 L 5 0.746269 35.8209 
NL 2010 CDA_10 109 4 8.5 R 2.8 3.669725 87.33945 
SE 1970 C_70 33 1 25.1 L 3.4 3.030303 258.6061 
SE 1970 FP_70 32 0 9.4 L 2.2 0 0 
SE 1970 M_70 5 0 14.3 R 3 0 0 
SE 1970 S_70 5 0 43.6 L 1.8 0 0 
SE 1970 V_70 12 0 5.3 L 5.3 0 0 
SE 1980 C_80 53 0 15.5 L 2.4 0 0 
SE 1980 FP_80 15 0 5.9 R 1.5 0 0 
SE 1980 M_80 17 0 23.6 R 3.5 0 0 
SE 1980 S_80 16 0 45.6 L 2.9 0 0 
SE 1980 V_80 33 0 5.6 L 5 0 0 
SE 1990 C_90 23 0 7.6 R 5.2 0 0 
SE 1990 FP_90 38 0 7.2 R 4.9 0 0 
SE 1990 MP_90 32 0 5 L 3.4 0 0 
SE 1990 M_90 32 0 22.4 R 6 0 0 
SE 1990 S_90 34 0 45.2 R 4.2 0 0 
SE 1990 V_90 28 0 6.2 L 5.7 0 0 
SE 2000 C_00 25 0 6.2 R 1.6 0 0 
SE 2000 FP_00 37 0 13.4 R 2.3 0 0 
SE 2000 KD_00 82 2 9.1 R 3.3 2.439024 73.2439 
SE 2000 M_00 61 0 15.3 R 3.8 0 0 
SE 2000 S_00 37 0 39.8 L 2.5 0 0 
SE 2000 V_00 75 0 8.4 L 4.3 0 0 
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Country Decade Party-Decade Statements 
Populist 
Statements Vote Share Ideology Radicalism Populism (%) 
Populism 
(weighted) 
SE 2010 C_10 7 0 6.1 R 3.2 0 0 
SE 2010 FP_10 11 0 5.4 R 3 0 0 
SE 2010 MP_10 9 1 6.9 L 2.7 11.11111 207 
SE 2010 S_10 58 0 12.9 L 2.2 0 0 
SE 2010 V_10 76 0 5.7 L 4.3 0 0 
SE 2010 SD_10 52 2 12.9 R 3.8 3.846154 188.5385 
SE 2010 M_10 175 1 23.3 R 3.4 0.571429 45.26857 
UK 1970 LIB_70 58 5 18.3 L 2.1 8.62069 331.2931 
UK 1970 LAB_70 79 6 39.2 L 3.8 7.594937 1131.342 
UK 1970 CON_70 88 4 35.8 R 1.3 4.545455 211.5455 
UK 1980 LAB_80 169 9 27.6 L 4.9 5.325444 720.213 
UK 1980 CON_80 83 1 42.4 R 3.9 1.204819 199.2289 
UK 1980 SDP_80 127 6 25.3 R 2 4.724409 239.0551 
UK 1990 LD_90 147 5 17.8 L 3.2 3.401361 193.7415 
UK 1990 LAB_90 53 3 34.4 L 4 5.660377 778.8679 
UK 1990 CON_90 219 4 41.9 R 3.8 1.826484 290.8128 
UK 2000 LD_00 255 12 18.3 L 2.2 4.705882 189.4588 
UK 2000 LAB_00 86 7 40.7 L 0.8 8.139535 265.0233 
UK 2000 CON_00 159 7 31.7 R 3.7 4.402516 516.3711 
UK 2010 LD_10 83 7 23 L 1 8.433735 193.9759 
UK 2010 LAB_10 104 5 29 L 2 4.807692 278.8462 
UK 2010 CON_10 133 13 36.1 R 3.1 9.774436 1093.857 
 
Notes. 
1) Six manifestos are missing. The missing cases are the following: in the 1970s Républicains Indépendant (France), 
PSDI, DC, MSI (Italy); for the1980s UDF (France); for the 2000s MDC (France).  
2) When possible, in order to determine the levels of radicalism, the Chapel Hill survey is used (Bakker et al. 2015). 
However, the survey does not cover the 1990s, for which the Party Manifesto Project is used (Lehmann et al. 2016). The 
values from the two datasets are then normalized and standardized. 
The data concerning the electoral results are obtained via Caramani (2000; 2015) 
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Appendix 4 – Conditions: Raw and Fuzzy Values 
 
Table 24 – Values for Conditions (Raw and Fuzzy) 
Country Decade 
Corruption Economy Convergence Account-Resp. 
Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy 
AT 1990s 67.03 0.51 8.25 0.26 0.55 0.20 61.80 0.64 
AT 2000s 71.81 0.39 6.62 0.12 0.60 0.12 63.40 0.57 
AT 2010s 71.71 0.39 11.16 0.64 0.39 0.67 63.50 0.56 
CH 1990s 91.16 0.06 12.30 0.76 0.44 0.53 65.50 0.46 
CH 2000s 72.69 0.36 8.33 0.27 0.67 0.05 68.40 0.27 
CH 2010s 72.70 0.36 10.25 0.53 0.38 0.71 75.20 0.05 
DE 1990s 86.73 0.09 8.35 0.27 0.63 0.08 56.50 0.81 
DE 2000s 55.74 0.66 9.08 0.37 0.26 0.91 59.60 0.72 
DE 2010s 73.56 0.34 10.30 0.54 0.47 0.44 63.50 0.56 
FR 1990s 53.60 0.68 12.22 0.75 0.44 0.52 59.40 0.73 
FR 2000s 36.11 0.84 9.30 0.40 0.39 0.67 59.30 0.73 
FR 2010s 59.89 0.61 12.54 0.78 0.58 0.16 54.60 0.86 
ITA 1990s 12.50 0.95 12.55 0.78 0.41 0.64 60.70 0.68 
ITA 2010s 12.79 0.95 16.20 0.95 0.38 0.71 50.50 0.92 
NL 1990s 90.66 0.06 8.46 0.29 0.22 0.95 65.10 0.49 
NL 2000s 80.37 0.18 5.33 0.06 0.34 0.81 68.00 0.29 
NL 2010s 79.61 0.19 10.26 0.53 0.46 0.46 68.00 0.29 
SE 1990s 91.94 0.05 10.72 0.59 0.66 0.06 68.60 0.26 
SE 2000s 88.76 0.07 5.23 0.06 0.40 0.67 70.40 0.17 
SE 2010s 82.50 0.14 8.95 0.35 0.35 0.79 73.70 0.07 
UK 1990s 77.30 0.24 13.41 0.84 0.61 0.11 48.60 0.94 
UK 2000s 71.98 0.38 9.56 0.44 0.34 0.80 56.60 0.81 
UK 2010s 59.13 0.61 14.56 0.90 0.36 0.75 57.60 0.78 
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Table 25 – Values for Outcomes (Raw and Fuzzy) 
Country Decade 
Right-Wing 
Populism 
Left-Wing 
Populism Total Populism 
Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy 
AT 1990s 2341.72 1 523.50 0.67 2865.22 1.00 
AT 2000s 419.56 0.5 205.55 0.17 625.12 0.33 
AT 2010s 2967.76 1 450.43 0.53 3418.19 1.00 
CH 1990s 1269.66 1 800.09 0.95 2069.75 0.97 
CH 2000s 1724.37 1 436.78 0.50 2161.15 0.98 
CH 2010s 745.85 0.93 1143.04 1.00 1888.89 0.95 
DE 1990s 331.63 0.35 1264.73 1.00 1596.36 0.89 
DE 2000s 177.24 0.15 309.67 0.30 486.91 0.23 
DE 2010s 0.00 0.05 2546.25 1.00 2546.25 0.99 
FR 1990s 801.74 0.95 1089.85 0.99 1891.59 0.95 
FR 2000s 1358.75 1 296.31 0.28 1655.06 0.91 
FR 2010s 437.39 0.54 295.50 0.28 732.88 0.43 
IT 1990s 1174.21 1 6.57 0.05 1180.78 0.73 
IT 2010s 637.43 0.84 86.92 0.09 724.35 0.42 
NL 1990s 120.48 0.11 108.98 0.1 229.47 0.11 
NL 2000s 562.84 0.75 513.06 0.65 1075.91 0.67 
NL 2010s 631.90 0.84 183.98 0.15 815.88 0.5 
SE 1990s 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 
SE 2000s 73.24 0.08 0.00 0.05 73.24 0.06 
SE 2010s 233.81 0.21 207.00 0.18 440.81 0.21 
UK 1990s 290.81 0.29 972.61 0.99 1263.42 0.77 
UK 2000s 516.37 0.68 454.48 0.54 970.85 0.6 
UK 2010s 1093.86 0.99 472.82 0.58 1566.68 0.89 
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Table 26 – Calculation of Accountability and Responsiveness 
  Responsiveness Accountability 
Total Country Decade GOVCAP REPRES TR_PTPP COMPET 
AT 1990s 71.1 58.2 58.1 59.7 61.8 
AT 2000s 66.8 64.4 59.7 62.7 63.4 
AT 2010s 66.5 70.5 50.7 66.3 63.5 
CH 1990s 75.7 65.6 45.7 75.0 65.5 
CH 2000s 76.4 68.7 55.9 72.4 68.4 
CH 2010s 78.5 73.0 80.1 69.1 75.2 
DE 1990s 66.0 53.3 44.7 62.1 56.5 
DE 2000s 67.9 61.6 44.8 64.0 59.6 
DE 2010s 65.7 60.9 62.1 65.2 63.5 
FR 1990s 67.8 50.5 60.2 59.0 59.4 
FR 2000s 62.0 57.2 60.2 57.8 59.3 
FR 2010s 51.0 60.2 55.4 51.7 54.6 
IT 1990s 64.7 50.4 55.1 72.6 60.7 
IT 2010s 50.0 48.6 39.7 63.8 50.5 
NL 1990s 77.2 50.5 64.2 68.4 65.1 
NL 2000s 70.8 56.0 70.7 74.7 68.0 
NL 2010s 64.8 59.2 69.4 78.5 68.0 
SE 1990s 74.1 63.7 71.9 64.9 68.6 
SE 2000s 69.6 70.1 75.2 66.8 70.4 
SE 2010s 73.0 68.5 81.5 71.9 73.7 
UK 1990s 45.7 76.4 34.3 37.9 48.6 
UK 2000s 45.3 77.1 53.6 50.2 56.6 
UK 2010s 51.8 74.8 56.8 47.0 57.6 
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Table 27 – Calculation of Economic Performance 
Country Decade Unemployment Gini GDP Total 
AT 1990s 3.3 28.1 6.6 8.249625 
AT 2000s 4.2 26.6 10.9 6.62109 
AT 2010s 4.9 29.3 0.7 11.16151 
CH 1990s 3.2 29.82 -3.9 12.29558 
CH 2000s 2.2 27.52 4.7 8.33472 
CH 2010s 3.4 30.09 2.7 10.24692 
DE 1990s 6.5 26.79 8.2 8.353365 
DE 2000s 8.5 27.00 8.2 9.080347 
DE 2010s 6.5 28.95 4.5 10.30213 
FR 1990s 11.1 28.54 3.0 12.2167 
FR 2000s 10.4 27.91 10.4 9.297281 
FR 2010s 8.7 28.13 -0.8 12.54253 
IT 1990s 9.0 31.91 3.2 12.55493 
IT 2010s 8.8 32.71 -7.1 16.20321 
NL 1990s 6.0 25.99 6.6 8.463507 
NL 2000s 4.0 24.03 12.1 5.327244 
NL 2010s 4.5 25.91 -0.4 10.26139 
SE 1990s 4.9 21.10 -6.2 10.72242 
SE 2000s 6.6 23.58 14.5 5.229819 
SE 2010s 8.1 25.17 6.4 8.951768 
UK 1990s 6.1 33.01 -1.1 13.41191 
UK 2000s 6.1 34.32 11.7 9.563203 
UK 2010s 6.6 33.85 -3.3 14.56104 
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Appendix 5 – Distribution Cases in Outcomes 
 
Figure 26: Distribution Acceptability of Total Populism 
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Figure 27: Distribution Acceptability Left-wing Populism 
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Figure 28: Distribution Acceptability Right-wing Populism 
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Figure 29: Distribution Cases in Conditions 
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Figure 30: Plots Total Populism and Conditions 
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Figure 31: Plots Right-wing Populism and Conditions 
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Figure 32: Plots Left-wing Populism and Conditions 
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Appendix 6 – All Solutions Without Stigma 
 
Table 28 – Solutions Total Populism (Without Stigma) 
Conservative Solution for Total Populism 
 
M1: D*E + C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG => POP 
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
 
1  D*E       0.847  0.770  0.550  0.135  DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
2  C*D*cnvg  0.956  0.907  0.357  0.040  AT_94; FR_12  
3  c*E*CNVG  0.924  0.867  0.370  0.062  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------  
   M1        0.852  0.775  0.652  
 
 
Intermediate Solution for Total Populism 
 
M1:    E + C*D + D*cnvg => POP  
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
 
1  E       0.821  0.741  0.644  0.128  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK_9
5; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
2  C*D     0.858  0.759  0.482  0.023  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_
94,IT_13,UK_10  
3  D*cnvg  0.872  0.800  0.502  0.047  AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95; AT_94; FR_
12  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------  
   M1      0.798  0.719  0.754  
 
 
Most Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism 
 
M1: C + E + D*cnvg => POP 
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
 
1  C       0.845  0.751  0.526  0.036  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_
94,IT_13,UK_10  
2  E       0.821  0.741  0.644  0.097  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK_9
5; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
3  D*cnvg  0.872  0.800  0.502  0.047  AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95; AT_94; FR_
12  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------  
   M1      0.791  0.712  0.767  
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Table 29 – Solutions Right-Wing Populism (Without Stigma) 
Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG + (C*D*E) => POP_CAL5  
M2: C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG + (D*E*CNVG) => POP_CAL5  
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases  
 
1  C*D*cnvg  0.935  0.886  0.357  0.045  0.045  0.101  AT_94; FR_12  
2  c*E*CNVG  0.845  0.775  0.346  0.064  0.119  0.064  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------  
3  C*D*E     0.907  0.865  0.440  0.023  0.096         FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,I
T_13,UK_10  
4  D*E*CNVG  0.885  0.845  0.426  0.010         0.083  AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,I
T_13,UK_10  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------  
   M1        0.889  0.845  0.605  
   M2        0.895  0.851  0.591  
 
Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1:    E*CNVG + C*D*cnvg => POP_CAL5  
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
 
1  E*CNVG    0.883  0.846  0.492  0.236  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT
_13,UK_10  
2  C*D*cnvg  0.935  0.886  0.357  0.101  AT_94; FR_12  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------  
   M1        0.895  0.851  0.593  
 
Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5 
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
 
1  C*cnvg  0.940  0.896  0.386  0.108  AT_94; FR_12  
2  E*CNVG  0.883  0.846  0.492  0.214  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_1
3,UK_10  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------  
   M1      0.896  0.853  0.600  
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Table 30 – Solutions Left-Wing Populism (Without Stigma) 
Conservative and Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: c*D + c*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg => POP_CAL5 
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----  
1  c*D       0.819  0.677  0.622  0.095  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; A
T_13  
2  c*E*CNVG  0.861  0.711  0.455  0.059  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
3  D*e*cnvg  0.819  0.664  0.436  0.025  AT_02,DE_94; AT_94  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----  
   M1        0.786  0.646  0.706  
 
Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: c*D + (c*E*CNVG + C*e*cnvg) => POP_CAL5  
M2: c*D + (c*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) => POP_CAL5  
M3: c*D + (C*e*cnvg + d*E*CNVG) => POP_CAL5  
M4: c*D + (d*E*CNVG + D*e*cnvg) => POP_CAL5  
 
                                  ---------------------------------  
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   cases  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------  
1  c*D       0.819  0.677  0.622  0.095  0.155  0.095  0.206  0.146  AT_02,
DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------  
2  c*E*CNVG  0.861  0.711  0.455  0.000  0.031  0.059                CH_95,
CH_11; AT_13  
3  C*e*cnvg  0.895  0.726  0.375  0.008  0.022         0.011         AT_94  
4  d*E*CNVG  0.825  0.657  0.408  0.002                0.033  0.061  CH_95,
CH_11  
5  D*e*cnvg  0.819  0.664  0.436  0.011         0.025         0.014  AT_02,
DE_94; AT_94  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------  
   M1        0.785  0.639  0.703  
   M2        0.786  0.646  0.706  
   M3        0.782  0.633  0.705  
   M4        0.783  0.640  0.708  
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Appendix 7 – All Solutions With Stigma 
Table 31 – Solution Total Populism (With Stigma) 
Conservative Solutions for Total Populism (With Stigma) 
 
M01: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + c*D*e*s + c*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5  
M02: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + c*D*e*s + D*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5  
M03: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + c*E*CNVG*S + D*e
*CNVG*s) => POP_CAL5  
M04: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + D*e*CNVG*s + D*E
*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5  
M05: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*e*cnvg*S + c*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5  
M06: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*e*cnvg*S + D*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5  
M07: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*cn
vg*S) => POP_CAL5  
M08: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + D*e*cnvg*S + D*E*CN
VG*S) => POP_CAL5  
M09: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + c*E*CNVG*S + D*e
*CNVG*s) => POP_CAL5  
M10: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + D*e*CNVG*s + D*E
*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5  
M11: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*cnvg*S + D*e
*CNVG*s) => POP_CAL5  
M12: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*D*cnvg*s + (D*e*cnvg*S + D*e*CNVG*s + D*E
*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5  
 
 
                incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   (M5
)   (M6)   (M7)   (M8)   (M9)   (M10)  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------  
 1  C*D*CNVG    0.886  0.799  0.386  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.0
21  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.021  0.021  
 2  c*d*S       0.855  0.767  0.409  0.036  0.062  0.120  0.062  0.120  0.0
36  0.057  0.062  0.120  0.036  0.057  
 3  C*D*S       0.897  0.813  0.430  0.031  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033  0.0
33  0.033  0.031  0.031  0.033  0.033  
 4  c*D*cnvg*s  0.946  0.909  0.370  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.0
44  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.088  0.088  
 5  c*D*e*cnvg  0.899  0.827  0.333  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                                           
 6  c*D*e*s     0.894  0.799  0.353  0.000  0.013  0.013                0.0
13  0.013  0.013  0.013                
 7  c*e*cnvg*S  0.895  0.798  0.329  0.000                              0.0
00  0.000                0.000  0.000  
 8  c*E*CNVG*S  0.961  0.927  0.322  0.003  0.012         0.012         0.0
12         0.012         0.012         
 9  D*e*cnvg*S  0.899  0.799  0.299  0.008                                            
0.008  0.008                
10  D*e*CNVG*s  0.852  0.694  0.278  0.000                0.013  0.013                              
0.013  0.013  
11  D*E*CNVG*S  0.915  0.845  0.356  0.000         0.009         0.009         
0.009         0.009         0.009  
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------  
    M1          0.831  0.760  0.771  
    M2          0.831  0.759  0.768  
    M3          0.831  0.760  0.771  
    M4          0.831  0.759  0.768  
    M5          0.828  0.756  0.771  
    M6          0.828  0.755  0.768  
    M7          0.833  0.763  0.779  
    M8          0.832  0.762  0.776  
    M9          0.828  0.756  0.771  
    M10         0.828  0.755  0.768  
    M11         0.833  0.763  0.779  
    M12         0.832  0.762  0.776  
 
----------------------------  
                (M11)  (M12)  cases  
--------------------------------------------------------------------  
 1  C*D*CNVG    0.021  0.021  DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
 2  c*d*S       0.062  0.120  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11  
 3  C*D*S       0.031  0.031  AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
 4  c*D*cnvg*s  0.088  0.088  DE_94; DE_13,UK_95  
--------------------------------------------------------------------  
 5  c*D*e*cnvg                DE_94; AT_02  
 6  c*D*e*s                   DE_94; UK_03  
 7  c*e*cnvg*S                CH_03; AT_02  
 8  c*E*CNVG*S  0.012         CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
 9  D*e*cnvg*S  0.008  0.008  AT_02; AT_94  
10  D*e*CNVG*s  0.013  0.013  UK_03; DE_02  
11  D*E*CNVG*S         0.009  AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
--------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
Intermediate Solution for Total Populism (With Stigma) 
 
M1:    D + S => POP_CAL5  
 
       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  
---------------------------------  
1  D   0.784  0.697  0.679  0.176  
2  S   0.800  0.713  0.683  0.180  
---------------------------------  
   M1  0.782  0.709  0.859  
 
       cases  
------------  
1  D   DE_94; UK_03; AT_02; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; DE_02; AT_94; FR_02; UK_10; 
FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13 
2  S   CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; AT_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; 
FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13 
------------  
 
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism (With Stigma) 
 
M1: D + S => POP_CAL5 
 
       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  
---------------------------------  
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1  D   0.784  0.697  0.679  0.176  
2  S   0.800  0.713  0.683  0.180  
---------------------------------  
   M1  0.782  0.709  0.859  
 
       cases  
------------  
1  D   DE_94; AT_02; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; AT_94; DE_02; FR_02; FR_12; 
UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13 
2  S   CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; 
FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13 
------------  
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Table 32 – Solutions Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma) 
Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma) 
 
Number of multiple-covered cases: 6  
 
M1: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + c*E*S*CNVG) => POP_CAL5  
M2: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) => POP_CAL5  
M3: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (c*E*S*CNVG + D*e*S*cnvg) => POP_CAL5  
M4: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (D*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) => POP_CAL5  
 
                                    ---------------------------------  
               incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   case
s  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------  
1  c*d*S       0.898  0.853  0.438  0.060  0.060  0.082  0.086  0.146  CH_0
3; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11  
2  C*D*S       0.975  0.961  0.477  0.074  0.076  0.076  0.074  0.074  AT_9
4; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
3  C*D*E*CNVG  0.912  0.874  0.361  0.031  0.031  0.031  0.031  0.031  UK_1
0; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------  
4  c*e*S*cnvg  0.920  0.863  0.345  0.000  0.005  0.005                CH_0
3; AT_02  
5  c*E*S*CNVG  0.951  0.925  0.326  0.003  0.012         0.012         CH_9
5,CH_11; AT_13  
6  D*e*S*cnvg  0.927  0.874  0.315  0.009                0.014  0.014  AT_0
2; AT_94  
7  D*E*S*CNVG  0.958  0.940  0.381  0.000         0.009         0.009  AT_1
3; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------  
   M1          0.880  0.839  0.719  
   M2          0.880  0.838  0.716  
   M3          0.885  0.846  0.727  
   M4          0.884  0.845  0.724  
 
Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma) 
 
M1:    S + C*D*E*CNVG => POP_CAL5  
 
               incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------  
1  S           0.885  0.850  0.773  0.443  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95
,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
2  C*D*E*CNVG  0.912  0.874  0.361  0.031  UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------  
   M1          0.859  0.818  0.804  
 
Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma) 
 
M1: S + (C*E) => POP_CAL5  
M2: S + (E*CNVG) => POP_CAL5  
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                                -------------------  
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------  
1  S       0.885  0.850  0.773  0.241  0.330  0.327  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL
_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------  
2  C*E     0.910  0.871  0.474  0.000  0.031         UK_10; FR_12; FR_95,IT
_94,IT_13  
3  E*CNVG  0.883  0.846  0.492  0.015         0.046  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; UK
_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------  
   M1      0.856  0.815  0.804  
   M2      0.846  0.803  0.819  
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Table 33 – Solutions Left-Wing Populism (With Stigma) 
Conservative Solutions 
 
M1: c*d*E*S + C*D*e*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (c*D*e*s) => 
POP_CAL5  
M2: c*d*E*S + C*D*e*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (D*e*CNVG*s) 
=> POP_CAL5  
 
                                    -------------------  
               incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1  c*D*cnvg*s  0.897  0.812  0.464  0.065  0.065  0.123  DE_94; DE_13,UK_95  
2  C*D*CNVG*s  0.880  0.635  0.344  0.028  0.028  0.028  DE_02; UK_10  
3  c*d*E*S     0.848  0.671  0.377  0.001  0.001  0.001  NL_12; CH_95,CH_11  
4  C*D*e*S     0.828  0.515  0.332  0.029  0.029  0.029  AT_94; FR_02  
5  c*E*CNVG*S  0.873  0.727  0.386  0.012  0.012  0.012  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
6  c*D*e*s     0.851  0.681  0.443  0.000  0.024         DE_94; UK_03  
7  D*e*CNVG*s  0.817  0.563  0.352  0.000         0.024  UK_03; DE_02  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
   M1          0.784  0.641  0.705  
   M2          0.784  0.641  0.705  
 
Intermediate Solution 
 
M1:    D*s + C*D*e + c*E*S => POP_CAL5  
 
          incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--  
1  D*s    0.801  0.640  0.565  0.173  DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_
10  
2  C*D*e  0.792  0.489  0.378  0.026  AT_94; DE_02; FR_02  
3  c*E*S  0.842  0.683  0.457  0.116  NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
 
Parsimonious Solution 
 
M1: C*e + D*s + c*E*S => POP_CAL5 
 
          incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--  
1  C*e    0.810  0.553  0.421  0.034  AT_94; DE_02; FR_02  
2  D*s    0.801  0.640  0.565  0.173  DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_
10  
3  c*E*S  0.842  0.683  0.457  0.081  NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--  
   M1     0.761  0.612  0.733  
 
293 
 
Appendix 8 – Outcomes and Stigma 
 
Figure 33: Distribution of Cases in Stigma 
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Figure 34: Total Populism and Stigma 
 
295 
 
Figure 35: Right-Wing Populism and Stigma 
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Figure 36: Left-Wing Populism and Stigma 
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Appendix 9 – Robustness Test without Convergence 
 
Table 34 – Robustness Test without Convergence (With Stigma) 
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism 
 
M1: S + C*E => POP_CAL5 
 
        incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------  
1  S    0.885  0.850  0.773  0.330  CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; 
AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13  
2  C*E  0.910  0.871  0.474  0.031  UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------  
   M1   0.856  0.815  0.804  
 
 
Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: S + C*E => POP_CAL5 
 
        incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------  
1  S    0.885  0.850  0.773  0.330  CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; 
AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13  
2  C*E  0.910  0.871  0.474  0.031  UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------  
   M1   0.856  0.815  0.804  
 
 
Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: D*s + c*E*S => POP_CAL5 
 
          incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---  
1  D*s    0.803  0.643  0.536  0.231  DE_94,UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK
_10  
2  c*E*S  0.842  0.683  0.432  0.127  CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---  
   M1     0.795  0.657  0.663  
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Table 35 – Robustness Test without Convergence (Without Stigma) 
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism 
 
M1: C => POP_CAL5 
 
       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------  
1  C   0.895  0.851  0.569    -    AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,I
T_13,UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------  
   M1  0.895  0.851  0.569  
 
 
Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: C => POP_CAL5 
 
       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------  
1  C   0.895  0.851  0.569    -    AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,I
T_13,UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------  
   M1  0.895  0.851  0.569  
 
 
Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: c*D*E => POP_CAL5 
 
          incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------  
1  c*D*E  0.886  0.764  0.488    -    AT_13,DE_13,UK_95  
-------------------------------------------------------  
   M1     0.886  0.764  0.488  
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Appendix 10 – Alternative Operationalization (A.O.) 
Table 36 – Variables used for the Alternative Operationalization (A.O.) 
Dimensions of 
Populism Aspects Questions in the Codebook 
People-centrism 
Closeness to the 
people 
Does the speaker claim to belong / be close to / know 
/ speak for / care for / agree with / perform everyday 
actions like / represent / embody the people? 
Stating a 
monolithic people 
Does the speaker describe the people as 
homogeneous, sharing common feelings, desires, or 
opinions? 
Stressing the 
virtues of the 
people 
Does the speaker describe the people in a positive 
way (moral, credible, competent, no lack of 
understanding, etc.)?  
Praising the 
people’s 
achievements 
Does the speaker stress positive actions and positive 
past and future impacts of the people (responsible for 
a positive development / situation, not being 
responsible for a mistake, etc.)? 
Claiming power 
for the people 
Does the speaker argue that the people should have / 
gain / not lose power? Does the speaker give the 
people the competence to act or decide on a specific 
political issue? Does the speaker demand institutional 
reforms for more participation of the people in 
politics? 
Anti-elitism 
Exclusion of the 
elites from the 
people 
Does the speaker describe the elites as not belonging 
to / not being close to / not knowing the needs of / not 
caring about / not speaking on behalf of / not 
empowering / deceiving the people? 
Blaming the elites 
Does the speaker argue that the elites are a 
burden/threat? Does the speaker argue that the elites 
are accountable for negative 
developments/situations? 
Denouncing the 
elites 
Does the speaker argue that the elites are responsible 
for wrong/stupid actions or immoral/criminal/ 
behaviour? Does the speaker argue that the elites are 
planning/scheming/striving something? 
Denying power to 
the elites 
Does the speaker argue that the elites should have 
not / lose / not have more power? Does the speaker 
deny to the elites the competence to act or decide on 
a specific political issue?  
 
Note: three additional aspects have been included in the measurement compared to the other 
operationalization. Notably, the three variables: 'blaming the elites', 'denouncing the elites', 
'claiming less power to the elites'. Since this operationalization is based on the co-occurrence of 
the pillars, there were no reasons to exclude them from the measurement of populism. 
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Table 37 – Measurement Populism in Manifestos (A.O.) 
Country Decade Party-Year Total Statements Populist Statements Percentage Weighted Populism 
AT 1970 SPÖ_1975 37 2 0 0 
AT 1970 ÖVP_1975 27 1 0 0 
AT 1970 FPÖ_1975 15 0 0 0 
AT 1980 ÖVP_1983 35 4 11.42857 543.0857 
AT 1980 SPÖ_1983 97 15 0 0 
AT 1980 FPÖ_1983 46 3 0 0 
AT 1990 FPÖ_1994 104 17 16.34615 2133.173 
AT 1990 GRÜNE_1994 31 4 12.90323 160.129 
AT 1990 SPÖ_1994 98 7 0 0 
AT 1990 ÖVP_1994 110 10 0 0 
AT 1990 LIF_1994 22 1 0 0 
AT 2000 SPÖ_2002 105 13 12.38095 1152.171 
AT 2000 GRÜNE_2002 52 4 7.692308 233.8462 
AT 2000 FPÖ_2002 139 7 5.035971 231.6547 
AT 2000 ÖVP_2002 170 6 0 0 
AT 2010 TS_2013 144 39 27.08333 558.675 
AT 2010 GRÜNE_2013 241 27 11.20332 417.4357 
AT 2010 NEOS_2013 79 6 7.594937 75.34177 
AT 2010 SPÖ_2013 60 2 0 0 
AT 2010 ÖVP_2013 92 11 0 0 
AT 2010 FPÖ_2013 19 4 0 0 
CH 1970 LdU_1975 16 3 18.75 168.75 
CH 1970 CVP_1975 106 0 0 0 
CH 1970 FDP_1975 19 0 0 0 
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Country Decade Party-Year Total Statements Populist Statements Percentage Weighted Populism 
CH 1970 SVP_1975 14 0 0 0 
CH 1970 SP_1975 18 1 0 0 
CH 1980 CVP_1983 25 0 0 0 
CH 1980 FDP_1983 30 0 0 0 
CH 1980 SVP_1983 42 0 0 0 
CH 1980 SP_1983 17 0 0 0 
CH 1990 FDP_1995 26 3 11.53846 1002.231 
CH 1990 GPS_1995 53 4 7.54717 79.24528 
CH 1990 CVP_1995 33 4 0 0 
CH 1990 SVP_1995 73 5 0 0 
CH 1990 SP_1995 43 5 0 0 
CH 2000 SVP_2003 169 47 27.81065 3861.231 
CH 2000 FDP_2003 47 9 19.14894 861.3191 
CH 2000 SP_2003 121 5 4.132231 462.1488 
CH 2000 CVP_2003 23 0 0 0 
CH 2000 GPS_2003 32 2 0 0 
CH 2010 SVP_2011 48 15 31.25 914.375 
CH 2010 SP_2011 31 5 16.12903 1809.677 
CH 2010 GPS_2011 91 5 5.494505 143.0769 
CH 2010 BDP_2011 3 0 0 0 
CH 2010 CVP_2011 42 2 0 0 
CH 2010 FDP_2011 49 2 0 0 
CH 2010 GLP_2011 14 0 0 0 
DE 1970 CDU_1972 31 3 0 0 
DE 1970 FDP_1972 2 0 0 0 
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Country Decade Party-Year Total Statements Populist Statements Percentage Weighted Populism 
DE 1970 SPD_1972 56 3 0 0 
DE 1980 SPD_1983 65 20 30.76923 1998.154 
DE 1980 CDU_1983 36 3 0 0 
DE 1980 FDP_1983 45 2 0 0 
DE 1980 Grüne_1983 25 2 0 0 
DE 1990 Grüne_1994 149 26 17.44966 382.1477 
DE 1990 CDU_1994 42 1 0 0 
DE 1990 FDP_1994 191 7 0 0 
DE 1990 SPD_1994 54 6 0 0 
DE 2000 SPD_2002 112 6 5.357143 412.5 
DE 2000 FDP_2002 115 5 4.347826 67.56522 
DE 2000 CDU_2002 91 3 3.296703 184.7802 
DE 2000 Grüne_2002 129 2 0 0 
DE 2010 Grüne_2013 54 22 40.74074 821.3333 
DE 2010 Linke_2013 120 34 28.33333 1169.6 
DE 2010 SPD_2013 135 33 24.44444 1382.089 
DE 2010 CDU_2013 37 0 0 0 
FR 1970 PS_1973 228 35 15.35088 2718.948 
FR 1970 UMP_1973 95 15 15.78947 476.8421 
FR 1980 PCF_1981 69 13 18.84058 1210.696 
FR 1980 UMP_1981 74 11 14.86486 561.8919 
FR 1980 PS_1981 43 1 0 0 
FR 1990 PCF_1997 71 5 7.042254 261.6338 
FR 1990 LO_1995 28 0 0 0 
FR 1990 PS_1997 72 10 0 0 
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Country Decade Party-Year Total Statements Populist Statements Percentage Weighted Populism 
FR 1990 UMP_1993 130 8 0 0 
FR 1990 FN_1997 17 0 0 0 
FR 1990 UDF_1997 23 1 0 0 
FR 2000 UDF_2002 117 17 14.52991 187.7265 
FR 2000 FN_2002 164 22 13.41463 1337.573 
FR 2000 LO_2002 33 0 0 0 
FR 2000 PS_2002 76 6 0 0 
FR 2000 EELV_2002 60 1 0 0 
FR 2000 UMP_2002 35 1 0 0 
FR 2010 EELV_2012 149 20 13.42282 183.2215 
FR 2010 MoDem_2012 78 8 10.25641 102.6667 
FR 2010 FN_2012 116 3 2.586207 273.1293 
FR 2010 PS_2012 94 2 0 0 
FR 2010 UMP_2012 40 1 0 0 
ITA 1970 PCI_1972 20 3 15 1178.85 
ITA 1970 PSI_1972 5 2 0 0 
ITA 1970 MSI-DN_1983 364 51 14.01099 104.8022 
ITA 1980 PCI_1983 515 24 4.660194 236.8777 
ITA 1980 PSI_1983 274 7 2.554745 49.51095 
ITA 1980 PRI_1983 486 11 2.263374 11.54321 
ITA 1980 DC_1983 102 4 0 0 
ITA 1980 MSI-DN_1994 121 18 14.87603 340.6463 
ITA 1990 MSI-DN_1994 53 7 13.20755 458.0377 
ITA 1990 FI_1994 118 13 11.01695 1110.508 
ITA 1990 LN_1994 112 10 8.928571 142.5 
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Country Decade Party-Year Total Statements Populist Statements Percentage Weighted Populism 
ITA 1990 PRC_1994 85 3 3.529412 72.6 
ITA 1990 PPI_1994 26 2 0 0 
ITA 1990 M5S_2013 38 7 18.42105 330.1053 
ITA 2010 M5S_2013 38 7 18.42105 330.1053 
ITA 2010 PD_2013 45 5 11.11111 677.3333 
ITA 2010 PDL_2013 68 5 7.352941 428.8235 
ITA 2010 SC_2013 38 5 0 0 
NL 1970 ARP_1971 104 15 14.42308 306 
NL 1970 PvdA_1971 61 2 3.278689 492.2951 
NL 1970 VVD_1971 98 0 0 0 
NL 1970 KVP_1971 40 0 0 0 
NL 1980 PvdA_1982 87 11 12.64368 1191.54 
NL 1980 VVD_1982 63 2 0 0 
NL 1980 CDA_1982 8 0 0 0 
NL 1990 VVD_1994 83 12 14.45783 722.8916 
NL 1990 D66_1994 128 17 13.28125 370.5469 
NL 1990 PvdA_1994 7 0 0 0 
NL 1990 CDA_1994 9 0 0 0 
NL 2000 GL_2002 156 44 28.20513 681.1538 
NL 2000 LPF_2002 25 5 20 1496 
NL 2000 CDA_2002 87 9 10.34483 603.931 
NL 2000 SP_2002 91 9 9.89011 256.7473 
NL 2000 D66_2002 137 11 8.029197 57.32847 
NL 2000 PvdA_2002 110 8 7.272727 219.6364 
NL 2000 VVD_2002 84 3 3.571429 187 
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Country Decade Party-Year Total Statements Populist Statements Percentage Weighted Populism 
NL 2010 PVV_2012 116 20 17.24138 922.931 
NL 2010 PvdA_2012 308 23 7.467532 425.9481 
NL 2010 SP_2012 134 9 6.716418 322.3881 
NL 2010 CDA_2012 109 5 4.587156 109.1743 
NL 2010 VVD_2012 162 7 4.320988 448.2593 
NL 2010 D66_2012 222 5 2.252252 28.82883 
SE 1970 C_1973 33 1 0 0 
SE 1970 FP_1973 32 0 0 0 
SE 1970 M_1973 5 0 0 0 
SE 1970 S_1973 5 0 0 0 
SE 1970 V_1973 12 1 0 0 
SE 1980 C_1982 53 0 0 0 
SE 1980 FP_1982 15 0 0 0 
SE 1980 M_1982 17 0 0 0 
SE 1980 S_1982 16 0 0 0 
SE 1980 V_1982 33 1 0 0 
SE 1990 C_1994 23 0 0 0 
SE 1990 FP_1994 38 0 0 0 
SE 1990 MP_1994 32 2 0 0 
SE 1990 M_1994 32 2 0 0 
SE 1990 S_1994 34 0 0 0 
SE 1990 V_1994 28 2 0 0 
SE 2000 C_2002 25 0 0 0 
SE 2000 FP_2002 37 0 0 0 
SE 2000 KD_2002 82 2 0 0 
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Country Decade Party-Year Total Statements Populist Statements Percentage Weighted Populism 
SE 2000 M_2002 61 1 0 0 
SE 2000 S_2002 37 0 0 0 
SE 2000 V_2002 75 2 0 0 
SE 2010 SD_2014 52 3 5.769231 282.8077 
SE 2010 C_2014 7 0 0 0 
SE 2010 FP_2014 11 0 0 0 
SE 2010 MP_2014 9 1 0 0 
SE 2010 S_2014 58 3 0 0 
SE 2010 V_2014 76 5 0 0 
SE 2010 _2014 175 1 0 0 
UK 1970 Liberal Democrats_1974 58 6 10.34483 397.5517 
UK 1970 Con_1974 88 9 10.22727 475.9773 
UK 1970 Labour_1974 79 7 8.860759 1319.899 
UK 1980 SDP/Alliance_1983 127 12 9.448819 478.1102 
UK 1980 Labour_1983 169 15 8.87574 1200.355 
UK 1980 Con_1983 83 4 4.819277 796.9157 
UK 1990 Labour_1992 53 4 7.54717 1038.491 
UK 1990 Liberal Democrats_1992 147 10 6.802721 387.483 
UK 1990 Con_1992 219 7 3.196347 508.9224 
UK 2000 Con_2001 159 23 14.46541 1696.648 
UK 2000 Liberal Democrats_2001 255 23 9.019608 363.1294 
UK 2000 Labour_2001 86 7 0 0 
UK 2010 Liberal Democrats_2010 83 12 14.45783 332.5301 
UK 2010 Con_2010 133 19 14.28571 1598.714 
UK 2010 Labour_2010 104 5 0 0 
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Table 38 – Populism by Country-Decade Raw and Weighted (A.O.) 
Country Decade 
Right-Wing 
Populism 
Left-Wing 
Populism Total Populism 
Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy 
AT 1990s 2293.302 1.0 0 0.1 2293.302 0.9 
AT 2000s 231.6547 0.2 1386.018 1.0 1617.672 0.8 
AT 2010s 634.0168 0.6 417.4357 0.7 1051.452 0.7 
CH 1990s 1002.231 0.8 79.24528 0.1 1081.476 0.7 
CH 2000s 4722.55 1.0 462.1488 0.8 5184.699 1.0 
CH 2010s 914.375 0.7 1952.754 1.0 2867.129 1.0 
DE 1990s 0 0.1 382.1477 0.7 382.1477 0.2 
DE 2000s 252.3454 0.2 412.5 0.7 664.8454 0.5 
DE 2010s 0 0.1 3373.022 1.0 3373.022 1.0 
FR 1990s 0 0.1 261.6338 0.5 261.6338 0.1 
FR 2000s 1525.3 0.9 0 0.1 1525.3 0.8 
FR 2010s 375.796 0.3 183.2215 0.3 559.0175 0.4 
IT 1990s 2051.692 1.0 72.6 0.1 2124.292 0.9 
IT 2010s 758.9288 0.7 NA 1.0 1766.367 0.9 
NL 1990s 722.8916 0.6 1007.439 0.7 1093.438 0.7 
NL 2000s 2286.931 1.0 370.5469 1.0 3501.797 1.0 
NL 2010s 1509.193 0.9 1214.866 0.9 2257.53 0.9 
SE 1990s 0 0.1 748.3361 0.1 0 0.1 
SE 2000s 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 
SE 2010s 282.8077 0.2 0 0.1 282.8077 0.2 
UK 1990s 508.9224 0.5 0 1.0 1934.896 0.9 
UK 2000s 1696.648 0.9 1425.974 0.6 2059.777 0.9 
UK 2010s 1598.714 0.9 363.1294 0.6 1931.244 0.9 
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Figure 37: Populism in Manifestos (A.O.) 
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Figure 38: Populism in Manifestos Weighted (A.O.) 
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Figure 39: Populism in Countries (A.O.) 
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Figure 40: Populism in Countries Weighted (A.O.) 
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Appendix 11 – All Solutions without Stigma (A.O.) 
 
Table 39 – Solutions Total Populism without Stigma (A.O.)160 
Conservative Solutions for Total Populism 
 
M1: C*D + c*E + D*CNVG + c*d*cnvg => POP_CAL5 
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------  
1  C*D       0.881  0.824  0.463  0.026  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95
,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
2  c*E       0.871  0.792  0.453  0.073  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,
UK_95; AT_13  
3  D*CNVG    0.914  0.869  0.493  0.052  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95
,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
4  c*d*cnvg  0.820  0.720  0.337  0.027  CH_03; NL_12,SE_94  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------  
   M1        0.831  0.775  0.727  
 
Intermediate Solution for Total Populism 
 
M1:    E + C*D + d*cnvg + D*CNVG => POP_CAL5  
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------  
1  E       0.831  0.766  0.610  0.097  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK
_95; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
2  C*D     0.881  0.824  0.463  0.013  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
3  d*cnvg  0.833  0.747  0.369  0.033  CH_03; NL_12,SE_94  
4  D*CNVG  0.914  0.869  0.493  0.043  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------  
   M1      0.820  0.765  0.756  
 
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism 
 
M1: C + E + d*cnvg + D*CNVG => POP_CAL5 
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------  
1  C       0.886  0.838  0.516  0.029  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
2  E       0.831  0.766  0.610  0.086  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK
_95; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
3  d*cnvg  0.833  0.747  0.369  0.027  CH_03; NL_12,SE_94  
4  D*CNVG  0.914  0.869  0.493  0.043  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------  
   M1      0.822  0.769  0.773  
                                                          
160 Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non-
membership, crossover point and full membership): 0 – 665 – 2294. To determine the 
configurations of the truth table considered as sufficient for the outcome the inclusion cut is 
.85. The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma. 
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Table 40 – Solutions Right-Wing Populism without Stigma (A.O) 161 
 
Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: C*D + D*CNVG + c*E*CNVG => POP_CAL5 
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------  
1  C*D       0.728  0.614  0.472  0.076  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95
,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
2  D*CNVG    0.808  0.721  0.538  0.065  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95
,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
3  c*E*CNVG  0.822  0.680  0.380  0.069  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------  
   M1        0.763  0.665  0.682  
 
Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1:    C*D + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5  
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------  
1  C*D     0.728  0.614  0.472  0.076  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
2  D*CNVG  0.808  0.721  0.538  0.054  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
3  E*CNVG  0.829  0.732  0.521  0.069  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT
_13,UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------  
   M1      0.762  0.663  0.682  
 
Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: C + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5 
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------  
1  C       0.752  0.646  0.540  0.113  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
2  D*CNVG  0.808  0.721  0.538  0.054  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
3  E*CNVG  0.829  0.732  0.521  0.039  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT
_13,UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------  
   M1      0.770  0.680  0.720  
 
                                                          
161 Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non-
membership, crossover point and full membership): 0 – 509 – 1697. To determine the 
configurations of the truth table that are considered as sufficient for the outcome the inclusion 
cut is .77. The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma. 
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Table 41 – Solutions Left-Wing Populism without Stigma (A.O.) 162 
 
Conservative Solution for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: c*D + D*CNVG + c*E*CNVG => POP_CAL5 
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------  
1  c*D       0.824  0.711  0.535  0.167  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; 
AT_13  
2  D*CNVG    0.746  0.608  0.485  0.116  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95
,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
3  c*E*CNVG  0.830  0.687  0.375  0.054  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------  
   M1        0.740  0.636  0.706  
 
Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1:    c*D + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5  
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------  
1  c*D     0.824  0.711  0.535  0.167  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; A
T_13  
2  D*CNVG  0.746  0.608  0.485  0.029  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
3  E*CNVG  0.757  0.616  0.465  0.056  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT
_13,UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------  
   M1      0.741  0.637  0.708  
 
Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: c*D + E*CNVG + (C*CNVG) => POP_CAL5  
M2: c*D + E*CNVG + (D*CNVG) => POP_CAL5  
 
                                -------------------  
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------  
1  c*D     0.824  0.711  0.535  0.167  0.205  0.167  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; 
DE_13,UK_95; AT_13  
2  E*CNVG  0.757  0.616  0.465  0.032  0.032  0.056  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------  
3  C*CNVG  0.784  0.645  0.408  0.000  0.022         DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,I
T_94,IT_13,UK_10  
4  D*CNVG  0.746  0.608  0.485  0.007         0.029  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,
FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10  
                                                          
162 Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non-
membership, crossover point and full membership): 0 – 262 – 749. To determine the 
configurations of the truth table that are considered as sufficient for the outcome the inclusion 
cut is .8. The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma. 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------  
   M1      0.749  0.646  0.701  
   M2      0.741  0.637  0.708  
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Appendix 12 – All Solutions with Stigma (A.O.) 
 
Table 42 – Solutions Total Populism with Stigma (A.O.) 
Conservative Solutions for Total Populism 
 
M1: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + c*
E*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5  
M2: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + D*
E*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5  
M3: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (c*E*CNVG*S + D*
e*cnvg*S) => POP_CAL5  
M4: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (D*e*cnvg*S + D*
E*CNVG*S) => POP_CAL5  
 
                                    ---------------------------------  
               incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   ca
ses  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------  
1  C*D*CNVG    0.912  0.860  0.372  0.020  0.020  0.020  0.020  0.020  DE
_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
2  c*d*S       0.932  0.895  0.417  0.062  0.062  0.081  0.086  0.122  CH
_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11  
3  C*D*S       0.886  0.832  0.397  0.027  0.029  0.029  0.027  0.027  AT
_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
4  c*E*cnvg*s  0.868  0.766  0.297  0.043  0.043  0.043  0.043  0.043  SE
_94; DE_13,UK_95  
5  D*e*CNVG*s  0.933  0.847  0.285  0.012  0.012  0.012  0.012  0.012  UK
_03; DE_02  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------  
6  c*e*cnvg*S  0.916  0.856  0.315  0.003  0.012  0.012                CH
_03; AT_02  
7  c*E*CNVG*S  0.952  0.903  0.299  0.003  0.011         0.011         CH
_95,CH_11; AT_13  
8  D*e*cnvg*S  0.922  0.860  0.287  0.008                0.017  0.017  AT
_02; AT_94  
9  D*E*CNVG*S  0.930  0.877  0.339  0.000         0.008         0.008  AT
_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------  
   M1          0.871  0.828  0.747  
   M2          0.871  0.827  0.744  
   M3          0.872  0.829  0.752  
   M4          0.871  0.828  0.749  
 
Intermediate Solution for Total Populism 
 
M1:    E + S + D*CNVG => POP_CAL5  
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------  
1  E       0.831  0.766  0.610  0.058  SE_94; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,U
K_95; AT_13; UK_10; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
2  S       0.880  0.844  0.703  0.183  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; AT_02; NL_12; 
CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
3  D*CNVG  0.914  0.869  0.493  0.032  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------  
   M1      0.849  0.808  0.870  
 
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism 
 
M1: E + S + D*CNVG => POP_CAL5 
 
           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------  
1  E       0.831  0.766  0.610  0.058  SE_94; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,U
K_95; AT_13; FR_12; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
2  S       0.880  0.844  0.703  0.183  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,C
H_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
3  D*CNVG  0.914  0.869  0.493  0.032  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------  
   M1      0.849  0.808  0.870  
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Table 43 – Solutions Right-wing Populism with Stigma (A.O.) 
 
Conservative Solutions for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + c*E*S*CNVG) 
=> POP_CAL5  
M2: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) 
=> POP_CAL5  
M3: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (c*E*S*CNVG + D*e*S*cnvg) 
=> POP_CAL5  
M4: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (D*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) 
=> POP_CAL5  
 
                                      ---------------------------------  
                 incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   (M3)   (M4)   
cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------  
1  c*d*S         0.873  0.799  0.482  0.076  0.076  0.100  0.105  0.173  
CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11  
2  C*D*S         0.786  0.677  0.434  0.043  0.045  0.045  0.043  0.043  
AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
3  C*D*E*CNVG    0.816  0.708  0.365  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025  
UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
4  c*D*e*s*CNVG  0.804  0.620  0.279  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  
UK_03  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------  
5  c*e*S*cnvg    0.805  0.657  0.341  0.000  0.000  0.000                
CH_03; AT_02  
6  c*E*S*CNVG    0.918  0.832  0.355  0.001  0.011         0.011         
CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
7  D*e*S*cnvg    0.800  0.665  0.307  0.010                0.010  0.010  
AT_02; AT_94  
8  D*E*S*CNVG    0.889  0.804  0.399  0.000         0.010         0.010  
AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------  
   M1            0.785  0.703  0.742  
   M2            0.787  0.705  0.741  
   M3            0.790  0.711  0.752  
   M4            0.792  0.713  0.751  
 
Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1:    S + c*D*CNVG + D*E*CNVG => POP_CAL5  
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------  
1  S         0.786  0.709  0.775  0.341  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95
,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
2  c*D*CNVG  0.823  0.695  0.360  0.014  UK_03; AT_13  
3  D*E*CNVG  0.832  0.733  0.452  0.029  AT_13; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------  
   M1        0.769  0.695  0.842  
 
Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: S + c*D*CNVG + (C*E) => POP_CAL5  
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M2: S + c*D*CNVG + (E*CNVG) => POP_CAL5  
 
                                  -------------------  
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-  
1  S         0.786  0.709  0.775  0.216  0.254  0.273  CH_03; NL_94,NL_02
; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_1
3  
2  c*D*CNVG  0.823  0.695  0.360  0.014  0.019  0.014  UK_03; AT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-  
3  C*E       0.768  0.637  0.452  0.000  0.018         UK_10; FR_12; FR_9
5,IT_94,IT_13  
4  E*CNVG    0.829  0.732  0.521  0.012         0.030  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-  
   M1        0.764  0.688  0.831  
   M2        0.762  0.686  0.843  
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Table 44 – Solutions Left-Wing Populism with Stigma (A.O.) 
 
Conservative Solutions for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: c*d*CNVG*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (c*D*e*s) => POP_
CAL5  
M2: c*d*CNVG*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (D*e*CNVG*s) => P
OP_CAL5  
 
                                    -------------------  
               incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (M1)   (M2)   cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------  
1  c*d*CNVG*S  0.822  0.707  0.350  0.056  0.056  0.056  NL_94,NL_02; CH_
95,CH_11  
2  c*D*cnvg*s  0.820  0.703  0.362  0.049  0.049  0.128  DE_94; DE_13,UK_
95  
3  C*D*CNVG*s  0.918  0.822  0.307  0.029  0.055  0.029  DE_02; UK_10  
4  c*E*CNVG*S  0.828  0.668  0.313  0.017  0.017  0.017  CH_95,CH_11; AT_
13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------  
5  c*D*e*s     0.846  0.709  0.377  0.000  0.014         DE_94; UK_03  
6  D*e*CNVG*s  0.878  0.761  0.323  0.000         0.014  UK_03; DE_02  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------  
   M1          0.849  0.773  0.636  
   M2          0.849  0.773  0.636  
 
Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1:    D*s + c*CNVG*S => POP_CAL5  
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------  
1  D*s       0.843  0.742  0.508  0.260  DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02
; UK_10  
2  c*CNVG*S  0.834  0.729  0.399  0.151  NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------  
   M1        0.838  0.763  0.660  
 
Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: D*s + c*CNVG*S => POP_CAL5 
 
             incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------  
1  D*s       0.843  0.742  0.508  0.260  DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02
; UK_10  
2  c*CNVG*S  0.834  0.729  0.399  0.151  NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------  
   M1        0.838  0.763  0.660 
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Appendix 13 – Robustness test without "Convergence" (A.O.) 
 
Table 45 – Robustness Test without "Convergence" (A.O.) With Stigma 
Parsimonious Solutions for Total Populism 
 
M1: S + C*E => POP_CAL5 
 
        incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------  
1  S    0.881  0.843  0.758  0.350  CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; 
AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94  
2  C*E  0.913  0.871  0.441  0.033  UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------  
   M1   0.854  0.810  0.792  
 
Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: S + C*E => POP_CAL5 
 
        incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------  
1  S    0.885  0.850  0.773  0.330  CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; 
AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13  
2  C*E  0.910  0.871  0.474  0.031  UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------  
   M1   0.856  0.815  0.804  
 
Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: c*S + D*S + C*D*E => POP_CAL5 
 
          incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------  
1  c*S    0.879  0.822  0.555  0.163  CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_1
2; AT_02; AT_13  
2  D*S    0.877  0.819  0.533  0.039  AT_02; AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR
_12,IT_94  
3  C*D*E  0.906  0.859  0.405  0.033  UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------  
   M1     0.849  0.800  0.729  
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Table 46 – Robustness Test without "Convergence" (A.O.) Without Stigma 
 
Parsimonious Solutions for Total Populism 
 
M1: C => POP_CAL5 
 
       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----  
1  C   0.895  0.849  0.542    -    AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,U
K_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----  
   M1  0.895  0.849  0.542  
 
 
Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism 
 
M1: C => POP_CAL5 
 
       incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------  
1  C   0.895  0.851  0.569    -    AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,I
T_13,UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------  
   M1  0.895  0.851  0.569  
 
Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism 
 
M1: C*D => POP_CAL5 
 
        incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----  
1  C*D  0.883  0.825  0.478    -    AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,
UK_10  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----  
   M1   0.883  0.825  0.478  
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Appendix 14 – Statistical significance (A.O.)  
 
Table 47 – Statistical Significance Unweighted Populism (A.O.) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Percentage of populist statements in manifestos 
 
        All Parties                            Mainstream Parties 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 6.28* 9.84*** 6.84*** 8.26*** 
 (2.57) (2.56) (2.07) (2.08) 
1970s 0.15 -3.41 0.13 -1.29 
 (1.91) (1.87) (1.75) (1.76) 
1980s 0.46 -3.10 1.52 0.10 
 (1.78) (1.76) (1.70) (1.70) 
1990s  -3.56*  -1.42 
  (1.62)  (1.62) 
2000s 2.08 -1.48 2.15 0.74 
 (1.72) (1.68) (1.69) (1.69) 
2010s 3.56*  1.42  
 (1.62)  (1.62)  
Length (cent) 2.35 2.35 1.04 1.04 
 (1.42) (1.42) (1.40) (1.40) 
AIC 1175.98 1175.98 734.37 734.37 
BIC 1223.36 1223.36 775.93 775.93 
Log Likelihood -572.99 -572.99 -352.19 -352.19 
Num. Obs. 174 174 118 118 
Num. Groups: Parties 65 65 41 41 
Var: Parties (Intercept) 6.01 6.01 2.53 2.53 
Var: Residual 51.59 51.59 32.44 32.44 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party 
manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). 
The observations are 174 because the 5 Star Movement's manifesto is coded both 
as left-wing and right-wing. 
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Table 48 – Statistical Significance Weighted Populism (A.O.) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Percentage of populist statements in manifestos (weighted) 
 
   All Parties                            Mainstream Parties 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 627.56*** 709.90*** 684.51*** 754.66*** 
 (155.77) (154.49) (147.45) (147.92) 
1970s -48.84 -131.17 -89.52 -159.66 
 (131.76) (128.56) (122.85) (123.39) 
1980s 42.76 -39.57 56.13 -14.01 
 (123.50) (120.78) (119.11) (119.17) 
1990s  -82.33  -70.14 
  (111.17)  (113.83) 
2000s 169.58 87.25 80.53 10.39 
 (119.66) (116.13) (118.57) (118.70) 
2010s 82.33  70.14  
 (111.17)  (113.83)  
Length_cent 91.46 91.46 -41.70 -41.70 
 (96.57) (96.57) (98.63) (98.63) 
AIC 2531.65 2531.65 1627.78 1627.78 
BIC 2579.04 2579.04 1669.34 1669.34 
Log Likelihood -1250.83 -1250.83 -798.89 -798.89 
Num. Obs. 174 174 118 118 
Num. Groups: 
Parties 65 65 41 41 
Var: Parties 
(Intercept) 1851.03 1851.02 14320.56 14320.56 
Var: Residual 253744.57 253744.58 159640.72 159640.72 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party 
manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). 
 
